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Abstract 
Whistle-blowing has garnered widespread attention in many countries, including the 
U.K. Whistle-blowing has been seen as one of the most effective ways to cater with 
illegal and unethical practices in organisations. Whistle-blowing describes the action 
of a worker disclosing (internally or externally) questionable practices, from within 
an organisation, to the parties that can take remedial actions. Nevertheless, whistle-
blowing is a risky action where the worker might lose his/her job for making the 
disclosure. In the early years of whistle-blowing practice, not much whistle-blowing 
protection legislation has been introduced. In the U.K. whistle-blowing protection 
legislation, known as the Public Interest Disclosure Act, was only enacted in 1998. 
Since then, various amendments to the Act have been made to give better protection 
to whistle-blowers. Many other policies have been introduced by policy makers in an 
effort to encourage whistle-blowing practice. Nevertheless, it is still an action that an 
individual might be disinclined to undertake. 
The purpose of this study is to identify factors that influence internal auditors in the 
U.K. to blow the whistle. Seven individual-level, independent variables (attitude, 
injunctive norm, descriptive norm, perceived behavioural control, self-efficacy, 
organisational professional conflict and awareness of the whistle-blowing protection 
legislation) are examined for their relationship with the dependent variable (intention 
to blow the whistle). Moral intensity is examined for its moderating effect on the 
relationships that exist between the seven independent variables and the dependent 
variable.  
Multiple regression analysis found positive and significant relationships involving 
six independent variables and the dependent variable. The six independent variables 
are attitude, injunctive norm, perceived behavioural control, self-efficacy, 
organisational-professional conflict and awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation. The moderated multiple regressions found significant moderating effects 
of moral intensity in a relationship between injunctive norm and whistle-blowing 
intention, and descriptive norm and whistle-blowing intention.  
Overall, the findings suggest that, individual-level variables also play significant role 
in determining internal auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. Relative to individual-
level variables, organizational-level and situational level variables have received 
much attention among researchers in the past. Therefore, the findings suggest that 
future researches should also put emphasis and consideration on individual-level 
variables along with organizational and situational level variables in their future 
work. Also, intention to whistle-blow among internal auditors in the U.K. is high 
especially in a scenario involving a wrongdoing that may harm public safety than in 
scenario involving falsified invoices and collusion and tiers of hierarchy. The spirit 
of whistle-blowing can be infused if more efforts were taken by government, media 
and many other parties. The efforts include promoting the encouragement for 
whistle-blowing and institutionalise effective whistle-blowing policies and 
procedures in organizations.    
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Background 
1.0 Introduction 
Organisational wrongdoings are frequently reported across the world in the media 
and have caught public attention. The reported organisational wrongdoings involve 
severe and serious cases such as; financial reporting fraud (Enron and WorldCom); 
negligence in performing tasks that may affect the safety of the public (Liverpool’s 
Alder Hey Hospital and Bristol Royal Infirmary); fraudulent trading and money 
laundering (HBOS); producing hazardous products (Food and Drug Administration, 
AstraZeneca, GlaxoSmithKline), among others, that could affect public interest. In 
the abovementioned cases, the wrongdoings were detected through whistle-blowing.  
Whistle-blowing has been identified as a source of information on wrongdoings or 
questionable practices that have occurred in the organisation. Through whistle-
blowing it is hoped that management teams or any parties who have power and 
authority can take remedial action. According to Hooks, Kaplan, and Schultz (1994) 
whistle-blowing is generally known as a management tool to deter and detect any 
wrongdoings in organisations. In the U.K., the Chartered Institute of Auditors 
describes whistle-blowing as a situation when an employee, contractor or supplier 
goes outside the normal management channels to report suspected wrongdoing at 
work (Chartered Institute of Auditors, 2014). Whistle-blowing reporting can be done 
via internal processes, set up by an organisation (internal whistle-blowing), or to an 
external party such as a regulator (external whistle-blowing). 
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From the above whistle-blowing cases, there are two lessons that can be learnt. First, 
despite the heroic action of whistle-blowers to stop organisational wrongdoings, the 
whistle-blowing action may bring harm to whistle-blowers. For example, they may 
face reprisals from their peers and superiors. Second, it needs the whistle-blower to 
make a critical decision for blowing the whistle. This has attracted the interest of 
researchers to examine factors that may influence organisational staff members to 
blow the whistle.  
The objective of this study is to examine factors (individual level) that may influence 
whistle-blowing intentions among internal auditors in the U.K. This study tests a 
conceptual model of factors that are likely to influence whistle-blowing intentions 
using a quantitative approach.  
In the first section of this chapter the background to the study is presented. In the 
second and third sections the motivations of the study and research objectives are put 
forward respectively. In the fourth section the conceptual framework for the research 
is explained. In the fifth section the boundaries of the present study are considered. 
In the sixth section, whistle-blowing practice in the U.K. context is discussed. 
Finally, the organisation of this thesis is presented in the last section.   
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1.1 Background to the study 
In the early 2000s the world was shocked by the U.S.A. whistle-blowing cases of 
Enron and WorldCom. In these two cases, the accounting scandals and fraud 
practices led to the collapse of both companies. The whistle-blowers in both Enron 
and WorldCom were positively rewarded in the media for their brave actions in 
revealing the dirty work of their co-workers. Although their actions have been 
rewarded and recognised in the media, they were not exempt from paying a price for 
their actions, which included receiving retaliations from their work colleagues and 
superiors.   
In the U.K., the accounting scandal in Tesco and the financial scandal in West 
London Mental Health NHS Trust are among two recent whistle-blowing cases. To 
date, both cases are still under investigation. Although the outcomes of these cases 
are not readily known, the capacity of the whistle-blowers to blow the whistle is 
more important and attracts attention.  
Whistle-blowing cases reported in the media have shown how whistle-blowers were 
put under stressful situations in confronting those who were against their whistle-
blowing actions. In most cases, challenges are received from their own superiors and 
peers. For example, Mr. Jesudason and Dr. Stephen Bolsin, the whistle-blowers in 
Liverpool’s Alder Hey Hospital and Bristol Royal Infirmary respectively, lost their 
jobs and have never been employed in the NHS since the scandal. Not only that, 
ramifications, such as being harassed and facing hostility and resentment from peers 
and superiors, are always the price that whistle-blowers need to pay for their actions. 
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At the end of the journey there is no guarantee that their life will be back to normal. 
The impact on the whistle-blower’s life, and that of their loved ones, is huge. There 
is always a possibility that they will find difficulties in getting a new job and a 
destroyed career and financial ruin are some of the worst experiences whistle-
blowers may face. The above descriptions give a wide picture on the complexity of 
the whistle-blowing phenomenon.   
Illegal and/or unethical cases (also called wrongdoing cases) in organisations exist in 
various forms. Frauds, corruptions, accounting or auditing irregularities, abuse of 
power, waste and mismanagement and producing or selling unsafe products to the 
public are among the most common wrongdoings in organisations. Over the years 
organisation wrongdoing cases across the world have increased (Bowen, Call, & 
Rajgopal, 2010) and these are expected to continue to occur in the future. Therefore 
whistle-blowing reporting is increasingly important in many societies and 
encouraging whistle-blowing practice is one of the ways organisations portray good 
governance (Eaton & Akers, 2007). 
In most situations, having information on any wrongdoings in organisations might 
not necessarily put individuals in a good and easy situation, especially those who 
have serious concern on the consequences of the wrongdoings and those who have 
responsibilities to report the wrongdoings, such as internal auditors. An awareness of 
the risks or ramifications they might encounter if they blow the whistle puts them 
into a dilemma of what action they should take. ‘Should I keep silent or voice my 
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concerns?’ and ‘Which welfare or interests should I consider most?’ are among the 
questions that may cross their minds.   
Although the basic idea of whistle-blowing has, in some ways, been accepted, the 
decision whether or not to blow the whistle involves a very complex decision process 
for the individual. Various factors may play their role in driving potential whistle-
blowers to the decision whether to blow or not to blow the whistle. This provides 
opportunities for researchers to investigate factors that influence whistle-blowing 
intention.   
A review of the literature shows that the subject of whistle-blowing has been 
progressively developed. This is partly caused by the increasing awareness, amongst 
scholars, of the importance of whistle-blowing, in addition to the advantages it brings 
to a wide range of entities such as organisations, investors, consumers and the public. 
Many scholars discuss various aspects of whistle-blowing such as; organisational 
whistle-blowing policy (Barnett, Cochran, & Taylor, 1993; Hassink, De Vries, & 
Bollen, 2007; Near & Dworkin, 1998; Tsahuridu & Vandekerckhove, 2008); national 
and international whistle-blowing protection legislation (Devine, 1999; Estlund, 
1992; Gobert & Punch, 2000; Kaplan, 2001; Lewis, 2001, 2008; Lewis & Uys, 2007; 
Vandekerckhove & Lewis, 2012; Vandekerckhove & Tsahuridu, 2010; Vickers, 
2000); and determinants of whistle-blowing intention (Chiu, 2003; Hwang, Staley, 
Te Chen, & Lan, 2008; Keil, Tiwana, Sainsbury, & Sneha, 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & 
Viswesvaran, 2005; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Park, Rehg, & Lee, 2005). These 
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papers discussed whistle-blowing in a manner that helps put the practice of whistle-
blowing at a higher place.  
Past research on whistle-blowing has been conducted in various lines of professions 
such as; police officers (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007); 
managers and executives (Keenan, 1990, 2000, 2002); nurses (Jackson et al., 2011; 
Mansbach & Bachner, 2010); external auditors (Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001; 
Maroun & Atkins, 2014; Taylor & Curtis, 2010); accountants (Hwang et al., 2008; 
Liyanarachchi & Adler, 2011; Patel, 2003); and internal auditors (Arnold & 
Ponemon, 1991; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008). As reported in the literature, whistle-
blowing reporting is a very risky action to be taken by any staff member, including 
internal auditors, due to the various possible incoming challenges and risks they may 
face, including reprisals (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991; 
Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008).   
Unlike external auditors, internal auditors have a wider scope of work in 
organisations. Through their work internal auditors are faced with broader 
opportunities to detect organisational wrongdoings. Internal auditors play important 
roles in organisational governance. Their roles include examining, evaluating and 
monitoring the adequacy and effectiveness of an organisation’s internal control 
structure.  
In performing their audit work, internal auditors may encounter situations or 
information involving suspicious and serious matters. As a consequence of having 
that information internal auditors have a responsibility or obligation to report the 
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matter to the organisation’s management. This responsibility, known as informing 
duty, is embedded in the role prescription of internal auditors (Near & Miceli, 1985). 
If the informing does not lead to remedial action from the person who has power and 
authority another option available for reporting the matter is via whistle-blowing. 
However, the whistle-blowing reporting is not included in the scope of responsibility 
of internal auditors. The decision to blow or not to blow the whistle depends greatly 
on the judgement of internal auditors as the whistle-blowing may impose risks. 
Informing and whistle-blowing should be seen as a series of reporting actions. 
Informing is a prescribed role of internal auditors and therefore is the first option on 
which internal auditors should embark in reporting suspicious matters. Whistle-
blowing, on the other hand, is not a prescribed role of internal auditors and should be 
regarded as an alternative option that internal auditors may take if the informing 
failed it purposes.   
Although literature regarding whistle-blowing in the past decades has started to 
consider internal auditors as the most qualified and reliable staff members to blow 
the whistle (Miceli et al., 1991), at present there are a limited number of whistle-
blowing studies that have been conducted in an internal auditing context. In addition, 
no empirical whistle-blowing studies in the internal audit profession have been 
conducted in the U.K. 
Previous studies on whistle-blowing, in an internal auditing context, have focused on 
organisational and situational level factors and the influences of individual-level 
factors have not been greatly investigated. The individual-level variables that are 
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frequently examined include the level of cognitive development (moral reasoning) 
and demographic characteristics. A considerable amount of the past research has 
used Kohlberg’s and Rest’s theory to investigate the association between levels of 
cognitive development of the individual and his/her whistle-blowing behaviour. In 
this study, drawing on the extended theory of planned behaviour (TPB), the 
influences of seven individual-level factors on the whistle-blowing intention are 
investigated. The seven independent variables are: attitudes towards whistle-blowing; 
injunctive norm; descriptive norm; perceived behavioural control; self-efficacy; 
organisational-professional conflict; and awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation. In addition, the moderating effect of moral intensity is examined. TPB is 
used because it helps explain intentions of behaviour. The theory has been widely 
used in behavioural research.   
1.1.1 Whistle-blowing in internal auditing context: a debated issue 
The relevance of internal auditors to blow the whistle has been debated by some 
scholars. Courtemanche (1988)  denied the relevance of internal auditors to whistle-
blow. His opinion was expressed in Vinten (1992a):  
internal auditors should not act as self-appointed watchdogs over the 
behaviour of their employers...internal auditors are not independent of 
management but independent because of management...[they]should bend with 
their management, even if the bending includes a figurative interpretation of 
laws, rules and regulations...(p. 8) 
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The author1 disagrees with the above arguments as the points contradict the functions 
of internal auditing. According to the IIA, internal auditing is:  
An independent and objective assurance and consulting activity that is guided 
by a philosophy of adding value to improve the operations of the organizations. 
It assists an organization in accomplishing its objective by bringing a 
systematic and disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness 
of the organization’s risk management, control and governing process (IIA, 
2013). 
The definition illustrates internal auditing as a profession that is entrusted to 
safeguard the interests of various parties. As a professional, internal auditors should 
always be independence and objective. In performing the tasks as internal auditors, 
all the trusts are run by ensuring that the organization are operating properly and 
looking for additional values for the organization. In addition, internal auditors 
should ensure there are no persecutions of any party to satisfy the personal needs of a 
person or a group of people within the organization. In other words, in performing its 
duties in an organization, not only the internal auditors have a responsibility towards 
the organization but also to the profession and other parties such as society in 
general. The above definition demonstrates that internal auditors have no obligations 
or responsibility for fulfilling the will of certain individuals, including management 
team members, but should bear their obligations and responsibilities to the 
organisation as an entity. The internal auditing function is established to help 
organisations to achieve objectives and sustain excellent performance. In other 
words, the functions of internal audit are more to adding value to organisations, such 
                                                 
1
 Author here refers to the author of this thesis. 
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as identifying rooms for operational improvements, and assessing organisational 
risks. An internal auditing function also helps organisations to mitigate such 
organisational risks and maintain high performance in the long run. In addition, 
internal auditing is a profession that emphasizes independent, objective and 
professional judgment (Umar & Anandarajan, 2004). Indeed, the nature of the 
auditing profession requires internal auditors to perform their work on 
professionalism and ethical grounds (Thorne, 1998). Therefore, having information 
about suspicious matters occurring in their workplace, internal auditors are 
responsible to inform the matters to the management team. If the informing brings to 
no remedial actions, internal auditors may proceed with whistle-blowing.   
The relevance of internal auditors to whistle-blow is also argued by Jubb (1999).  
Jubb insists that the duty to report matters which internal auditors encounter during 
their audit works is already within the role-prescription of internal auditors and is 
also within the internal auditors’ profession territory (Jubb, 1999). The duty to report, 
as claimed by Jubb in his article, refers to the ‘informing’ duty of internal auditors. 
The informing role basically involves reporting any suspicious matters found during 
their audit work to those in the normal chain of command in the organisation. The 
party in the chain of command here refers to those in the management team who can 
take appropriate action on the suspicious matters. If the informing results in no 
action, internal auditors may consider further communication of the information to 
persons outside the normal chain of command, and this action is referred to as 
“whistle-blowing”. Whistle-blowing normally occurs if the suspicious matters are 
generally serious, for example, matters involving illegal and/or unethical practices. 
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Furthermore, being in a group of honourable professions2 requires internal auditors 
to execute their duties with independence and objectivity. Their roles as internal 
auditors require them to take care of a group of stakeholders’ interests.  
There are two channels for whistle-blowing: internal and external. Regardless of 
which channel(s) is being used, the main reason to blow the whistle is to inform 
those with authority to remedy the illegal and/or unethical behaviour in their 
workplace. Internal whistle-blowing occurs when internal auditors report to the 
parties outside the normal chain of command within the organisations, for example, 
to the audit committee of the board. Alternatively, internal auditors can disclose the 
information to parties outside of the organisation and this is called external whistle-
blowing. As reported in the literature, potential whistle-blowers who trust their 
organisations’ whistle-blowing policies and investigation mechanism will first opt 
for internal channels of whistle-blowing (Barnett, 1992). Additionally, blowing the 
whistle externally might be viewed as a violation of business etiquette, employee 
loyalty, code of conduct and professional standards. The IIA requires internal 
auditors to avoid, if possible, disclosing sensitive information to the individuals 
outside of their organisation. As such, internal auditors should consider external 
whistle-blowing as their last resort. The above explanation is briefly illustrated in 
                                                 
2
 Internal auditing is recognized as an honourable profession due to the high entry qualification 
requirements; both academic and professional qualifications. They are also bounded with Professional 
Standards which summon them with Independence and Objectivity obligation. Independence guides 
them with ‘freedom’ which is vital for their unbiased judgement while Objectivity is to assist them not 
to be in any situation which may expose them with conflict of interest. Thirdly, they are required to 
continuously update their skills, knowledge and other competencies which may help them with their 
competence and due professional care. Lastly, the profession makes it compulsory for internal 
auditors to undergo continuing professional development (IIA, 2009). 
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Figure 1.1. There is a debate of whether or not internal channel should be included in 
whistle-blowing reporting. In this study, whistle-blowing reporting includes both 
internal and external channels and discussion on this matter is discussed in section 
2.1.  
Figure 1.1: Reporting channel options 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Audit work 
Identify any suspicious matters occurring in the organization. 
Inform the management line (informing) 
Blow the whistle 
First communication channel:  
Internal whistle-blowing: 
Raise a concern to person outside 
the normal chain but within the 
organization such as audit 
committee. 
Second communication channel: 
External whistle-blowing: 
Raise a concern to outsiders such as 
regulators and media. 
What should internal 
auditors do? 
If no actions are taken and 
the matters are 
‘sufficiently’ serious, what 
other options? 
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1.1.2 Whistle-blowers and the loyalty issue  
According to Near and Miceli (1985), whistle-blowers are members of organisations. 
This has subsequently raised the issue of loyalty between whistle-blowers and 
organisations. The loyalty issue has been discussed by various scholars (see Jubb, 
1999; Lewis, 2011). For the purpose of this study, considering there are two main 
employment positions of internal auditor, in-house and outsourced, the term 
‘organisational members’ is used rather than ‘employees’.  
According to Larmer, Duska asserts that loyalty arises in a reciprocal relationship 
where there is a mutual surrendering of self-interest (Larmer, 1992). Duska also 
argued that organisational members have no prima facie duty to be loyal to the 
organisation where they are working (Larmer, 1992). This is based on his 
justification that an organisation is only an object and its primary aim is profit 
maximisation (this applies to private sector). This implies that, from the 
organisation’s side, it is quite impossible for organisations to surrender their self-
interests for the benefit of their members. Duska then concludes that there is no 
loyalty involvement in the relationship between organisational members and their 
organisations, thus whistle-blowing behaviour by organisational members does not 
have any moral justification on which to be argued (Larmer, 1992; Vandekerckhove 
& Commers, 2004).  
In his counter argument to Duska’s view, Larmer (1992) claimed that loyalty does 
not necessarily involve reciprocal relationship. According to Larmer (1992), 
organisations deserve loyalty from their organisational members. In his paper, 
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Larmer points out three key points to explain the context in which loyalty applies. 
First, loyalty to organisations does not necessarily mean organisational members are 
refrained from reporting any immoral actions that took place in their workplace. 
Larmer added that organisational members who blow the whistle are not disloyal to 
the organisation. In fact, the action is regarded as more loyal. This is because by 
blowing the whistle, the organisational members prevent their employers from 
engaging in self-destructive behaviour. The second point is that loyal organisational 
members should try to resolve the problem internally without interventions from 
outsiders. In other words, staff should whistle internally first before bringing the 
matters to external parties. By this way, opportunities are given to the organisation to 
resolve the problem. Lastly, loyalty is more than a consideration of justice. In his 
paper, Larmer put forward his opinion that punishment is not the right way to punish 
disloyalty. Larmer (1992) also added that the loyalty spirit should supposedly 
encourage staff to continuously ensure the organisation is free from any problems. 
Continuous efforts should also be taken by organisational members to ensure 
problems in organisations do not escalate. In a situation when whistle-blowing 
becomes necessary, the action should be regarded as a positive action. The whistle-
blowing action is taken with an aim to help the organisation (Larmer, 1992).  
In their article, Vandekerckhove and Commers (2004) introduce the concept of 
‘rational loyalty’ in the whistle-blowing context. This  refers to the loyalty to the 
organisation’s explicit set of mission statements, goals, value statement and code of 
conduct, which are judged as legitimate, which organisational members  advocate 
(Lewis, 2011; Vandekerckhove & Commers, 2004). In this sense, loyalty does not 
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apply to the physical aspects of the organisation, such as the executives, board of 
directors and colleagues (Lewis, 2011; Vandekerckhove & Commers, 2004). 
According to Lewis (2011), a loyal person is a person who is ‘true to obligations’ (p. 
77) and in a situation when an organisation departs from its explicit mission, goals 
and values, the ‘rational loyalty’ would justify the necessities of whistle-blowing and 
organisational members do not have any loyalty concerns towards their organisation 
that involve  any questionable practices or wrongdoings. 
1.1.3 The relevance of internal auditors to blow the whistle   
The literature in this field reveals that there has been an increase in attention on the 
internal auditing function (Subramaniam, Carey, Soh, & Martinov-Bennie, 2011). 
This is also the current scenario in the U.K. (Allegrini, D'Onza, Paape, Melville, & 
Sarens, 2006). The internal auditing function has been given a new recognition and  
the internal auditor is one of the four pillars of an organisation’s good governance 
(Karagiorgos, Drogalas, Gotzamanis, & Tampakoudis, 2010) alongside non-
executive directors, executive management and external auditor. Davies (2009) 
asserts that an effective internal auditing function is one of the elements that enables 
organisations to survive. Overall, internal auditors are in a position that may affect 
others’ decisions and it is essential that internal auditors blow the whistle in a 
situation that requires them to do so. 
Internal auditing is a profession that comes with prestige and trustworthiness. The 
profession requires auditors to pursue their responsibilities as stated in the 
professional standards and codes of ethics. The IIA’s Code of Ethics requires its 
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members to keep up to date with law and regulations and make disclosures as guided 
by the law and the profession. They are also required to disclose all material facts 
which, if not disclosed, may distort their report (IIA, 2009) and may consequently 
tarnish the image and credibility of the professional. On the website of the IIA, 
whistle-blowing is described as an event that occurs when: 
an employee, contractor or supplier goes outside the normal management 
channels to report suspected wrongdoing at work, i.e. speaking out in a 
confidential manner. This can be done via internal processes set up by the 
organization (internal whistle-blowing) or to an external body such as a 
regulator (external whistle-blowing). Public disclosure to the media is also 
perceived by some as whistle-blowing and is of interest to internal audit as a 
possible indicator on the control environment and in the context of an internal 
auditor needing to go outside his/her organization to get concerns dealt with 
(IIA’s website). 
This statement should be seen as a form of encouragement given by the professional 
body to internal auditors to blow the whistle in situations that require them to do so. 
Internal auditors are obligated to act in accordance with the IIA’s Standards and 
Code of Ethics which requires them to use the internal channels (internally whistle) 
before opting for external channels. The support given by the IIA adds another point 
on the relevance of internal auditors to blow the whistle.  
According to Schmidt (2005), Kaplan, Pope, and Samuels (2010) and Trevino and 
Victor (1992), staff members are usually the first to know any wrongdoings or 
questionable practices in their organisations. Chadwick (2000) and Hillison, Pacini, 
and Sinason (1999) assert that no other staff members, either from within or outside 
the organisation, understand the organisation’s policies and procedures as well as 
internal auditors. Vinten (2003) asserts that internal auditors are in the key position 
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to have a sound knowledge of the internal activities in their workplaces. The 
relevance of internal auditors to blow the whistle can also be seen from their unique 
position in an organisation. The position and the job specifications of internal 
auditors provide them with wide access to their organisation’s documents and files. 
Moreover, the internal auditor role permits rigorous involvement and subsequently 
makes the internal auditor a person who clearly understands the internal matters in 
the workplace. The privileged access is one of the important criteria for whistle-
blowing as highlighted by Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove (2008). Therefore, 
internal auditors are the utmost reliable members to identify any illegal and unethical 
practices occurring in their workplace and should make a report accordingly. Having 
such significant and sensitive information on the organisation they audit, on one 
hand, and denying their responsibility to blow the whistle, on the other hand, is not in 
line with the objective of establishing internal auditing functions in organisations in 
the first place.   
The above explanation sufficiently highlights the relevance of internal auditors as 
one of the most eligible organisational members to blow the whistle.   
1.2 Motivations of the study 
The first motivation for conducting this research concerns the unique position of 
internal auditors in organisations. The unique position here refers to the dual 
allegiance which internal auditors hold: first, to the internal audit profession and 
second, to the organisation. On one hand, internal auditors are paid for their work by 
the organisation, i.e. they are paid to do what the management teams ask them to do, 
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on the other hand, internal auditors are obligated to uphold standards of professional 
practice which include independence and objectivity. Conflicts arise when internal 
auditors are asked to keep the interest of management teams, or those who are in 
power, over the interests of the organisation itself or other stakeholders. These 
conflicts place their independence and objectivity values at risk. The possible tension 
between management demands and professional responsibilities, which the literature 
refers to as organisational-professional conflict, creates a critical point for internal 
auditors in deciding either to blow the whistle or not to blow and encouraged the 
researcher to conduct this research.  
The second motivation for conducting this research concerns the limited number of 
whistle-blowing cases researched in an internal auditing context. Slovin (2006)  
states that internal audit is the second most common method of fraud detection, 
which shows that research on whistle-blowing in the internal auditing context should 
not be underemphasised. Read and Rama (2003) suggest that the role of internal 
auditors in whistle-blowing needs to be further reviewed. Within the literature there 
has been considerable discussion of the significance of the role of internal auditors. 
However, there is limited research that investigates internal auditors in the whistle-
blowing context. As shown in Table 2.2 (see Chapter Two), whistle-blowing 
research in an internal auditing context is limited; limited variables have been 
investigated. Previous research has mainly focused on organisational-level factors, 
for instance codes of conduct in organisation (Read & Rama, 2003), organisational 
justice (Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, & Thornton, 2010), situational-level factors, for 
instance, rewards (Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008), and value congruence, perceived 
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victimization and retaliation (Miceli & Near, 1994).  Many other variables, discussed 
in whistle-blowing literature and in ethical decision making literature more generally, 
have not been thoroughly studied and consequently create a wide and significant 
knowledge gap. Therefore a need for this study is to examine factors that influence 
internal auditors to blow the whistle. Arnold and Ponemon (1991) claim that there is 
limited information on the internal auditors’ whistle-blowing decisions, as evidenced 
by the limited number of studies on internal auditing whistle-blowing since then. 
As demonstrated in Table 2.2, from the limited number of whistle-blowing studies in 
an internal auditing context, most of the research has been conducted in the U.S.A. 
The research on whistle-blowing involving internal auditors is not even extensive in 
the U.S.A. In the U.K., whistle-blowing research is still modest (Vinten & Gavin, 
2005). The findings from the U.S.A. whistle-blowing literature might not be 
generalized to the U.K. context for various reasons; for example, both countries 
differ in their whistle-blowing protection legislation, culture and society norms. 
Further discussion on the differences in whistle-blowing practice between the U.S.A. 
and the U.K. is provided in Section 1.6. Vogel (1992) claims culture differences 
among countries leads to a variation in perception of ethics, morals, justice, loyalty, 
right and wrong. These, in turn, influence their acceptance or rejection towards the 
whistle-blowing practices. The U.K. whistle-blowing literature is generally 
discussion and conceptual papers (e.g. Chambers, 1995; Lewis, 2006, 2008; Saha, 
2008; Vandekerckhove & Lewis, 2012; Vinten, 2003, 2004; Vinten & Gavin, 2005). 
From these limited whistle-blowing papers, few of the research papers discuss the 
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whistle-blowing issue in an internal auditing context, for instance papers written by 
Chambers (1995) and Vinten (2003).  
Discussions and arguments raised in their papers have motivated the author to 
conduct this present study empirically.3 This point leads to the third motivational 
factor for conducting this research. 
Finally, previous whistle-blowing studies put much attention on organisational and 
situational level factors (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 in Chapter Two). Several 
factors, from organisational and situational-level, have been examined, for example; 
job position; retaliation; rewards; codes of conduct; and job performance. However, 
antecedents or factors of whistle-blowing intention from individual-level have not 
received equal interest among previous researchers. MacNab and Worthley (2008)  
claim that there is little whistle-blowing research that examines individual level 
factors available in the literature (e.g. Sims & Keenan, 1998), and more empirical 
research on the influence of individual-level factors, on whistle-blowing reporting 
action, is needed (MacNab & Worthley, 2008; Sims & Keenan, 1998). Moral 
reasoning and demographic characteristics are the most frequent individual level 
factors which have been examined so far. The calls for more studies on individual-
level factors have motivated this research to investigate other individual-level factors 
that may influence whistle-blowing intention.  
                                                 
3
 Empirical papers refer to articles which report research based on actual observations or experiments 
where the research applies certain methods – qualitatively or quantitatively – which seek to establish 
causal relationship or critically analyse behaviour, values or beliefs from the data gained in the 
observations or experiments. 
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In bringing together these four motivational factors, this research identified that a 
wide and significant knowledge gap exists. Thus, this present study was conducted to 
examine factors that influence an internal auditor’s intention to blow the whistle. 
Specifically, this study was conducted in the U.K., a context which has previously 
been under-researched. This study is specifically related to the UK social democratic 
and based on the Public Interest Disclocure Act (1998). PIDA is the whistle-blowing 
protection legislation in the U.K. that provides protection to whistle-blowers.  
1.3 Research objectives 
The principal aim of this research is to identify factors that influence an internal 
auditor’s intention to blow the whistle. Several individual-level factors were 
investigated. The objectives of the research are listed below: 
1) To determine whether there are significant differences between respondents 
from various demographic backgrounds (gender, age, work experience, 
client categories and employment position) in all independent variables 
examined in this study. 
2) To investigate the individual-level factors (attitudes towards whistle-
blowing, injunctive norm, descriptive norm, perceived behavioural control, 
self-efficacy, organisational-professional conflict and awareness of the 
whistle-blowing protection legislation) that influence an internal auditor’s 
intention to blow the whistle upon discovering unethical and/or illegal 
behaviour. 
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3) To identify the moderating effect of moral intensity on the relationship 
between the individual-level factors and whistle-blowing intention. 
1.4 A brief review of proposed research conceptual framework 
The research conceptual framework of this study is based on the extended4 version of 
the TPB. The original TPB was introduced by Ajzen in 1985 (Ajzen, 1991). The TPB 
is a social-psychological model which was developed to investigate intention and 
behaviour of a person under a specified situation where the person might have lack 
of control on his/her own behaviour. The original TPB model has three core 
variables: attitudes towards (specific) behaviour, social norms and perceived 
behavioural control.  
Previous literature on TPB reveals that there are inconsistent empirical findings on 
the contribution of the social norm and perceived behavioural control in predicting 
intention. Based on those findings, and the suggestions by previous research in this 
study, the social norm is decomposed into multidimensional belief variables. The 
decomposition allows researchers to investigate the influence of norm beliefs 
variables in greater detail. As suggested in the literature, the social norm variable is 
decomposed into injunctive norm and descriptive norm. This is purposely to 
investigate the influence of injunctive norm and descriptive norm, rather than general 
social norm influence. The decomposition TPB has been proved to have better 
                                                 
4
 Extended version here means additional variables are added to the original model of the TPB.  
42 
 
explanatory power than the original TPB model (Hsu & Chiu, 2004; Lin, 2008; 
Taylor & Todd, 1995a).  
This study also investigates the influence of the perceived behavioural control and 
self-efficacy on the intention to blow the whistle. These two variables have been 
argued as similar, by some scholars; however, empirical findings have proved that 
these two variables are measuring two different things (Tavousi et al., 2009; Terry & 
O'Leary, 1995; Trafimow, Sheeran, Conner, & Finlay, 2002). 
In addition to the three core variables of the TPB, several other variables that have 
been discussed in ethical decision making literature are also included in the research 
framework. The variables are organisational-professional conflict and awareness of 
the whistle-blowing legislation. A few demographic variables were also included in 
the framework as control variables. Moral intensity was tested for its moderating 
effect on each of the individual relationships between the independent variables 
(seven individual-level variables) and the dependent variable (intention to blow the 
whistle). Details of these variables are explained in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the research conceptual framework.  
1.5 Boundaries of the research 
There are boundaries to this research. First, this study was only interested in 
examining the internal auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. Internal auditors are 
chosen as subjects because they have privilege in relation to any other staff members. 
They are given greater access to the organisation’s documents and files. The position 
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as internal auditors presents them with opportunities to encounter any illegal and 
unethical practices in the organisation.  
Second, data was collected in the U.K. Thus, the findings of this study may not be 
suitable for generalization to other countries. 
Third, only variables from individual-level factors were examined in this study. 
Although there are three general factors; organizational, situational and individual, 
that help explain reporting behavior among employees within organizations (Miceli, 
Near, & Dworkin, 2008), no variables from organizational-level and situational-level 
factors are examined in this study. Past research has largely focused on 
organizational-level factors and situational-level factors; however, there is limited 
research on the individual-level factors. The inconsistent findings of the influence of 
individual-level variables compared to the consistent findings of organizational and 
situational variables on whistle-blowing intention or behavior as reported by Vadera, 
Aguilera, and Caza (2009) suggests that more research on individual-level variables 
are warranted. Investigating individual-level factors has been the main focus in this 
study and it is anticipated that this study will contribute valuable findings to the 
literature. Investigating individual-level factors allows the researcher to better 
understand how internal auditors perceive whistle-blowing, the role of significant 
others in influencing their intention to blow the whistle and their self-ability to blow 
the whistle, among others. Individual-level factors are factors that are much closer 
and personal to the individual compared to the organisational and situational factors.  
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1.6 Whistle-blowing in the U.K. context 
According to David (1986), the U.K. is one of the democratic countries that practices 
secrecy. It has also been reported in the literature that people in the U.K. live in a 
culture that emphasizes secrecy which Vinten (1994) refers as “over secretive U.K” 
(p.14). The secrecy culture is said to have deeply inflicted the British way of life. 
Apart from the secrecy culture, historically, no constitutional right to freedom of 
speech was applied in the U.K. until the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporated 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Lewis & Trygstad, 2009). 
The integration of Article 10 facilitated a new phase where each individual was given 
freedom of expression. However, Article 10(2) has restricted freedom of expression 
where the disclosure of confidential information is prohibited. This has, in fact, given 
little value to whistle-blowing practices (Lewis & Trygstad, 2009).  
Whistle-blowing has received prominence in various developed countries. The 
U.S.A. and the U.K. are two developed countries that have long established their 
whistle-blowing protection legislation. Vinten (1994), in his book “Whistleblowing: 
Subversion or Corporate Citizenship”, potrayed the attitudes toward whistle-blowing 
practices in the U.K. as less positive and there is relatively lighter progressive 
movement on the whistle-blowing practices, compared to the U.S.A. This is the 
situation that describes the whistle-blowing practices in the U.K. prior to the 
establishment of the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) in 1998. PIDA is the 
whistle-blowing protection legislation in the U.K. that provides protection to whistle-
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blowers. Today, after almost twenty years of its establishment, a more positive 
acceptance toward whistle-blowing practices is expected.   
There are various reasons that mean the empirical findings of the U.S.A whistle-
blowing literature cannot be generalized to the U.K. environment. The U.S.A and the 
U.K. differ in culture and social norms. The difference in culture and norms might 
explain the way internal auditors in these two countries accept the idea of whistle-
blowing and subsequently their willingness to blow the whistle. Based on Hofstede’s 
cultural dimension theory, the U.K. and the U.S.A. are grouped in the same cluster 
(Hofstede, 2011). Nonetheless, there are differences which may further discriminate 
the cultures, customs and whistle-blowing practices between these two countries. A 
study by Salter, Guffey, and McMillan (2001) found that the small differences 
between the U.S.A. and the U.K. on their points in Uncertainty Avoidance (the U.K. 
score 35, while the U.S.A. score 46) were able to significantly discriminate the 
intention to cheat between the U.S.A. students and the U.K. students. In the study, 
the British students were found to be more self-contained although they were in an 
environment where cheating was encouraged. Hofstede’s cultural dimension 
describes the differences between countries, based on the culture of their societies 
which affects the values of their members and, subsequently, their behaviour in these 
societies, in these countries.  
The U.K. whistle-blowing legislation has been exemplary to the whistle-blowing 
legislation acts of Ireland, Japan and South African (Transparency International, 
2013). In previous years, whistle-blowing in the U.K. should be made in good faith.  
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However, recently, some changes in whistle-blowing legislation have been 
introduced by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. One of the changes 
involves the removal of the good faith requirement which is then replaced with the 
public interest requirement. In another aspect, public employees in U.K. 
organisations receive greater protection than in private organisations (Miceli, Near, 
& Dworkin, 2009) which is similar to the situation in the U.S.A. and Australia. Also, 
to date, whistle-blowing protection legislation in the U.K. has not fully accepted the 
idea of rewarding whistle-blowers. The practice of rewarding whistle-blowers, 
however, has long been procedure in the U.S.A. Furthermore, in the U.K., whistle-
blowing protection legislation is more concerned with providing protection to 
potential whistle-blowers (Matthewson, 2012). This is very different from the U.S.A. 
where legislations are enacted to encourage the reporting practice and ensure that 
concerns are properly investigated (Matthewson, 2012).  
In the U.K., although organisations are not legally bound to have whistle-blowing 
policies and procedures, whistle-blowing has become one of the main aspects in 
organisational governance. The Committee on Standards in Public Life, in their 
initial attempts towards good governance and manifestation of open culture, has 
initiated the public sectors to establish internal whistle-blowing policies and 
procedures (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2005; Public Concern at Work, 
2013a). While in the private sectors, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code requires 
listed companies to have whistle-blowing policies in their organisation. This was 
discussed in the U.K. Corporate Governance Code under the internal control system 
and risk management matter (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). Furthermore, if 
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companies do not have the related policies and procedures, they are required to 
explain their reasons for not having the policies in their annual reports. However, no 
sanctions are given to those who fail to comply with the Code as the law does not 
make it mandatory. In addition to the U.K. Corporate Governance Code, the U.K. 
Bribery Act (2010) encourages organisations to have in place adequate procedures 
which provide guidelines to their staff members on the actions they should take if 
they want to raise their concerns. Furthermore, the adequate procedures act as a 
valuable protection tool for organisations to defend themselves in a situation 
involving corporate liability. The most recent survey administered by Public Concern 
at Work and Ernst and Young in 2013 revealed that 90% of respondents claimed to 
have formal whistle-blowing arrangements in their organisation, however, one in 
three thought their whistle-blowing arrangements were not effective. The survey was 
conducted in more than 30 different sectors including Central Government, Banking, 
Healthcare and Construction (Public Concern at Work, 2013a). Overall, all of the 
attempts mentioned earlier, and the establishment of the PIDA 1998, should be seen 
as positive efforts in the U.K. in its attempts to deter and prevent significant 
wrongdoings which may harm the organisations and their stakeholder’s interests as a 
whole. 
Despite all of the mechanisms explained above, workers in the U.K. are given no 
general right to inform wrongdoings (Lewis & Trygstad, 2009). According to Lewis 
and Trygstad (2009), the whistle-blowing protection is granted to those who adhere 
to the provisions of Part IVA Employment Rights Act 1996 which underlines 
Protected Disclosures (see Employment Rights Act, 1996). Also, the right or 
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responsibility of a worker to come forward and raise their concerns concerning 
questionable practices in organisations has not been expressed aloud. Internal 
auditors, however, are expected to report their concerns as outlined by the IIA. 
In the U.K., whistle-blowing tends to be perceived as a duty (Vandekerckhove & 
Tsahuridu, 2010). According to Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu (2010), statutory 
duty is imposed on workers to report dangerous work situations to their employer, 
while any money laundering and suspected terrorist activities should be directly 
reported to the police. Having knowledge about wrongdoings is a liability 
(Vandekerckhove & Tsahuridu, 2010). However, currently there is no common law 
duty for workers to report their concerns other than the previous mentioned activities.  
Lewis (2008) further asserts that the PIDA 1998 has not adequately provided 
protection to whistle-blowers in the U.K.  
1.7 Thesis structure 
There are six chapters in this thesis. Chapter Two provides the literature review on 
whistle-blowing studies, the theoretical approach of this research, hypothesis 
development and the research conceptual framework. In Chapter Three, research 
philosophy, research methodology and research methods are discussed. Research 
findings are presented in Chapter Four and a discussion of the research findings is 
presented in Chapter Five. The final chapter provides contributions of the study, 
limitations of the study, suggestions for future research and a summary and 
conclusion of the research. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.0 Introduction 
Chapter One introduced whistle-blowing and its relevance to the internal audit 
function. In this chapter, the literature on whistle-blowing, in both a general context 
and in an auditing context, especially internal auditing, is discussed. The literature 
review is important to assess the current state of knowledge and identify 
opportunities for further whistle-blowing studies. 
In the first section, discussions on whistle-blowing are presented. Whistle-blowing as 
prosocial behaviour and the U.K. whistle-blowing regulatory framework are 
discussed in the second and third sections respectively, followed by a discussion of 
reviews on empirical whistle-blowing studies in the fourth section. In the fifth 
section, the theoretical approaches to whistle-blowing studies are explained. Next, 
the variables examined in this study are discussed in the sixth section and the 
hypotheses are developed. The research conceptual framework and the definition of 
examined variables are presented in the last section.  
2.1 Whistle-blowing reporting 
In this study, the whistle-blowing definition by Near and Miceli (1985) is applied. 
This definition is used because, not only is it the most popular and has been applied 
by many scholars, but the definition is relevant to the context of this study (internal 
audit). Near and Miceli (1985) define whistle-blowing as: 
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the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral 
or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4) 
To elaborate the definition of whistle-blowing, other authors explain what constitutes 
whistle-blowing. According to Alleyne, Hudaib, and Pike (2013) and Near, Dworkin, 
and Miceli (1993), there are some arguments among scholars on what constitutes 
whistle-blowing. Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu (2010) claim that an act constitutes 
whistle-blowing if it has the following three characteristics: first, the act is 
intentional disclosure of information by an individual who has privileged access to 
the information; second, the information being disclosed is on perceived malpractice 
or wrongdoing that has occurred in the organisations or under the responsibility of 
the organisation; and lastly, the intentional disclosure is being made with an aim to 
rectify the malpractice or wrongdoing before the wrongdoing escalates. The whistle-
blowing action is taken with a purpose to promote public interests.   
There are some debates on the channels of whistle-blowing. Some scholars argue that 
reporting questionable organisational practices internally should not be regarded as 
whistle-blowing (Courtemanche, 1988; Jubb, 1999). In contrast with the definition 
by Near and Miceli (1985) which does not exclude an internal channel as a possible 
channel for whistle-blowing, Jubb (1999) only considers one channel for whistle-
blowing; external whistle-blowing. Jubb (1999) defines whistle-blowing as: 
 a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto public record 
 and is made by a person who has or had privileged access to data or 
 information of an organisation, about non-trivial illegality or other 
 wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates and is 
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 under the control of that organisation, to an external entity having potential 
 to rectify the wrongdoing (Jubb, 1999, p. 78). 
In this study, both internal and external reporting channels are considered as whistle-
blowing activities. This is because both channels are the mediums which 
organisational members can use to raise their concerns. According to 
Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu (2010) many previous researchers assert that the 
term whistle-blowing can be used to describe any disclosure about wrongdoings 
which are not necessarily pursued within the normal hierarchical line. The 
researchers further contend that, more recently, the usage of the term whistle-
blowing covers internal disclosures. After all, the external and internal reporting 
channel is used by whistle-blowers to raise their concerns and is aimed at rectifying 
the wrongdoings (Vandekerckhove & Tsahuridu, 2010). These whistle-blowing 
channels are necessary and important medium for internal auditors to report any 
organisational questionable practices.  
Whistle-blowers are advised to use internal channels in their first attempt (Near & 
Miceli, 1996). The reporting should be made to internal members of the organisation 
who have the power and authority to take remedial action. Ethically, internal whistle-
blowing should become the preferred channel, as opposed to external whistle-
blowing. Internal whistle-blowing serves various benefits to the organisation, such as 
providing an opportunity for them to take appropriate action without bringing the 
internal affairs to the knowledge of the public. The external reporting channel 
involves whistle-blowers making a report to persons or parties outside the 
organisation. However, in certain circumstances, whistle-blowers may choose to 
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report externally in their first attempt to report the organisational questionable 
practices. For example, an organisation’s staff members may blow the whistle 
outside the organisation if they are confident that their manager is the culprit, or is 
amongst the culprits, and reporting their concern to the manager or elsewhere in the 
organization might not bring about any resolution or involve unacceptable personal 
costs.     
It is very important to differentiate between internal whistle-blowing and internal 
reporting. In general, internal whistle-blowing and internal reporting share some 
similarities. For example, both internal whistle-blowing and internal reporting are: 
first, performed by current or former organisation members; and second, the 
information focuses on potentially illegal, unethical or improper acts and the 
communication is made to an empowered entity. However, there are also points that 
make internal whistle-blowing differ from internal reporting: internal whistle-
blowing is unauthorised, voluntary reporting of illegal or improper acts to those who 
have power and authority to take remedial action. In contrast, internal reporting is 
authorised reporting and it may or may not be voluntary. As internal auditor, who 
holds a great responsibility and trust to a large group of stakeholders, it is their 
responsibility to report any questionable practices that occur in their workplace. 
Internal reporting has been established in the terms of reference as internal auditor 
and it should be used at its best. If the internal reporting leads to a dead end, the 
internal auditor may consider the alternative options, internal whistle-blowing. The 
internal reporting and internal whistle-blowing is essential to allow internal auditors 
perform their duties properly and appropriately. 
53 
 
Various types of questionable practices might occur in organisations. There are 
considerable disputes of whether such practices are ethical or unethical. To evaluate 
the ethicality of a practice is a matter of judgement which might differentiate from 
one individual to another but also differentiate from one organisation to another. In 
general, organisational practices that are within the law are normally considered as 
ethical (Borrie, 1996). There are, however, practices that are legal but unethical, such 
as accounting irregularities, and some acts that are illegal and unethical, such as 
corruption and theft. 
According to Near and Miceli (1985), whistle-blowing involves reporting 
organisational activities that bring harm to third parties or that might put public 
interest at risk. Near and Miceli (1985) further list a few characteristics of activities 
that necessitate individuals to blow the whistle. The activities involve: first, 
misconduct, neglect or irresponsibility; second, corrupt, socially harmful or illegal 
activity; and third, wasteful activities. The authors also briefly mentioned about the 
legitimacy of activities. Activities that organisations have the authority to commit 
describe the legitimacy of the activities and activities that are legitimate are activities 
that are accepted by organisational members and societies (Near & Miceli, 1985).  
The U.K whistle-blowing regulatory framework provides guidance on circumstances 
that support workers to blow the whistle. The circumstances (which are known as 
qualifying disclosures), as listed in Section 43B ERA 1996 (Employment Rights Act 
1996), include activities relating to (a) a criminal offence (b) breach of legal 
obligation (c) miscarriage of justice (d) danger to the health and safety of any 
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individual (e) damage to the environment, and (f) the deliberate attempt to conceal 
any of those activities.     
2.2 Whistle-blowing as prosocial behaviour 
The lack of comprehensive theory of whistle-blowing has been noted by previous 
researchers such as Near and Miceli (1985), Miceli and Near (1988) and Park and 
Blenkinsopp (2009) and this is the same in the present day. Miceli and Near (1988) 
therefore suggest that researchers can base their studies on other behavioural research 
that seems appropriate and has similarities, in some way, with whistle-blowing. 
According to Gundlach, Douglas, and Martinko (2003), following the purpose of 
whistle-blowing that promotes social welfare, many past whistle-blowing researchers 
have used a prosocial perspective on which to base their research. Gundlach et al. 
(2003) also claimed that a prosocial perspective has dominated the whistle-blowing 
framework due to its richness in explaining an individual’s actions towards perceived 
wrongdoings. In addition, the prosocial behaviour perspective fits with the whistle-
blowing practice for several reasons; first, prosocial behaviour has essential impact 
for organisations; second, it illustrates behaviours that go over the limits of the 
specified role of individuals in organisations, that are necessary to protect the 
organisation from any dangers; and lastly, providing ways to improve the 
organisation with a purpose to maintain organisational survivability (Brief & 
Motowidlo, 1986).   
In their definition of prosocial behaviour, Brief and Motowidlo (1986) emphasise the 
expected consequences of the behaviour, rather than the motive of actors, which is 
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the focal point of other scholars’ definitions of prosocial behaviour. The prosocial 
behaviour as defined by Brief and Motowidlo has been used widely in whistle-
blowing studies. According to Brief and Motowidlo (1986), prosocial behaviour in 
organisations refers to: 
behavior which is (a) performed by a member of an organization, (b) directed 
toward an individual, group, or organization with whom he or she interacts 
while carrying out his or her organizational role, and (c) performed with the 
intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, group, or organization 
toward which it is directed (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986, p. 711). 
Brief and Motowidlo (1986) listed 13 specific kinds of prosocial behaviour, 
including whistle-blowing. According to Brief and Motowidlo (1986), although the 
act of external whistle-blowing appears to bring harm to the (reputation of the) 
organisation, in contrast, the consequence of the external reporting in fact safeguards 
the interests of other organisations, individuals and society-at-large. Similarly, if 
individuals opt for internal whistle-blowing, the reporting to the internal members 
could be more readily illustrated as an effort that aims to bring benefit to the 
organisation. The action of voicing concerns internally, by any staff member, should 
not be regarded as damaging the organisation, but as an effort to help the 
organisation protect itself from damage if the disclosure is made externally. Brief and 
Motowidlo insist that both the external and internal whistle-blowing action is a form 
of prosocial behaviour. 
2.3 The U.K. whistle-blowing legal framework  
The U.K. whistle-blowing legal framework outlines the procedures for organisational 
members to follow to blow the whistle in order to be protected by the legislation. In 
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order to be protected by the legislation, the disclosure made by organisational 
members must be (1) a qualifying disclosure (2) made for public interests and (3) 
reported to the appropriate person (prescribed person). 
A qualifying disclosure is where the worker has a reasonable belief that entails one 
or more of the following:  
 (1) a criminal offence has been, is being, or is likely to be, committed 
 (2) a person has failed, is failing, or is likely fail, to comply with any legal 
 obligation which he is subject to 
 (3) a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to, occur  
 (4) the health and safety of an individual has been, is being, or is likely to be, 
 endangered 
 (5) the environment has been, is being, or is likely to be, damaged 
 (6) information tending to show any matter falling within any of the 
 preceding categories has been, or is likely to be, deliberately concealed  
In terms of methods of disclosure, there are two channels which organisational 
members should use. The first is internal disclosure, where a qualifying disclosure is 
made internally to an employer or other reasonable person. For organisational 
members in a public body, such as the NHS, the internal prescribed person is 
minister of the Crown. The second channel is external disclosure, where a qualifying 
disclosure is made to a prescribed person or body such as the media, police, MPs or 
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regulators. The internal channel, however, should be exhausted before resorting to an 
external channel. In circumstances involving suspicions of terrorism or money 
laundering, workers have a legal duty to report to external parties (police)  
(Chambers, 1995). These two channels of whistle-blowing, as outlined in the 
whistle-blowing regulatory framework, are in line with the whistle-blowing 
definition used in this study. 
Protection given by PIDA 1998 covers all organisational members as defined in 
Section 230(3) of the ERA 1996 and also a number of other categories of 
organisational members including contractors, trainees, agency staff, home workers 
and members of an LLP (limited liability partnership). 
2.4 Empirical literature on whistle-blowing  
In this section, empirical literature on whistle-blowing is presented and discussed. 
The purpose of this section is to provide a synopsis of the empirical research on 
whistle-blowing. This is essential in order to have thorough insight on what has been 
carried out in the field. As this study is interested in examining antecedents or factors 
that may affect the whistle-blowing decision, reference to a relatively recent review 
by Vadera et al. (2009) is made. The extant literature on whistle-blowing studies as 
summarised by Vadera et al. is shown in Figure 2.1. The article reviews the 
antecedents of whistle-blowing, particularly individual-level and situational-level 
variables, which have been examined in previous works. 
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Figure 2.1: The extant literature of whistle-blowing 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vadera et al. (2009) 
In their review Vadera et al. (2009) highlight the arenas in which whistle-blowing 
research reported inconsistent and consistent findings. Vadera et al. aim to identify 
new and fruitful areas for future research. The author notes that the list of papers 
reviewed and presented in the article had been published from 1982 to 2009. In the 
review Vadera et al. reported that individual-level variables of whistle-blowing have 
more inconsistent findings compared to the situational-level variables of whistle-
blowing. Demographic characteristics such as age, gender, tenure and personal 
morality have yielded mixed results compared to other individual-level variables 
such as role responsibility, job performance, organisational position and pay level. 
For the situational-level variables, previous whistle-blowing studies report fairly 
consistent results. In their article Vadera et al. suggest future research regarding 
whistle-blowing should consider an individual’s  relationship with several ‘actors’ 
such as family, peers, superiors and supervisors. The inconsistent findings of the 
individual-level factors in addition to the limited studies that investigate individual-
level factors certainly provide an opportunity for future research.    
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The updated empirical whistle-blowing articles are listed in Table 2.1 following a 
forward citation search (and other methods) on whistle-blowing studies that was 
performed based on Vadera et al.’s article. This was purposely to update the work by 
Vadera et al. and gain insight into what factors have been examined to date.  
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Table 2.1 Recent empirical whistle-blowing studies  
 Author Variables Studied Country & 
Respondents 
Data Collection & 
Analysis Method 
Results 
1. Miceli, 
Near, Rehg, 
and Van 
Scotter 
(2012) 
Perceived organisational 
support, perceived justice of 
reporting channels, personality, 
evidence, co-worker 
invalidation, observer leverage. 
U.S.A. 
 
Organisational 
members. 
Survey. 
 
ANOVA, Logistic 
regression analysis.  
Observation of wrongdoing was associated 
with lower perceived organisational support 
and lower perceived justice of reporting 
channels.  
2. Waytz, 
Dungan, and 
Young 
(2013) 
Fairness, loyalty U.S.A. 
 
Organisational 
members. 
Surveys, essay writing 
task. 
 
Paired-samples T-tests, 
independent- samples T-
tests, ANOVA.  
Fairness-loyalty trade-off predicts people’s 
willingness to blow the whistle.  
3. Cassematis 
and Wortley 
(2013) 
Personal and situational factors Australia. 
 
Employees in 
public sector 
organisations. 
Surveys. 
 
Binary logistic regression. 
It was possible to classify whistle-blowers 
on the individual initiative, whistle-blowing 
propensity (individual and organisational), 
fear of retaliation, perceived wrongdoing 
seriousness and perceived personal 
victimisation. Whistle-blowers are not 
markedly dissimilar to non-reporting 
observers. Whistle-blowers are most likely 
to be ordinary employees making a good 
faith attempt to stop the wrongdoing.  
 
4. Lavena 
(2014) 
Individual and organisational 
variables 
U.S.A. 
 
Federal 
employees. 
Using data collected by 
Merit Systems Protection 
Board. 
 
Logistic regression 
analysis. 
The likelihood of whistle-blowing is 
positively associated with norm-based and 
affective work motives but negatively 
associated with several key indicators or 
organisational culture, including 
perceptions of respect and openness, 
cooperatives and flexibility in the 
workplace and fair treatment and trust in 
supervisors. 
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5. Erkmen, 
Çaliskan, 
and Esen 
(2014) 
Demographic variables Turkey. 
 
Accounting 
professionals. 
Scenario based 
questionnaire. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis and 
Mann.Whitney. U-test.  
Accounting professionals’ demographic 
factors are important to understand the 
whistle-blowing behaviour. There are no 
differences in accounting professionals 
whistle-blowing behaviour in terms of their 
demographic characteristics with exception 
of gender and age. 
 
6. Chen and 
Lai (2014) 
Potential harm, social pressure, 
organisational commitment. 
Taiwan. 
 
Employees in 
various 
organisations. 
Scenario based 
questionnaire. 
 
T-test. 
Moral intensity is correlated with whistle-
blowing intention. Only the potential harm 
is positively correlated with intention. 
Potential harm and social pressure 
differentially affect the choice of internal or 
external channel. Organisational 
commitment has a moderated mediated 
effect among moral intensity, whistle-
blowing intention and behaviour.  
 
7. Jones, 
Spraakman, 
and 
Sánchez-
Rodríguez 
(2014) 
Self-interest, anger, perceptions 
of unfairness. 
Canada. 
 
Accounting 
students. 
Web-based survey. 
 
T-test, PLS 
All the three variables lead to the whistle-
blowing intention. In the case of faculty 
member misconduct, anger and perceptions 
of unfairness play a greater role than co-
benefit process of prosocial organisational 
behaviour.  
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As shown in Table 2.1, there is evidence that individual-level factors have started to 
receive wider attention in recent studies. For instance, the study by Lavena (2014) 
investigated the influence of norms. In the study by Cassematis and Wortley (2013) 
the individual-level variables examined are the demographic characteristics, job 
satisfaction and trust in management. However, relative to situational-level variables, 
studies on individual-level factors are limited, and they are not comprehensive. As 
reported in Miceli et al. (2008) individual-level variable is one of the factors that 
helps explain reporting behaviour and is worthy of research. 
2.4.1 Empirical research on whistle-blowing in accounting and 
auditing context 
Financial scandals, accounting irregularities and disputable organisational practices 
that put public safety at risk show the importance of accountants and auditors 
(external and internal) to raise their concerns on an organisation’s questionable 
practices. To date, however, limited whistle-blowing studies have been conducted on 
accountants and auditors (external auditors and internal auditors) (see Table 2.2). 
Review of previous whistle-blowing literature reveals that previous whistle-blowing 
studies have generally been conducted on general employees.  
Whistle-blowing literature in the auditing and accounting context shows that 
investigations into organisational/situational-level antecedents are dominant. In other 
words, not many previous studies have examined individual-level variables. This 
also indicates that the influence of individual-level variables has not been 
comprehensively and exhaustively examined, therefore more research is needed.  
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In 22 years (from 1990-2011) there were only seven empirical whistle-blowing 
studies on internal auditors. Arnold and Ponemon (1991) was the first empirical 
whistle-blowing study that used internal auditors as their sample. The study by 
Syahrul Ahmar (2011) is a relatively recent whistle-blowing research in an internal 
auditing context. 
As can be observed from the list of whistle-blowing studies listed in Table 2.2, 
organisational-level and situational-level variables were frequently examined in 
previous research and the scenario based survey and mail questionnaire is the most 
common method used. Findings of the studies found that internal auditors with lower 
levels of moral reasoning were less likely to blow the whistle due to fear of 
retaliation (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991) and rewards provided to whistle-blowers have 
a significant influence on the likelihood of internal auditors to blow the whistle (Xu 
& Ziegenfuss, 2008). Miceli et al. (1991) found that internal auditors were less likely 
to whistle-blow when they were not morally compelled or not prescribed in their 
role. Arnold and Ponemon (1991) reported that internal auditors were less likely to 
whistle-blow compared to external auditors. 
The fact that whistle-blowing behaviour is difficult to examine has driven previous 
research to investigate whistle-blowing intention (Patel, 2003). Intention is 
investigated rather than the actual whistle-blowing behaviour due to:  
(1) difficulty of carrying out the investigations into unethical conduct in actual 
organizations, (2) suggesting that actual whistle-blowers censor the 
information they provide to investigators due to the perception that data 
gathered in actual organizations preclude their confidentiality or anonymity, 
(3) illuminating the difficulty of locating actual whistle-blowers for 
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questioning, or (4) citing the inherently flawed nature of such data (e.g., self-
reports or past events) (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, pp. 278-279).  
Research on intention has seen the use of scenario-based survey as the most popular 
technique used by researchers. Although scenario-based surveys have their 
limitations, such as they are unable to capture the actual view of the real world, the 
use of scenario-based survey is contended by Ayers and Kaplan (2005) as 
particularly useful for whistle-blowing intention studies as it allows for greater 
control over competing explanations, hence enhancing internal validity. Other types 
of research technique such as interview, field-experimental and longitudinal survey 
may not be suitable in whistle-blowing research (Miceli & Near, 1988). Miceli and 
Near (1988) stated that “because of obvious ethical concerns, one cannot randomly 
select employees to witness manipulated wrongdoing in order to determine which 
individual or situational characteristics are associated with whistle-blowing” (p. 277). 
Furthermore, the scenario-based survey is the popular method used in business ethics 
studies (Weber, 1992) due to advantages it brings to the studies. One of the obvious 
advantages of scenario-based survey, compared to simple direct questions, is it 
allows researchers to incorporate complex, multi-dimensional issues that reflect 
decision making process in the real world (Weber, 1992). Further discussion on the 
advantages of scenario-based survey is discussed in section 3.7. Therefore, the use of 
scenario-based survey is regarded as the most appropriate research technique for 
whistle-blowing research. 
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Table 2.2: Whistle-blowing studies involving accountants and auditors 
 Author Variables Studied Country & 
Respondents 
Data Collection & Analysis 
Method 
Results 
(A) Studies involving internal auditors 
1 Arnold and 
Ponemon 
(1991) 
Position, retaliation, 
moral reasoning 
U.S.A. 
 
Internal auditors 
(public and private 
sector). 
Walk-in questionnaires were 
distributed to internal auditors 
who attended professional 
training programme. 
 
(Scenario-based survey; 1 
scenario) 
Internal auditors with low level of 
moral reasoning were unlikely to 
whistle-blow especially if retaliation 
meant job termination. External 
auditors were most inclined towards 
whistle-blowing act compared to 
internal auditors. 
 
2 Miceli et al. 
(1991) 
Job performance, role U.S.A./ 
Canada. 
 
Internal auditors 
(public and private 
sector) 
Mail questionnaire 
 
(Not scenario-based survey) 
Poor performers with low salary have 
less interest to blow a whistle. Will 
blow if it is included in their role 
description also if they are many 
observers. 
3 Miceli and 
Near (1994) 
Value congruence, 
perceived victimisation, 
retaliation 
U.S.A. 
 
Director of internal 
audit 
Mail questionnaire 
 
(Not scenario-based survey) 
Managerial retaliation was more 
likely when (1) the whistle-blower 
perceived that ceasing the 
wrongdoing would bring harm to the 
organisation, (2) the wrongdoing 
harmed the climate or culture in the 
organisation,  
(3) the whistle-blower failed to 
remain anonymous, (4) the 
wrongdoing was harmful to the 
public and, (5) there was low value 
congruence between whistle-blowers 
and their organisations.  
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4 Read and 
Rama (2003) 
Authority, codes of 
conduct 
U.S.A. 
 
CIA in public held 
manufacturing 
company 
Mail questionnaire 
 
(Not scenario-based survey) 
71% of chief internal auditors 
received whistle-blowing complaints. 
The receipt of complaints was 
positively associated with 
involvement of internal auditing in 
monitoring compliance with the 
corporate code of conduct, and with 
audit committee support of internal 
auditing.  
 
5 Xu and 
Ziegenfuss 
(2008) 
Rewards, moral 
reasoning 
- 
Internal auditors 
Mail questionnaire 
 
(Scenario-based survey; 1 
scenario) 
Internal auditors are more likely to 
report wrongdoing to higher 
authorities when incentives are 
provided. Rewards systems have a 
positive effect on intention to 
whistle-blow. Internal auditors with 
lower levels of moral reasoning are 
more sensitive to cash incentives. 
 
6 Seifert et al. 
(2010) 
Organisational justice U.S.A. 
 
Internal auditors and 
management 
accountants 
Walk-in 
questionnaires were distributed to 
internal auditors and management 
accountants who attended 
monthly chapter meetings at 
various locations across the USA 
conducted by IIA and IMA 
(Institute of Management 
Accountants).  
 
(Scenario-based survey; 1 
scenario) 
 
Whistle-blowing policies and 
mechanisms which incorporate 
higher levels of procedural justice, 
distributive justice and interactional 
justice were perceived to increase the 
propensity that organisational 
accountant would internally report 
financial statement fraud.  
7 Syahrul 
Ahmar (2011) 
Age, gender, tenure, size 
of organisation, job 
levels, seriousness of 
Malaysia. 
 
Internal auditors. 
Mail questionnaire 
 
(Scenario-based survey; 4 
Seriousness of wrongdoing is the 
most consistent and the best predictor 
of internal whistle-blowing 
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wrongdoing, status of 
wrongdoer 
scenarios) intentions. Gender, age, job level and 
status of wrongdoer show limited 
capacity to predict internal whistle-
blowing intentions. 
 
(B) Studies involving external auditors 
8 Finn and 
Lampe (1992) 
Measured whistle-
blowing decision, ethical 
judgement, issue-
contingent, situational 
variables 
Auditors Ethical vignettes 
 
(Scenario-based survey; 7 
scenarios) 
 
Ethical judgement is positively 
associated with whistle-blowing 
decision. Ethical decision making 
was influenced by issue-contingent, 
individual and situational variables. 
 
9 Label and 
Miethe 
(1999) 
Attitudes, whistle-
blowing legislation 
U.S.A. 
 
AICPA members & 
CPA in industry and 
government 
Mail questionnaire 
 
(Not scenario-based survey) 
Majority of auditors opposed the 
legislation. Major differences in 
opinion between different groups of 
auditors (firm partner, staff auditor, 
seasoned auditor and novice auditor). 
 
10 Kaplan and 
Whitecotton 
(2001) 
Reporting intention, 
seriousness of act, 
personal costs of 
reporting, responsibility 
for reporting, 
commitment to 
accounting profession 
U.S.A. 
 
Audit seniors 
Questionnaire distributed during 
training programme. 
 
(Scenario-based survey; 1 
scenario) 
Auditors’ reporting intentions were 
stronger when personal costs of 
reporting were lower or personal 
responsibility for reporting was 
perceived to be higher. Seriousness 
of act is not significantly related to 
intentions to report. 
  
11 Taylor and 
Curtis (2010) 
Professional 
commitment 
(professional identity), 
organisational 
commitment moral 
intensity, reporting 
intention (likelihood of 
reporting and 
perseverance of 
U.S.A. 
 
Audit seniors. 
Questionnaire  
 
(Scenario-based survey; 3 
scenarios) 
Moral intensity and professional 
identity significantly relate to 
reporting intention. 
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reporting) 
12 Maroun and 
Atkins (2014) 
Enclosure, efficient 
bodies and disciplinary 
power  
South Africa. 
 
External auditors 
Detailed interviews Blowing the whistle on the reportable 
irregularities increased the 
information made available to 
stakeholders. It also helped portray 
the sense of transparency and 
accountability of external auditors. 
The regulation also responsible to the 
illusion of active reporting.  
(C) Studies involving accountants 
13 Somers and 
Casal (1994) 
Commitment, whistle-
blowing intention 
Management 
accountants 
Data from National Association 
of Accountants. 
 
Regression analysis 
Moderate level of commitment was 
most likely to influence whistle-
blowing intention. 
 
14 Patel (2003) Culture and 
demographics 
Australia, India, 
Malaysia 
 
Accountants -  
Big 6. 
Questionnaire 
 
(Scenario-based survey; 2 
scenarios) 
Compared to Indian and Chinese 
cultures, whistle-blowing as an 
internal control mechanism was 
likely to be more effective in 
Australian culture. 
 
15 Hwang et al. 
(2008) 
Whistle-blowing 
intention,  social justice, 
professional ethics, sense 
of morality, monetary 
rewards, promotions, 
peer encouragement, job 
protection, internal 
control system, media 
attention, retaliation, 
religious beliefs, sense of 
betrayal, Confucius’ 
teaching, guanxi, auditor 
independence, 
employment, contracts 
or business transactions, 
Taiwan. 
 
Accountants – CPA 
firms, corporations, 
professional 
associations and 
universities 
Questionnaire 
 
(Not scenario-based survey) 
General sense of morality was the 
greatest predictor to whistle-blowing 
followed by abiding organisation 
policy. Guanxi, fear of retaliation and 
fear of media coverage may 
discourage whistle-blowing.  
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social justice and 
fairness. 
16 Liyanarachchi 
and Adler 
(2011) 
Retaliation, age, gender 
and whistle-blowing 
intention 
New Zealand. 
 
Accountants- CPA 
members. 
Online questionnaire 
 
(Scenario-based survey; 3 
scenarios) 
For early career accountants, males 
were more likely to whistle-blow. 
Accountants in mid-age group were 
not likely to blow the whistle when 
there would be retaliation. 
Accountants aged 45 and above 
respond to retaliation differently 
between genders. 
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2.5 Theoretical approaches to whistle-blowing study  
The lack of whistle-blowing theory has seen many studies apply various behavioural 
theories in their research. For example, Arnold and Ponemon (1991) and Xu and 
Ziegenfuss (2008) used Kohlberg’s ethical decision making theory to investigate the 
influence of moral reasoning on whistle-blowing decision making and Park and 
Blenkinsopp (2009) based their research on the TPB in examining factors that 
influence whistle-blowing intention. 
None of the empirical whistle-blowing studies in an accounting and auditing context 
drew their investigation based on reasoned action or planned behaviour. 
Nevertheless, the theory of planned behaviour was used by Park and Blenkinsopp 
(2009) in their whistle-blowing study on South Korean police officers and by 
Randall and Gibson (1991) in their study on nurses’ intention to report wrongdoings. 
The theory of reasoned action (TRA) and the theory of planned behaviour are well-
known behavioural theories that help explain intention and behaviour. The limited 
investigation on individual variables encouraged this research to examine individual 
variable influences on the whistle-blowing intention using the theory of planned 
behaviour (the successor of the TRA). 
In this study, whistle-blowing is regarded as a prosocial behaviour. Following this 
line of thought, it is reasonable to assume that there are a number of variables that 
may influence an individual’s intention to blow the whistle. Guided by the premise 
that whistle-blowing is an action that needs a person to be thoughtful, rather than 
impulsive, or primarily unconscious with their decision, the model of TPB, therefore 
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provides a suitable framework for this study. The extended TPB was used where 
various determinants of whistle-blowing intention were examined; not restricted to 
the three core variables of the original model of TPB (see Figure 2.3). The TPB has 
been widely used in predicting various types of behavioural intention (Madden, 
Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992) including unethical behavioural intention (Chang, 1998). 
Chang (1998) found the TPB was better than the TRA, the predecessor of the TPB, 
in predicting unethical behaviour intention. In addition to the TPB, a variable from 
the Social Learning Theory, self-efficacy, which was introduced by Bandura 1977), 
and a variable introduced in Jones (1991), moral intensity, were also included in the 
research conceptual framework. The two variables are included in the research for 
two reasons. First, the variables have been identified as influential factors in 
behavioural-based studies (e.g.,Manstead & Eekelen, 1998; Povey & Conner, 2000; 
Rhodes & Courneya, 2003) and, second, very few previous whistle-blowing studies 
have examined these variables. Therefore, in the author’s view there is a necessity to 
examine these variables.     
2.5.1 Theory of planned behaviour 
The TPB, which was introduced by Ajzen in 1985, is successor to the TRA. These 
two theories were developed with the purpose to investigate intention and behaviour 
of a person under a specified situation where the person might have complete control 
(TRA) or lack of complete control (TPB) on his/her own behaviour. According to 
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Chang (1998), both theories assume that human beings are basically rational5 and 
they make best use of the information they possess in their decision making.  
The TRA, a theory introduced by Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen in the 1960s, is a 
theory that focuses on a person’s intention to perform a certain behaviour. Intention 
is the likelihood or subjective probability that a person will perform the behaviour in 
question, whether or not he or she actually performs the behaviour. The TRA is a 
general model and it was designed to explain any human behaviour (Davis, Bagozzi, 
& Warshaw, 1989). Furthermore, the literature explains that the TRA has been 
widely used and has proved successful in predicting various domains of behaviour 
(Davis et al., 1989). The theory incorporates both personal and social components in 
the behavioural intention model. Specifically, the TRA contains two predictors of 
behavioural intention (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2: Theory of reasoned action 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bagozzi (1992) 
                                                 
5
 A careful use of the word ‘rational’ however should be emphasised as it might drive someone to a 
misunderstanding of the TPB. A brief explanation is provided in Section 2.4.1.1 (see Ajzen, 2014). 
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The first predictor is attitudes toward behaviour, a personal component in the TRA 
model.  Attitudes toward behaviour refer to the favourableness of one’s evaluation of 
the behaviour under studied. The second predictor is social norms, a social 
component in the TRA model. Social norm refers to a person’s perception of 
pressure from others to perform the behaviour under studied. The TRA postulates 
that performance of behaviour is determined by a person’s intention (behavioural 
intention) which is jointly determined by the person’s attitude and social norms with 
regard to the behaviour under studied.  According to the TRA, behavioural intention 
is the immediate antecedent of any behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986). Based on 
that notion, the TRA assumes that the stronger a person’s behavioural intention, the 
more the person is expected to put effort into the behaviour in question and 
ultimately the greater the likelihood that the person will actually perform the 
behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986). The accuracy of prediction is, however, subject 
to the time interval between the measurement of intention and the observation of the 
behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986). The TRA has a limitation where the TRA is 
only useful to predict intention of a behaviour that is under volitional control of the 
person. A behaviour is said under one’s volitional control if the behaviour is 
completely under a person’s control where the person can decide at will either to 
perform or not to perform the behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986). According to 
Ajzen and Madden (1986) the TRA is insufficient to predict behavioural intention 
which a person has not complete control over the behaviour.  
Realising that there are various kinds of behaviour that a person may get involved 
with, and not all the behaviours are under the person’s complete control, motivated 
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Ajzen to introduce the TPB, an extension to the TRA model. The TPB was 
introduced in the 1980s, where perceived behavioural control was added as one of 
the determinants of behavioural intention (see Figure 2.3). The TPB is a behavioural 
model that explains behaviours that are not completely under a person’s volitional 
control. The literature reports a considerable amount of research that supports the 
TPB (Bagozzi, 1992; Elliott, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003; Norman, Clark, & 
Walker, 2005).  
Figure 2.3: Theory of planned behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bagozzi (1992) 
The TPB proposes a person’s behaviour is predicted by behavioural intention based 
on three predictors which are conceptually independent of each other (Ajzen, 2006). 
The three predictors of intention are: first, the person’s evaluation of the behaviour 
(attitude); second, perceived social pressure to commit the behaviour (social norms); 
and third, the easiness and controllability of the behaviour (perceived behavioural 
control) to the person (Lee, 2011). Both the TRA and TPB maintain that behavioural 
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intention is an additive function of attitude and other factors. All the factors are 
compensatory to each other which ultimately makes these theories very flexible 
(Bagozzi, 1992).  
Past papers have proved the applicability of the TPB to predict ethical and unethical 
behaviour (Carpenter & Reimers, 2005; Chan, 1998; Cohen, Ding, Lesage, & 
Stolowy, 2010; Randall & Gibson, 1991; Rashidian & Russell, 2011; Shaw, Shiu, 
Hassan, Bekin, & Hogg, 2007). Randall and Gibson (1991), in their paper on ethical 
decision making in the medical field, report the success of the TPB in predicting 
nurses’ intention to report wrongdoing. Meanwhile, Chang (1998) asserts the 
effectiveness of the TPB in predicting intention for unethical behaviour. Park and 
Blenkinsopp (2009) used the TPB model to study the whistle-blowing intention 
among police officers in South Korea. In their study they found that all of the three 
core variables of the TPB have significant positive effects on whistle-blowing 
intentions.  
Although the TPB has been widely applied in behavioural research, the theory has 
been debated for its lack of explanatory power in testing different behavioural 
intentions in different contexts. In a meta-analysis paper by Sutton (1998), Sutton 
claimed that the TRA and the TPB explain, on average, between 40% and 50% of the 
variance in intention respectively, while for variance in behaviour both theories 
predict between 19% and 38%. Also, in a meta-analysis paper by Armitage and 
Conner (2001), the scholars report that the “TPB accounted for 27% and 39% of the 
variance in behaviour and intention, respectively” (p. 471) In other studies, the 
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explanatory power of the TPB has been reported as low as 13% and 7%  (Mirkuzie, 
Sisay, Moland, & Åstrøm, 2011). In other words, the percentage figures represent the 
ability of the three core variables of the TPB in explaining behavioural intention. The 
residual percentage indicates there are other variables which have not been included 
in the studies that might also have the potential to predict behavioural intention.    
The literature reveals that there is a considerable amount of behavioural research that 
uses the extended theory of planned behaviour (e.g. Conner & Armitage, 1998; Lin, 
2006; Warburton & Terry, 2000; Wu & Teng, 2011) by including additional 
variables. Several other researchers also decomposed the main variables of the TPB. 
The extension of the TPB is purposely to examine a broader range of behavioural 
predictors (Ajzen, 1991; Armitage & Conner, 2001). The decomposition of the TPB, 
on the other hand, occurs when the TPB main constructs are decomposed into 
multidimensional belief constructs (Taylor & Todd, 1995b). According to Taylor and 
Todd (1995b), the decomposition provides “a stable set of beliefs” (p. 151) which 
can be applied in a wider and broader setting Ultimately, it allows a more in-depth 
and improved understanding of the relationship between the variables under studied 
than the original TPB model. Previous studies by Taylor and Todd (1995a) and Shih 
and Fang (2004) decomposed the attitudinal beliefs and control beliefs from one-
dimensional variable into multi-dimensional variables. Bagozzi (1982) found the 
inappropriateness of combining multi-dimensional variables into one-dimensional 
variable where in the study invalid results were obtained. In this present study, both 
the extension and the decomposition of the TPB model are applied in order to 
optimise its explanatory power. 
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 2.5.1.1 Recent debate on the theory of planned behaviour 
Despite its popularity and longevity, the TPB and its predecessor, the TRA, are not 
exempt from receiving criticism from some scholars. Recently, Sniehotta, Presseau, 
and Araújo-Soares (2014), in their editorial article, share their (personal) view about 
the TPB. In their article, using a provocative title ‘Time to Retire the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour’, the scholars invited other scholars to stand up and give their 
comments (e.g. Abraham, 2014; Ajzen, 2014; Armitage, 2014; Conner, 2014; 
Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2014; Ogden, 2014; Rhodes, 2014; Schwarzer, 2014; 
Trafimow, 2014). The validity and utility of the TPB are the main points argued by 
Sniehotta et al.  The rest of the article is merely a list of other scholars’ criticisms of 
the theory which Sniehotta et al. cite in their editorial. Ajzen, the person who 
introduced the TPB, notes that in the editorial article the authors did not put any 
effort into further discussion of the criticisms that they cite (Ajzen, 2014). The 
editorial article, therefore, makes readers curious about the actual points that 
Sniehotta and his colleagues try to emphasise.    
Ajzen (2014) acknowledges that some scholars have misunderstood the TPB and 
they continuously criticise the theory based on a shallow and misleading knowledge 
of the theory. According to Ajzen, the diagram of the TPB is often used by 
researchers without reading and reasonably understanding the narrative that 
accompanies the diagram (Ajzen, 2014). Ajzen claims that such circumstance has 
brought scholars to a misconception about the theory. In addition, Ajzen states that 
some of the criticisms of the TPB, cited by Sniehotta et al., are false. The lists of 
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criticisms were used by Sniehotta et al. in an attempt to drive readers to the 
limitations of the TPB, on which they base their reasoning for the retirement of the 
theory. One of the points that Sniehotta et al. put forward is the TPB’s limited 
predictability of behaviour particularly when the studies used longitudinal rather than 
the ‘shortitudinal’ (Sniehotta et al., 2014, p. 1) types of research. Sniehotta et al. also 
claim that the TPB fails to encourage researchers to use longitudinal and 
experimental research. In fact, the use of ‘shortitudinal’ research is much more 
relevant as the theory measures intention of behaviour at one particular point in time. 
It is not possible, or at least very difficult, to measure intention using longitudinal 
research as the intention is very fragile and volatile as time passes by. With regard to 
this matter, Sniehotta et al. also raised the issue of the overuse of correlation analysis, 
which they personally view as unnecessary in the present day. Therefore, should the 
type of research (longitudinal, ‘shortitudinal’ (cross-sectional) or experimental) and 
type of analysis technique (correlational, regression, factorial, or structural equation 
modelling), which researchers use, be necessarily a fault of the theory? Various 
factors might lie behind the use of a certain type of research and the type of analysis 
used. Perhaps what Sniehotta et al. intend to highlight is the limited productivity of 
the original model of TPB in a health behaviour research context. Sniehotta et al. 
also mentioned behaviour change, but Ajzen (2014) explains in his counterargument, 
the TPB is not a theory of behaviour change. In fact, the TPB is developed to help 
explain and predict people’s intentions and behaviours and the theory serves as a 
good guide for researchers to design effective behaviour change interventions 
(Ajzen, 2014).  
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In response to Sniehotta et al.’s point concerning the failure of TPB in explaining 
behaviour from intentions, Ajzen (2014) explains that the prediction of behaviour 
from intention is subject to potential problems as that may rise at the time the actual 
behaviour is being performed. Also, the discrepancy between behaviour and 
intention might also be caused by the beliefs that individuals have during the real 
situation which is not really similar to the belief that they have for a hypothetical 
situation, a method which is usually used by researchers who apply TPB.   
Ajzen and Madden (1986) outline that a strong association between intention and 
behaviour depends on a few factors: first, the measure of intention should correspond 
in its level of generality to the criteria of the behaviour under investigation; and 
second, the intention must not have changed in the interval between the time at 
which it was assessed and the time at which the behaviour is observed. They further 
suggest that the accuracy of prediction usually varies inversely with the time interval 
between the time the intention being measured and the time the observation of 
behaviour took place. This is because the time gap might be filled with a number of 
events that may produce changes in intentions, or, unanticipated obstacles may 
prevent people from carrying out their intentions. If this matter has been highlighted 
by Ajzen in explaining the TPB, why should an argument still exist on this matter, 
especially three decades after the theory was introduced? The view from Sniehottal 
et al. is perhaps a matter of misunderstanding that has arisen from their side. There is 
also no sufficient explanation by Sniehotta et al. on the ‘quality’ of the research they 
refer to and use as evidence to prove the failure of the TPB. Any research is exposed 
to various incidences, including methodological problems, that might affect the 
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results. The incidences might concern errors, response bias, social desirability bias, 
errors or bias in measuring the items of constructs and errors that occur during 
transferring the data into a database. Lots of questions could be proposed for 
clarification before blaming the theory, particularly when unexpected results are 
gained from the research. 
Sniehotta et al. also forwarded other scholars’ criticisms that the TPB is exclusively 
focused on rational reasoning which has made the theory exclude the aspects of 
unconscious and emotions that might influence behaviour. In his article Ajzen (2014) 
explains that the “TPB does not propose that people are rational or that they behave 
in a rational manner” (p. 13) and “TPB makes no assumptions about the objectivity 
or veridicality of behavioural, normative and control beliefs” (p. 3). The TPB in fact 
stipulates that the belief that a person possesses, no matter how it is formed, will 
reasonably and consistently influence his/her attitudes, subjective norms, perceived 
control, intentions and behaviour. 
In answer to the comments concerning the low explanatory power of the TPB’s 
constructs in predicting intention, Ajzen admits that it has been the case in most of 
the previous studies that use the TPB model. In his explanation, Ajzen points out that 
the low explanatory power problem can be explained, in part, by the low reliability 
and validity of the constructs in that particular research. Apart from that, the use of 
three to four items to measure each construct, and the imperfection in measuring the 
constructs, might also be the reason for the low explanatory power. The low 
explanatory power of the three variables also illustrates that there are some other 
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variables that might influence intention and Ajzen does not totally prohibit 
researchers from adding new variable(s) to the original model of TPB. After all, the 
TPB is developed with an aim to understand human behaviour and human behaviour 
is a field of study that is very universal. Various factors may affect human behaviour 
and this might, in part, explain why the TPB is a general model. Indeed, in his 
previous article, Ajzen asserted: 
The theory of planned behavior is, in principle, open to the inclusion of 
additional predictors if it can be shown that they capture a significant 
proportion of the variance in intention or behavior after the theory’s current 
variables have been taken into account (Ajzen, 1991, p. 199).      
In their article, Sniehotta et al. expressed their negative view on the extended-TPB 
models which were currently practised by various researchers. For them, the 
“Extended-TPB models do a disservice to the novel ideas” (Sniehotta et al., 2014, p. 
4). They further pointed out that what is currently needed is a new theoretical 
development rather than extending the TPB. Urging the retirement of the TPB and 
rejecting the extending of the TPB, might indicate, to some readers, that Sniehotta et 
al. discredit the contributions that the TPB brings to behavioural research. Did they 
mean to say that the attitudes, social norms and perceived control are no longer 
relevant for investigation as the results of their effects are already known from past 
research? If a new theory is developed by anyone, should these three factors be 
excluded? If they do include them, is this a new theory or a replication of Ajzen and 
and Fishbein’s (1975, 1980) ideas?  
In consideration and conclusion of the above paragraphs, one question that came to 
the author’s mind is ‘Should the limitations of a theory be the reasons for its 
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retirement?’ This is a question that required a more delicate, careful and in-depth 
justification before Sniehotta et al. expressed their belief. Any theory might have its 
limitations, however, are the limitations a major or a minor concern? The theory has 
been used for the past three decades and has been applied to a wide range of actions. 
Bagozzi (1992) did mention that “one mark of the success of any theory is its 
longevity” (p. 178) which, in his article, he refers to the TRA and TPB. 
In addition to the comments by Ajzen, the following are some of the comments made 
by other authors. Armitage (2014) describes Sniehotta et al. “bemoan” (p. 2) the lack 
of studies that apply TPB in experimental studies. Armitage also points out that 
Sniehotta et al. should not interpret the mixed findings of TPB as the failure of TPB, 
but rather it should be viewed as a sign for further research. Conner (2014) disagrees 
with the action by Sniehotta et al. who interpreted the meta-analytic reviews of 
prospective correlation tests of TPB as the lack of power of TPB. Interestingly, 
Conner notes that Sniehotta et al. remain silent on the high explanatory power of 
variance, for both intentions and behaviour, which has been reported in the same 
meta-analytic research that they cite in their editorial article. Conner also notes that 
Sniehotta et al. gave little value to the extended model of TPB, but, at the same time, 
they do not mind new models that appear to include many of the same variables that 
have been tested in the extended version of the TPB (Conner, 2014). Gollwitzer and 
Oettingen (2014) share their opinions and suggest researchers, particularly in health 
behaviour studies, should be more careful in adapting general theories, such as the 
TPB, and be certain that the theories which they intend to use really fit with the 
research that they want to conduct. As suggested by Gollwitzer and Oettingen, any 
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general theories, when used in health behaviour, require proper adjustments and this 
is an important point that any health behaviour researcher should take into 
consideration. With regard to the retirement issue of the TPB, Gollwitzer and 
Oettingen point out that “the development of novel theories requires knowledge of 
what has been around. New theorists might do well to obtain knowledge of previous 
theory and to respect the past work of more weathered faculty” (p. 5). 
This debate provided some useful insights for the author and guided her to plan the 
research methodology based on learning taken from the weaknesses and strengths of 
the previous studies. The nature of the TPB that helps explain or predict people’s 
intention and behaviour shows that cross-sectional research is most suited to the 
TPB. Although the theory has been widely used in various behavioural studies, there 
are cases where the explanatory power of the theory is low. One of the reasons that 
lies behind it is the three variables (attitude, social norm and perceived behavioural 
control) of the theory do not fully explain the behaviour. In other words, there are 
other variables that might explain the behaviour. The theory, however, does not 
restrict any other variables from being added (extended TPB model) to the original 
model of the theory, after the original variables have been taken into account. The 
new variables selected for investigation must be based on strong literature. Another 
reason for the low explanatory power is the low reliability and validity of constructs 
as well as the imperfection in measuring the constructs. This point highlights the 
essence of a strong and carefully designed research instrument in a study. In this 
study, therefore, an extended TPB model is used in order to study more variables that 
may affect whistle-blowing intentions not restricted to the three core variables of 
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TPB. Along with the three core variables of the theory, four additional independent 
variables were added in the research conceptual framework. This is purposely to 
investigate the impact of those variables on whistle-blowing intention, as discussed 
in whistle-blowing literature. Despite the comments by Sniehotta et al. (2014) which 
are regarded by Ajzen (2014) as “misguided” (p.1) and by Conner (2014) as 
“misplaced or lacking in strong evidence” (p.1), this study uses the TPB with 
consideration of its limitations and has subsequently designed the research 
instrument accordingly. The ability of the TPB in explaining intention and behaviour 
has currency, proved in many behavioural research studies including 
entrepreneurship (for example, Souitaris, Zerbinati, & Al-Laham, 2007; Van 
Gelderen et al., 2008) and reporting intention (for example,  Stone, Jawahar, & 
Kisamore, 2009). Two particular elements have been added in this research and are 
discussed below. 
2.5.2 Bandura’s self-efficacy element in social cognitive theory 
Self-efficacy is one of the constructs in social learning theory which was introduced 
by Bandura in 1977 (Leganger, Kraft, & Roysamb, 2000). Self-efficacy also plays a 
key role in more recent theory, introduced by Bandura in the 1980s, known as social 
cognitive theory (Leganger et al., 2000; Manstead & Eekelen, 1998). According to 
Bandura, self-efficacy involves a person’s “judgment of how well one can execute 
courses of action required to deal with prospective situations” (Bandura, 1982, p. 
122). Self-efficacy is about optimistic beliefs which individuals possess about their 
ability to cope with various obstacles. This, in turn, shows their competency to face 
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challenging situations (Beu, Buckley, & Harvey, 2003). Self-efficacy looks at the 
qualities which make a person persevere, in challenging situations, with diligence, 
heightened problem solving skills and coping strategies (MacNab & Worthley, 
2008).  
Based on Bandura’s self-efficacy concept, the construct influences one’s actual 
behaviour via the efficacy expectancy on behavioural intentions. This efficacy 
expectancy is responsible for influencing people’s motivation to engage in a 
particular behaviour (Terry & O'Leary, 1995). According to Bandura (1982), self-
efficacy is not only a matter of what one knows what to do. Indeed, Bandura explains 
that efficacy requires one to be capable of organising his/her cognitive, social and 
behaviour skills into an integrated course of action. Self-efficacy is also about how 
individuals judge a situation on how much effort they should take and how long they 
can persist to the challenges and obstacles (Bandura, 1982). Relying on what they 
believe about their capability, individuals normally avoid activities which they think 
exceed their capability and choose to perform activities that they are assured they are 
able to manage (Bandura, 1982; Shoemaker, 1999). 
Self-efficacy, however, has been regarded by some scholars as similar to the 
perceived behavioural control variable, a construct in the TPB model. According to 
Terry and O'Leary (1995), Ajzen provides no specific explanation on the perceived 
behavioural control variable. Terry and O’Leary state that Ajzen conceptualised the 
perceived behavioural control variable as “the estimate of the extent to which the 
person has control over whether he or she is able to perform the behaviour, although 
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he also claims that the concept of perceived behavioural control is similar to the 
notion of self-efficacy” (Terry & O'Leary, 1995, p. 201). On his web page, Ajzen 
explains that although both the perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy 
variables are conceptually similar, operationally they are assessed differently (Ajzen, 
2006). Self-efficacy measures how likely a person can overcome obstacles that they 
encounter in the process of performing the behaviour, while perceived behavioural 
control is measured via assessment of how a person thinks that to perform a 
behaviour is under his/her own control. Bandura (1982) provides explanation of the 
distinction between perceived control and self-efficacy. According to Bandura, there 
are two types of expectancies that influence a person’s decision to engage in 
behaviour (Terry & O'Leary, 1995). The first expectancy is efficacy expectancies. 
Efficacy expectancies describe how a feeling of doubt about one’s ability to perform 
behaviour may discourage him/her from performing the behaviour. The second 
expectancy is outcome expectancy which describes that although a person feels 
confident that he/she able to perform the behaviour, he/she may be reluctant to 
perform due to his/her perception that the behaviour will not lead to the desired 
outcome. The outcome expectancy is viewed by Bandura as perceived control (Terry 
& O'Leary, 1995). Empirical evidences in literature shows that the perceived control 
variable is not similar to self-efficacy variable and should be distinguished (e.g. 
Tavousi et al., 2009; Terry & O'Leary, 1995; Trafimow et al., 2002; White, Terry, & 
Hogg, 1994).    
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2.5.3 Jones’s moral intensity element of ethical decision making  
Acknowledging that none of the previous ethical decision making models, such as 
Rest (1986), Trevino (1986), Ferrell and Gresham (1985), and other models (see 
Jones, 1991) incorporate the characteristics of the moral issue in their ethical 
decision making models, Jones (1991) proposed an issue contingent model. The issue 
contingent model specifically focuses on the moral intensity of the behaviour in 
question. According to Jones, moral intensity refers to “the characteristics of the 
moral issue itself” (Jones, 1991, p. 371). The moral intensity construct is relevant in 
ethical decision making as the ethical decision making process itself is an issue-
contingent matter, and it must be explicitly recognised and examined (Singhapakdi, 
Vitell, & Franke, 1999). Further, Jones claims that it is likely to be possible to  
measure moral intensity in a situation that apparently shows relatively large 
distinctions, for example, an action that results in death compared to actions that 
result in injuries (Jones, 1991). Accordingly, the investigation of moral intensity in 
this study is considered relevant.  
Reliant  on Rest’s model, Jones (1991) posits that there are six components of moral 
issue: magnitude of consequences (MC); social consensus (SC); probability of effect 
(PE); temporal immediacy (TI); proximity (P); and concentration of effect (CE), that 
directly influence each stage of the ethical decision making process (see Figure 2.4). 
These six components jointly function as a moral intensity construct; a construct that 
“captures the extent of issue-related moral imperative in a situation” (Jones, 1991, p. 
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372). The six components of moral intensity provided by Jones (1991) are described 
below. 
Magnitude of consequences: “the sum of harms (or benefits) done to 
victims (or beneficiaries) of the moral act in question” (p. 374). 
Social consensus: “the degree of social agreement that a proposed act is 
evil (or good)” (p. 375). 
Probability of effect: “is a joint function of the probability that the act in 
question will actually take place and the act in question will actually 
cause the harm (benefit) predicted” (p. 375). 
Temporal immediacy: “is the length of time between the present and the 
onset of consequences of the moral act in question (shorter length of time 
implies greater immediacy)” (p. 376). 
Proximity: “is the feeling of nearness (social, cultural, psychological, or 
physical) that the moral agent has for victims (beneficiaries) of the evil 
(beneficial) act in question” (p. 376). 
Concentration of effect: “is an inverse function of the number of people 
affected by an act of given magnitude” (p. 376). 
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Figure 2.4: An issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in 
organizations* 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
  Rest’s (1986) model  
 
* adapted from Jones (1991, p. 379 ) 
Moral intensity has received considerable attention by researchers. In a review paper 
by Loe, Ferrell, and Mansfield (2000), two studies that examined moral intensity 
were identified. The amount of research that examined this construct then increased 
to 32 studies, as reported in a paper by O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005). In the paper, 
consistent findings that support moral intensity as a significant predictor of ethical 
perceptions were mainly reported. 
With regard to the moral intensity variable, some previous researchers only 
examined some of the individual moral intensity components while others examined 
all of the components of moral intensity. The literature reveals that moral intensity 
has been investigated for its direct influence as well as its moderating effect on 
ethical perceptions and ethical intentions. In this study, all the six components of 
moral intensity are tested as a unit of moral intensity. All the components of moral 
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90 
 
intensity are crucial as they capture the extent of issue-related matters and are 
therefore relevant to the study.    
2.6 Variables affecting whistle-blowing intention and hypothesis 
development 
In this study, seven independent variables were examined. The variables are: 
attitudes toward whistle-blowing; injunctive norm; descriptive norm; perceived 
behavioural control; self-efficacy; organisational-professional conflict; and 
awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation. In addition, moral intensity was 
examined for its moderating effect on the individual relationship between the seven 
independent variables and the dependent variable (whistle-blowing intention). 
Demographic variables were tested for significant differences that may exist, if any, 
between respondents on the seven independent variables. These demographic 
variables are further treated as control variables.    
The variables for this study are elaborated on in the following paragraphs, based on 
the discussion above.  
2.6.1 Independent variables  
2.6.1.1 Attitudes toward whistle-blowing  
As discussed in section 2.5.1, attitudes toward specific behaviours refer to the degree 
of favourableness or unfavourableness of one’s evaluation of the behaviour 
understudied. The ‘attitudes’ variable is a personal component of the TRA and the 
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TPB. In general, the notion of these theories is the more one has favourable attitudes 
toward a specific behaviour, the higher the probability that the attitudes will 
positively influence the person’s intention toward performing the behaviour.    
Past empirical studies, in various research disciplines, found consistent results on the 
significant association between attitude and intention. Those studies include whistle-
blowing research on police officers by Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), research on 
corporate managers’ decision making by Carpenter and Reimers (2005), reporting on 
unethical and/or illegal behaviour by university students (Chang, 1998) and in the 
medical profession (Randall & Gibson, 1991), and intention to get involved in 
entrepreneurship (Autio, Keeley, Klofsten, Parker, & Hay, 2001; Kautonen, Van 
Gelderen, & Tornikoski, 2013). All of these studies report positive and significant 
relationships between attitude and intention. 
From the limited literature on whistle-blowing, as shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, 
there is a small amount of whistle-blowing research which examines the influence of 
attitudes toward whistle-blowing on the whistle-blowing intention. None of the past 
whistle-blowing research in an internal auditing context has examined this variable. 
Therefore, in this study, the influence of attitudes toward whistle-blowing on the 
whistle-blowing intention was examined and the relationship between these variables 
is hypothesised as:  
Hypothesis 1(H1): The whistle-blowing intention among internal auditors in the 
U.K. is positively influenced by the attitudes toward whistle-blowing.  
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2.6.1.2 Social norm (injunctive norm and descriptive norm) 
Social norm is a component of the TRA and the TPB. Social norm refers to the 
perceived social pressure on a person either to perform or not to perform the 
behaviour under studied. The general rule to describe the relationship between social 
norm and intention is the more positive and favourable social pressure to a person; 
the stronger the intention of the person to perform the behaviour.    
Findings from previous research report mixed results regarding the social influence 
on behavioural intention. In a meta-analytic review,  Armitage and Conner (2001) 
report social norm as a weak predictor of intention in the TPB model.  Due to the 
weak association between social norm and intention, which were continuously 
reported in previous research, some researchers have intentionally removed the 
variable in their study (e.g. Sparks, Shepherd, Wieringa, & Zimmermanns, 1995). 
However, in other studies, social norm has shown a significant influence on 
intention, for example, Finlay, Trafimow, and Moroi (1999), Carpenter and Reimers 
(2005), and Kautonen et al. (2013). In research by Chang (1998), social norm has no 
influence on the intention. Randall and Gibson (1991) reported only a moderate 
effect of social norm in influencing intention to report unethical behaviour in the 
medical profession. As reported by Armitage and Conner (2001), a possible reason 
for the weak relationship is due to poor measurement where a single-item is used.  
Sheeran and Orbell (1999) suggest a narrow conceptualisation of the social norm 
component might contribute to a better norm-intention relationship analysis. In 
conjunction with that, as explained in Sheeran and Orbell (1999), the distinction 
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“between the is (descriptive) and the ought (injunctive) meaning of social norm” 
Sheeran and Orbell (1999, p. 2112) should be highlighted since both norms drive 
different basis of motivation. Social norm which concerns the perception approval 
from significant others, to perform a behaviour, reflects an injunctive norm. 
Meanwhile, descriptive norm reflects the perception of whether significant others 
perform the behaviour under studied. Hence, in this study, the decomposition of 
social norm into injunctive norm and descriptive norm is applied and hypothesised 
as: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The whistle-blowing intention among internal auditors in the 
U.K. is positively influenced by the injunctive norm.  
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The whistle-blowing intention among internal auditors in the 
U.K. is positively influenced by the descriptive norm. 
2.6.1.3 Perceived behavioural control  
Perceived behavioural control refers to the perceived ease or difficulty to perform the 
behaviour under consideration. According to Ajzen and Madden (1986), the 
perceived behavioural control variable was added in the TPB to cater for situations 
where a person has no control over certain resources, such as time, money, skills and 
cooperation from others. The general rule that describes the association between 
intention and perceived behavioural control is the greater a person perceived he or 
she has control on the behaviour under studied, the stronger the person’s intention to 
perform the behaviour.  
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According to Armitage and Conner (2001), a behavioural study is unique in nature 
because there are no absolutes. Empirical findings reveal an inconsistent relationship 
between perceived behavioural control and behavioural intention in different 
behavioural studies. Randall and Gibson (1991), and Mahon, Cowan, and McCarthy 
(2006) found the role of perceived behavioural control on intention least influential 
when compared to attitude and social norm. In a study by Park and Blenkinsopp 
(2009) perceived behavioural control significantly influenced the internal whistle-
blowing intention.    
Blowing the whistle is not an easy decision for one to make and to blow the whistle 
is, in part, subject to how much control a person has to blow the whistle. Few 
whistle-blowing studies have examined the perceived behavioural control variable in 
their study such as Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), Chiu (2003) (this study specifically 
examines locus of control)6, and Ab Ghani, Galbreath, and Evans (2011) (internal 
locus of control)7. 
In this study, perceived behavioural control was examined for its influence on the 
whistle-blowing intention. The association between the perceived behavioural 
control and intention is hypothesised as:  
                                                 
6
 Locus of control is “a belief about whether the outcomes of our actions are contingent on what we do 
or on events outside our personal control” (Lee, 2013, p. 1047). 
7
 Internal locus of control is a “belief that outcomes are generally contingent upon the work and effort 
put into them” (Ab Ghani et al., 2011, p. 4). The internal locus of control was claimed as consistent 
with the perceived behavioral control variable and falls within the element of perceived behavioural 
control (Ab Ghani et al., 2011). 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): The whistle-blowing intention among internal auditors in the 
U.K. is positively influenced by perceived behavioural control. 
2.6.1.4 Self-efficacy 
Internal auditors are required to ethically-driven in performing their tasks. This 
requirement is truly emphasised by the IIA. However, when it comes to 
organizations, internal auditors also need to follow what is being practiced by the 
organizations and the practices might inconsistent with the IIA requirement. If this 
happens, in order for the internal auditors to perform their tasks in line with the IIA’s 
requirement, they might need to face with obstacles and challenges which exist in the 
organizations.  
In situations that need internal auditors to speak out or blow the whistle when they 
found any questionable practices, internal auditors may face with various challenges 
and obstacles. These challenges may come from top management officers, work 
colleagues or clients. The challenges may affect internal auditors’ capability to take 
right actions. Therefore, it is very essential to investigate internal auditors’ capability 
to take right actions in a difficult situation such as situation that needs them to blow 
the whistle on management’s wrong actions in managing organizations.   
According to Bandura (1986), self-efficacy is “judgment of one’s capability to 
accomplish  certain level of performance” (p. 391). Bandura also explain that self-
efficacy is one’s conviction that one can execute the behaviour that will produce the 
desired outcome (Bandura, 1977). Self-efficacy is a construct that evaluates one’s 
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competence to successfully perform the behaviour under consideration to reach a 
desired outcome (Elias, 2009).  
A person with high self-efficacy will continuously endeavour with greater effort 
(MacNab & Worthley, 2008). The general rule that describes self-efficacy in relation 
to the probability of performing a task is the more confidence one has, the higher the 
self-efficacy and the more he/she is motivated to succeed in performing the task and 
vice versa.  
As whistle-blowing is one option for internal auditors who have knowledge or 
observe any questionable practices, it is important to examine the internal auditors’ 
self-efficacy that may influence their whistle-blowing intention. Self-efficacy is 
relevant in this study as whistle-blowing is often related to a situation that may put 
individuals into a potentially stressful situation.   
Hypothesis 4: The whistle-blowing intention among internal auditors in the U.K. is 
positively influenced by self-efficacy.  
2.6.1.5 Organisational-professional conflict 
The work scope and job responsibilities of internal auditors require them to serve 
many interests – employer, client, public, shareholders and other stakeholders.  It 
puts internal auditors in conflict when the organisation’s or client’s expectations are 
incompatible with the professional standard of conduct which internal auditors need 
to adhere to. This coincides with Lenz and Sarens’s (2012) assertion that 
“positioning internal auditor as agent to the board and, at the same time, as partner to 
97 
 
management is challenging in practice, as there are potential tensions between the 
board and management” (p. 533). In this situation, organisational-professional 
conflict (OPC) may arise, as explained by Sorensen (1967). The OPC relates to a 
situation where the internal auditors are trapped between abiding the code of ethics 
and professional standards, on one hand, and obeying the employer’s or client’s 
decisions on the other. Aranya and Ferris (1984) and Sorensen (1967) investigated 
the influence of this conflict on the accountant’s attitudes and behaviours towards 
turnover and found a positive association between the variables. OPC has not been 
studied by previous whistle-blowing scholars in the internal auditing context, and it 
has also not been extensively studied in other behavioural studies. Brierley and 
Cowton (2000) in their meta-analysis of accounting studies, assert that the OPC is 
still relevant for investigation in today’s business ethics environment. Thus, the 
association between OPC and intention to blow the whistle is hypothesised as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The whistle-blowing intention among internal auditors in the 
U.K. is positively associated with perceived organisational-professional conflict.  
2.6.1.6 Awareness of the whistle-blowing protection legislation  
The existence of whistle-blowing protection acts (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Acts 2002 
(U.S.A.), Whistle-Blower Protection Act 1989 (USA), Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998 (U.K.), Whistle-Blower Protection Act 2010 (Malaysia)) are frequently 
mentioned in whistle-blowing literature. However, little is known about how the 
awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation impacts the intentions towards 
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whistle-blowing. There is an obvious notion that if people are not aware of the 
legislation, it is less likely that they will support whistle-blowing behaviour. Studies 
in other fields have shown a significant effect of awareness on attitudes, for example, 
marketing (Mainieri, Barnett, Valdero, Unipan, & Oskamp, 1997; Percy & Rossiter, 
1992), tourism (Lee & Moscardo, 2005), and information systems (Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010).  
As reported in a review paper by Vadera et al. (2009), previous studies have not 
extensively examined the effect of awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation on whistle-blowing behaviour. Vadera et al. (2009) recommend that more 
empirical studies on the role of laws on whistle-blowing should be conducted. One of 
the suggestions given by Vadera et al. (2009) is to examine how the law and its 
enforcement facilitate the progress of whistle-blowing across nations. In this study, 
the association between the awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation and 
intention towards whistle-blowing is examined and the relationship is hypothesised 
as: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The whistle-blowing intention among internal auditors in the 
U.K. is positively influenced by awareness of the whistle-blowing protection 
legislation.  
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2.6.2 Moderating variable 
2.6.2.1 Moral intensity  
According to Jones (1991), moral intensity, which has six components (as discussed 
in section 2.5.3), focuses on the characteristics of the issue under consideration. The 
combined effects of its components define the overall moral intensity.  
Based on the previous explanation of moral intensity (see section 2.5.3), Jones claims 
that the six components of moral intensity are expected to have interactive effects at 
least at some levels (Jones, 1991). In general, a low effect (high) in moral intensity is 
expected if: first, the action in question has negligible (severe) negative 
consequences (result on the MC); second, most people agree that the action is ethical 
(unethical) (result on the SC); third, the negative consequences are unlikely (certain) 
to actually happen (result on the PE); fourth, the time gap between the decision and 
the outcome is long (in immediate future) (result on the TI); fifth, the consequences 
are spread over a large (small) number of people (result on CE); and lastly, the 
decision maker is relatively removed from the list of people that might be affected 
(affects individuals that are close to the decision maker) (P) (Frey, 2000). 
Ethics literature suggests that one’s perceptions of the characteristics (intensity) of a 
moral issue are an important element in the decision making process (Singhapakdi et 
al., 1999) and the suggestion has been supported empirically. Singhapakdi, Vitell, 
and Kraft (1996) found empirical findings that support their hypotheses on the 
influence of moral intensity on marketers’ ethical perceptions and intentions. 
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Morris, and Ketchand (2001) found that magnitude of consequences (MC) and 
probability of effect (PE) influenced ethical judgement and behavioural intention. 
Similar findings have been found by Singhapakdi et al. (1999), where the moral 
intensity has a direct and indirect effect (mediating effect) on the intention. Taylor 
and Curtis (2010), who conducted a study in a public accounting firm, found a 
positive relationship between moral intensity and intention to whistle-blow.   
Moral intensity has also been tested for its moderating effect in previous research, for 
example, the moderating effect of magnitude of consequences on the relationship 
between attitudes, social norm, self-efficacy, financial cost and ethical climate on 
managers’ environmental ethical decision intentions, as revealed in Flannery and 
May (2000). The same finding was found by Bhal and Dadhich (2011).  
It can be surmised that whistle-blowing studies in an internal auditing context are in 
their infancy, and there is limited investigation on the moderating effect of moral 
intensity on the whistle-blowing intention. Thus, this study considers there is a need 
to investigate the moderating effect of moral intensity on the individual relationships 
established between independent variables: attitudes towards whistle-blowing; 
injunctive norm; descriptive norm; perceived behavioural control; self-efficacy; and 
organisational-professional conflict, and the dependent variable (internal auditors’ 
intention to blow a whistle).  All six components are tested as a unit of moral 
intensity.  
Based on the literature, people in the Britain were self-contained (Salter, Guffey & 
McMillan, 2001) and very concern with serious ethical situations. Therefore, in this 
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study, it is expected that moral intensity will moderate the relationship between the 
independent variables and dependent variables.  
Thus, it is hypothesised:  
Hypothesis 7a (H7a): Moral intensity will moderate the individual relationships 
between attitudes towards whistle-blowing and whistle-blowing intention. 
Hypothesis 7b (H7b): Moral intensity will moderate the individual relationships 
between injunctive norm and whistle-blowing intention. 
Hypothesis 7c (H7c): Moral intensity will moderate the individual relationships 
between descriptive norm and whistle-blowing intention. 
Hypothesis 7d (H7d): Moral intensity will moderate the individual relationships 
between perceived behavioural control and whistle-blowing intention. 
Hypothesis 7e (H7e): Moral intensity will moderate the individual relationships 
between self-efficacy and whistle-blowing intention. 
Hypothesis 7f (H7f): Moral intensity will moderate the individual relationships 
between organizational-professional conflict and whistle-blowing intention. 
Hypothesis 7g (H7g): Moral intensity will moderate the individual relationships 
between awareness towards whistle-blowing protection legislation and whistle-
blowing intention. 
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2.6.3 Dependent variable 
2.6.3.1 Whistle-blowing intention 
As mentioned in section 2.5.1, the TPB is a theory that predicts and explains an 
individual’s behaviour (Ajzen, 1985). According to the TPB, the intention to perform 
or not to perform a particular behaviour has been identified as the best proxy for 
justifying the actual behaviour. Behavioural intention refers to the probability of the 
individual to engage in the behaviour being studied (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). The 
TPB asserts that the stronger the intention to perform a behaviour, the greater the  
likelihood to perform the behaviour. This study is concerned with the intention to 
blow the whistle by internal auditors in the U.K. The nature of investigating the 
decision to whistle-blow involves a sensitive and confidential element, therefore 
examining intention is more appropriate and practical, rather than investigating the 
actual whistle-blowing behaviour. This is examined by means of scenarios. 
2.6.4 Control variables  
2.6.4.1 Demographic variables 
In this present study, five demographic characteristics of internal auditors are treated 
as control variables. The five demographic profiles are gender, age, years of work 
experience in internal auditing, client categories and employment position. All of 
these demographic profiles are examined for significant differences with regard to 
the seven independent variables tested in this study.  
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2.6.4.1.1 Gender 
In the ethical decision making literature, gender is one of the most common variables 
tested (Craft, 2013; Loe et al., 2000; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Mixed findings 
are reported in two review papers by Loe et al. (2000) and O'Fallon and Butterfield 
(2005). According to these authors the majority of published papers found either no 
significant gender differences or found females were more ethically sensitive and 
less tolerant of unethical practices than their male counterparts. While the results on 
gender differences might be regarded as mixed or inconclusive, it is notable that 
males were rarely found to be more ethically sensitive than females. The findings on 
gender differences have been reported as inconclusive (Loe et al., 2000). Similar to 
what has been reported by Loe et al. and O’Fallon and Butterfield, Vadera et al. 
(2009) report that previous research on gender and whistle-blowing have reported 
inconsistent findings. Hyde (2005) introduces gender similarities hypothesis which 
holds that males and females are much alike on most, but not all, psychological 
variables. Consequently, in this study, gender groups were analysed for their 
significant differences in the seven independent variables. 
2.6.4.1.2 Age 
According to Deshpande (1997), age is a demographic variable that has seldom been 
investigated in literature on ethical beliefs and decision making. In a more recent 
ethical decision making review article, there are fewer studies on age (Craft, 2013). 
However, a review of ethical decision making literature suggests that age is one of 
the predictors of ethical attitude. Loe et al. (2000), O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) 
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and Craft (2013) report mixed and inconsistent findings regarding the effect of age 
on the ethical decision making process. From these review papers, it was found that 
quite a few researchers report that there are no significant age differences with regard 
to ethical decision making. However, there were also a few researchers who reported 
that age has a positive relationship with the ethical decision making process. 
However, a number of previous researchers reported a negative relationship between 
age and the ethical decision making process. Similar findings have been reported in a 
review article on whistle-blowing, for example, Vadera et al. (2009) reported mixed 
findings on the association between age and whistle-blowing. These mixed findings 
suggest that there is a complex association involving age and the ethical decision 
making process, including matters concerning whistle-blowing. Therefore, in this 
study, responses on the seven independent variables were compared based on the age 
groups of the participants. 
2.6.4.1.3 Internal auditing work experience 
In a review paper by Loe et al. (2000), the authors list work experience as one of the 
variables that has received attention for investigation by previous researchers in the 
ethical decision making field. Loe et al. reviewed eighteen empirical papers that 
examined education and work experience and found that only three of the papers (by 
Kidwell, Stevens and Bethke (1987), Callan (1992) and Kohut and Corriher (1994)) 
had: first, specifically associated the length of employment with ethical values; and 
second, used actual personnel (state employees) in organisations as their samples.  
Two of these papers (Callan (1992) and Kohut and Corriher (1994)) found that the 
length of employment does not relate with ethical values while in the third paper 
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(Kidwell, Stevens and Bethke 1987) it was found that the greater the work 
experience a manager had, the more ethical responses they gave. The other papers 
report findings on education and work position. However, no investigation on length 
of work experience was conducted. In a more recent review paper on ethical decision 
making literature (see O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), mixed findings were reported 
by previous researchers. The findings mainly report there were no significant 
relationship between work experience and moral reasoning. With reference to the 
association between work experience and whistle-blowing, Vadera et al. (2009) 
found that most of the previous research that they reviewed focused on the 
association between the work experience and the whistle-blowing channels (external 
or internal). Because some studies have found a relationship, in this study, responses 
by the respondents from different lengths of work experience were examined for any 
significant differences with regard to the seven tested independent variables. 
2.6.4.1.4 Client categories 
As listed in Table 2.2, there are a few researchers who have previously conducted 
whistle-blowing studies among internal auditors in the public and private sectors 
(Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Miceli et al., 1991). However, none of the researchers 
has examined the possible differences in perception between internal auditors who 
audit public organisations and internal auditors who audit private organisations. So 
far, previous research examined perceptions of individuals based on their job 
positions (e.g., job position as internal auditors, external auditors and market analysts 
as studied by Arnold & Ponemon, 1991) or based on job performance (e.g., Miceli et 
al., 1991). Yet, there is no study on whistle-blowing that examines different 
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perceptions of whistle-blowing between internal auditors in public and private 
sectors. In addition, it is difficult to find research on ethical decision making 
involving internal auditors that compares different organisational environments (e.g. 
public sector versus private sector). However, the issue on the differences which may 
exist between organisation members from the two different organisation 
environments has been heavily discussed in public management literature. The 
discussion has subsequently seen many researchers start to examine differences, if 
any, between public and private management and leadership, among others. Wittmer 
(1991) (as cited in Andersen, 2010) states that personnel who work in the public 
sector are dissimilar to personnel in private sectors in terms of their work-related 
values, reward preferences, needs and personality types. Similar findings are also 
found by Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman (1995). The authors reported that there were 
notable differences between public and private managers on their personnel rules and 
constraints. Based on the arguments, discussions and findings from public 
management literature, this study examines the differences, if any, in the responses 
on the seven independent variables, between internal auditors who audit public 
organisations and internal auditors who audit private companies. 
2.6.4.1.5 Employment position 
This study has a concern with internal auditors’ judgments. This study perceives that 
employment position might affect internal auditors’ judgment during their audit 
works. There are two main employment positions of internal auditors: in-house and 
outsourced. As cited in Henderson (1997), Goodwin (1996) states that the types of 
employment (in-house or outsourced) of individuals in organisations has an impact 
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on how an individual perceives their judgments (Ahlawat & Lowe, 2004), roles and 
responsibilities.  
A considerable number of previous research examined the ability of internal auditors 
to maintain their independence and objectivity (i.e., Ahlawat & Lowe, 2004) in 
pursuing their different roles (assurance provider or consultant) (Stewart & 
Subramaniam, 2010). The research found that internal auditors who engaged in both 
assurance and consulting activities are exposed to a self-review threat and/or a social 
pressure threat (Stewart & Subramaniam, 2010) which subsequently may impair their 
objectivity. The discussion and findings from the research leads the author to 
examine internal auditors’ judgment on ethical situations based on their employment 
position (in-house and outsourced). Not only might different roles impair their 
independence and objectivity, there are other factors, such as employment position, 
that may also affect their judgment and further their independence and objectivity.  
Studies on internal auditors’ judgement are limited and extension to different 
situations are warranted (Stewart & Subramaniam, 2010). Therefore, this study 
examined the judgment by internal auditors from different employment position. 
Previous internal audit research on outsourcing examined the extent of outsourcing 
(i.e., Carey, Subramaniam, & Ching, 2006; Martin, Lavine, Baker, & O’Leary, 2000; 
Selim & Yiannakas, 2000). However, not much research has examined to what 
extent in-house and outsourced internal auditors differs in their judgment and 
decision making. Different employment position of internal auditors create a 
different type of relationship; first, employer-employee (in-house internal auditors) 
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and second, firm-client (outsourced). The different relationship may further brings to 
different dilemma faced by internal auditors and subsequently may affect their 
judgments. Schneider (2008) (as cited in Mahzan, Zulkifli, & Umor, 2012) contends 
that outsourced internal auditors are indeed different from in-house internal auditors. 
According to Schneider, the two groups of internal auditors have dissimilarity in 
terms of the management control upon them. The nature of employer-employee 
relationship provides in-house internal auditors with more conflict of interests. As 
employees, they are expected to do what management team asked them to do 
including not to report any questionable practices that occur in their workplace. 
Obeying to the management orders is very important to them, which in turn may 
affect their remuneration and career. Compared to in-house position, outsourced 
position provides internal auditors with lesser conflicts. While safeguarding the 
interests of clients is a priority for them, the firm-client relationship has one 
advantage over the employer-employee relationship. In general, outsource firms have 
a portfolio of clients. The portfolio helps outsource firms to diversify risk better 
(Ahlawat & Lowe, 2004) than in-house internal auditors. Outsourced internal 
auditors have more reasons for behaving appropriately for their own reputational 
capital and avoiding costs of malpractice suits (Ahlawat & Lowe, 2004). Although 
previous research has found minimal difference, between in-house and outsourced 
internal auditors (see Mahzan et al., 2012), this issue has been very little studied. 
Therefore, in this present study, responses on the seven tested variables by the two 
groups of internal auditors are explored. 
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In the U.K., outsourcing services has become a major consideration for organization  
and the limited research that has examined the employment position variable 
provides avenue for further research. Therefore, in this present study, responses on 
the seven tested variables by the two groups of internal auditors are explored. 
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2.7 Research conceptual framework 
The above explanation of the variables tested in this study is summarised in the 
research conceptual framework as shown below.   
Figure 2.5: Research conceptual framework of whistle-blowing intentions    
among internal auditors  
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2.7.1 Variables definition 
Definitions of each of the variables are as listed below.    
Attitudes towards 
whistle-blowing 
Injunctive norm 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
Self-efficacy 
Organisational-
professional conflict 
Awareness of whistle-
blowing legislation  
Moral intensity 
i. Magnitude of consequences ii. Probability of effect 
iii. Social consensus iv. Temporal immediacy 
v. Proximity vi. Concentration of effect 
Intention 
towards 
whistle-
blowing 
Control variables 
 
i. Age ii. Gender 
iii. Working 
experience 
iv. Client 
categories 
v. Employment 
position 
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1. Awareness of whistle-blowing legislation: Possession of knowledge of 
the existence of whistle-blowing protection legislation in the U.K.  
2. Attitudes (towards whistle-blowing): Feelings of favourable or 
unfavourableness which a person holds on whistle-blowing.    
3. Injunctive norms: Perceptions of important people’s approval of a 
person’s (whistle-blowing) behaviour (Park & Smith, 2007). 
4. Descriptive norms: Perceptions possessed by a person of whether the 
important others themselves perform the (whistle-blowing) behaviour 
(Park & Smith, 2007). 
5. Perceived behavioural control: A person’s perceptions of the 
controllability or power he/she has in performing the (whistle-blowing) 
behaviour.  
6. Self-efficacy: A person’s perceptions of his/her capability to overcome a 
series of obstacles in performing the behaviour.  
7. Organisational-professional conflict: A situation when professional 
loyalties, which a person should hold, are incompatible with the 
organisational loyalties which are demanded upon them.     
8. Moral intensity: A multidimensional construct that “captures the extent 
of issue-related moral imperative in a situation” (Jones, 1991, p. 372). 
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9. Intention: Indication of a person’s willingness to perform the (whistle-
blowing) behaviour.   
10. Whistle-blowing: The action of disclosing an organisation’s illegal 
and/or unethical practices by organisation members (former or current) to 
the person or party who have authority (internal and/or external channels) to 
take remedial action (Near & Miceli, 1985). 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the theoretical and empirical literature on whistle-blowing. 
Whistle-blowing studies have been completed in various fields and involve various 
professions. However, limited empirical research in an internal auditing context was 
available. Most of the empirical studies were conducted in the U.S.A. and no 
empirical whistle-blowing studies in an internal audit context that have been 
conducted in the U.K. Reviews by MacNab and Worthley (2008) and Vadera et al. 
(2009) found that individual variables have received little attention in previous 
studies and more research on individual variables in whistle-blowing studies, 
particularly in an internal auditing context, is needed. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Methodology and Method 
3.0 Introduction 
The two preceding chapters of this thesis discussed whistle-blowing issues in the 
internal auditing context. A body of literature was presented, reviewed and 
discussed. Some of the variables discussed in the literature were then put forward 
and hypothesized for further investigation. 
In this chapter, research methodology and research method are discussed. In the first 
section of this chapter, the research aims and objectives of this study are restated as a 
reminder of the core investigation of this study. Following this, the general research 
methodology and research method are discussed. The general types of research 
philosophy are put forward in the subsequent section and are followed by a 
discussion. The specific research approach used in this study is explained in the 
fourth section then, in the fifth and sixth sections, research populations and samples, 
and data collection method are discussed respectively.  
3.1 Research aim and objectives 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the principal aim of this study is to investigate factors 
that influence an internal auditor’s intention to blow the whistle. Seven individual-
level factors are examined for their influence on the internal auditor’s intention to 
blow the whistle. Three objectives of this study are: 
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1) To determine whether there are significant differences between respondents 
from various demographic backgrounds (gender, age, work experience, 
client categories and employment position) in all of the independent 
variables examined in this study. 
2) To investigate the individual-level factors (attitudes towards whistle-
blowing, injunctive norm, descriptive norm, perceived behavioural control, 
self-efficacy, organisational-professional conflict and awareness of the 
whistle-blowing protection legislation) that influence an internal auditor’s 
intention to blow the whistle upon discovering unethical and/or illegal 
behaviour during their audit work. 
3) To identify the moderating effect of moral intensity on the individual 
relationship established between the individual-level factors and the whistle-
blowing intention. 
3.2 Research methodology and research method 
Oppenheim (1992) explains the distinctions between research design (also known as 
research methodology) and research technique (also known as research method). 
Research design is defined as a “basic plan or strategy of the research, and the logic 
behind it, which will make it possible and valid to draw more general conclusions 
from it” (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 6). According to Miller (1983), research methodology 
provides a body of knowledge which enables researchers to explain and analyse their 
research method. The research methodology should be able to answer research 
questions and to make valid inferences in terms of generalization, association and 
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causality (Oppenheim, 1992).  On the other hand, research method is a subset of 
research methodology. Research method refers to “methods used for data generation 
and collection” (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 6). Both the research methodology and 
research method play a core role in providing essential information related to the 
study. Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) assert that research method is crucially 
important because it links the theory and the argument which researchers use to 
inform others about their research and data.  
Bryman and Bell (2007) claim that the selection of a research method is made based 
on preference after a range of research process dimensions have been considered. 
The selection of the research method includes the methodological procedure used in 
sampling technique, medium used for data collection and statistical analysis, which 
are also prudently determined. Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009) emphasize that 
further to the comprehensive research plan, any constraints and ethical issues which 
the research encounters should also be taken into account. 
3.3 Research philosophies 
Research philosophies provide readers with information on a researcher’s holistic 
belief in viewing the world and/or the phenomenon being studied. In social science, 
there are two main dimensions of research philosophy: ontology and epistemology.  
According to Scotland (2012), “ontology is the study of being” (p.9). Scotland 
further describes ontology as how researchers perceive “how things really are and 
how things really work” (p.9). Saunders et al. (2009)  describe ontology as the  
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“nature of reality” (p.110). Overall, the ontology paradigm is a concern about reality. 
The ontology of the research provides answers to the question of “what is the nature 
of the social and political reality to be investigated” (Hay, 2002, p.63 cited in Grix, 
2002). Answers to that question will then guide researchers to the next aspect of 
research philosophy – the epistemology.  
Epistemology is concerned with discovering the existence of knowledge (Grix, 2002) 
and is also described as acceptable knowledge (Bryman & Bell, 2007). According to 
Scotland (2012), epistemology is the nature and form of knowledge and how the 
knowledge is created.  
To summarise, ontology is about “what is out there to know about” while 
epistemology is about “what and how we can know about it”  (Grix, 2002, p. 175). 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the difference between ontology and epistemology.  
There are two main research philosophies of ontological and epistemological 
position in social science research (Creswell, 2009). Creswell describes the first 
branch of the research philosophy as a quantitative research that relies on objectivism 
as a way of viewing the world/phenomenon and consequently bases its work on 
empirical results which are obtained from scientific and experimental analysis. The 
second branch of the research philosophy is labelled as a qualitative research, the 
nature of which is described as phenomenological and radical. Its analysis requires a 
more subjective view. Creswell also relates the latter research philosophy as 
interpretive and post-positivistic. 
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Table 3.1:  Distinctions between ontology and epistemology 
Dimensions of philosophy Definition 
Ontology What exists in the world 
Epistemology How we come to know about what exists 
Source: Adapted from Schuh and Barab (2007, p. 71) 
According to Grix (2002), two ontological positions are objectivism and 
constructivism and two epistemology positions are positivism and interpretivism. 
3.3.1 Ontological positions: objectivism versus constructivism 
Ontology “defines what is real in the world, whether physical or abstract structures”  
(Schuh & Barab, 2007, p. 70). Objectivism is derived from two basic elements: 
realism and essentialism (Jonassen, 1991). Realism is a belief that the world, which 
is separate to humans and human experience, really exists. According to Lakoff 
(1987), knowledge is available for humans to seek. In other words, realists believe 
that knowledge will be similarly understood by humans. According to Trigg (1980), 
realism “indicates the view that reality exists independently of our conceptions of it, 
though it may coincide with them” (p. 3). Trigg (1980) further distinguishes realism 
from ‘idealism’, a view which purports that everything that exists is dependent on the 
mind. Essentialism, on the other hand, refers to a nucleus element which is necessary 
for making something be what it should be, without which it would not be the thing 
that it should be (Jonassen, 1991). In conclusion, from the objectivist’s point of view, 
reality exists on its own and is independent of humans (Vrasidas, 2000). 
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A contrasting view to objectivism is constructivism. From the constructivist’s point 
of view, knowledge does not exist independent of humans, but is, in fact, constructed 
(Vrasidas, 2000). Simplified by Jonassen (1991), if the emphasis of objectivism is on 
object, constructivism puts attention on how knowledge is constructed. According to 
Jonassen (1991), construction of knowledge may be affected by previous experience, 
mental structures and beliefs which individuals hold in interpreting the objects or 
events. Jonassen (1991) notes that constructivism includes the existence of external 
reality in constructing their own reality. The assumptions which underlie the views of 
objectivism and constructivism are shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Assumptions inherent in objectivism and constructivism 
 Objectivism Constructivism 
Reality  
(real 
world) 
External to the knower. 
Structure determined by entities, 
properties, and relations. 
 
Structure can be modelled. 
Determined by the knower. 
Dependent upon human mental 
activity. 
Product of mind. 
Symbolic procedures construct 
reality. 
Structure relies on 
experiences/interpretations. 
Mind Processor of symbols. 
Mirror of nature. 
Abstract machine for 
manipulating symbols. 
Builder of symbols. 
Perceiver/interpreter of nature. 
Conceptual system for constructing 
reality. 
Thought Disembodied: independent of 
human experience. 
Governed by external reality. 
Reflects external reality. 
Manipulates abstract symbols. 
Represents (mirrors) reality. 
Atomistic: decomposable into 
“building blocks”. 
Algorithmic. 
Classification. 
Embodied: grows out of bodily 
reality. 
 
Grounded in 
perception/construction. 
Grows out of physical and social 
experience. 
Imaginative: enables abstract 
thought. 
More than representation (mirrors) 
of reality.  
Gestalt properties. 
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Relies on ecological structure of 
conceptual system.  
Building cognitive models. 
Meaning Corresponds to entities and 
categories in the world.  
Independent of the 
understanding of any organism. 
External to the understander. 
Does not rely on correspondence to 
world. 
Depending upon understanding. 
 
Determined by understander. 
Symbols Represent reality. 
Internal representations of 
external reality (“building 
blocks”). 
Tools for constructing reality. 
Representations of internal reality. 
 
Source: Adapted from Jonassen (1991, p. 7) 
3.3.2 Epistemological positions: positivism versus interpretivism 
Epistemology “concerns what constitutes acceptable knowledge” (Saunders et al., 
2009, p. 112). It addresses four main, related, aspects of human knowledge: origins, 
nature, methods and limits (Reber, 1995). According to Grix (2002), epistemology is 
categorized into positivism and interpretivism.  
Positivists believe that reality is observable and explainable. According to Kirk and 
Miller (1986) the real world provides the best answer to the phenomenon being 
studied. This is parallel with the way positivists view a phenomenon which is 
independent of the process or circumstances involved in interpreting it. Willig (2001) 
notes that the goal of conducting positivist research is to produce “objective 
knowledge” (p. 3) which can be achieved without any personal involvement from the 
researcher. 
Interpretivists are also known as anti-positivists (Mack, 2010). The core principle of 
interpretivism is any phenomenon that cannot be objectively observed, instead it 
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needs to be experienced. In contrast to positivists whose objective is ‘to explain’, the 
interpretivist’s aim is ‘to understand’ (which is very subjective in nature) before they 
can proceed to the explaining stage. In the interpretivist point of view, reality is an 
event which surrounds many people. These people then interpret the reality 
differently. 
The ontological and epistemological positions of a positivist and interpretivist are 
summarized in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Ontological and epistemological positions of a positivist and 
interpretivist 
 Positivist Interpretivist 
Ontology 
assumptions 
 Reality is external to the 
researcher and 
represented by objects 
in space.  Objects have meaning 
independently of any 
consciousness of them.  Reality can be captured 
by our senses and 
predicted. 
 
 Reality is indirectly 
constructed based on 
individual interpretation 
and is subjective.  People interpret and make 
their own meaning of 
events.  Events are distinctive and 
cannot be generalized.  There are multiple 
perspectives on one 
incident.  Causation in social 
sciences is determined by 
interpreted meaning and 
symbols. 
Epistemology 
assumptions 
 The methodology of the 
natural sciences should 
be employed to study 
social reality.  Truth can be attained 
because knowledge 
rests on a set of firm, 
unquestionable, 
indisputable truths from 
 Knowledge is gained 
through a strategy that 
“respects the differences 
between people and the 
objects of natural sciences 
and therefore requires the 
social scientist to grasp the 
subjective meaning of 
social action”. 
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which our beliefs may 
be deduced.   Knowledge is generated 
deductively from a 
theory or hypothesis.  Knowledge is objective. 
 Knowledge is gained 
inductively to create 
theory.  Knowledge arises from 
particular situations and is 
not reducible to simplistic 
interpretation.  Knowledge is gained 
through personal 
experience. 
Source: Adapted from Mack (2010, pp. 7-8) 
3.3.3 Research strategy: quantitative versus qualitative versus 
mixed-method research 
There are three main research strategies: quantitative; qualitative; and mixed-method. 
According to Brannen (2005), a research strategy is chosen based on the 
epistemological position of the research. Bryman (2012) asserts that apart from the 
epistemology, the ontological considerations and the connection between theory and 
research also contribute to the classification of quantitative and qualitative research. 
In addition, selection of research strategy is also based on the research objectives and 
the research questions (Bazeley, 2008). 
In quantitative research design, researchers use scientific method, embark on specific 
theory, develop hypotheses and analyse data using quantitative methods (Warfield, 
2010).  
On the other hand, qualitative researchers observe and interact with events being 
studied. The direct involvement of the qualitative researcher, with the events, might 
influence the interpretation of the data being analysed (Warfield, 2010).  
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Literature on research methodology revealed that some scholars describe quantitative 
research as a research that relies heavily on the use of number (number-oriented, for 
instance, percentage, mean, and median), while qualitative research is a research that 
uses words more than numbers (explanation or justification-oriented). This idea, 
however, seems contradicted by Brannen (2005). Brannen disagreed with some 
scholars’ idea that associates, first, the quantitative research with hypothetic-
deduction and, second, the qualitative research with inductive logic of enquiry. From 
Brannen’s point of view, both types of research strategy may employ both forms of 
logic. 
Within the literature, there are many different terms used to describe quantitative and 
qualitative researchers. According to Bryman (1984), quantitative researchers are 
known as ‘positivist’ and ‘empiricist’ and qualitative researchers are referred to as 
‘naturalistic’, ‘ethnographic’, ‘interpretivist’ and ‘constructivist’.  
A mixed-method strategy may also be used by researchers (Bryman, 2006). Mixed-
method research contains elements of both qualitative and quantitative approach 
(Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011; Warfield, 2010). Although, some scholars assert that 
mixed-method research is relevant and current (Bryman, 2006), there is considerable 
debate on mixed-method research in literature.  This includes: debates on the types of 
study that are suitable for a mixed-method strategy; the philosophical position of 
mixed-method research; validity strategies; rationales for using mixed-method 
research; and data analysis (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Theoretically mixed-
method research may be ideal. However, in practice, it is very challenging and real 
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life is complicated. It is difficult to match or to integrate the philosophical view of 
quantitative research and qualitative research in one as both research strategies view 
the world differently. Furthermore, there are other considerations, such as: type of 
project; type of data collection and operations; type of data analysis; and inferences 
(Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011) that researchers need to take into account in using a 
mixed-method strategy. More challenges are expected when a mixed-method is used 
(Clark & Creswell, 2011). Bazeley (2008) provides a list of situations when mixed-
method is usually applied (see Table 3.4). In this study a pure quantitative research 
strategy is adopted as it is most appropriate for the aim of the research.   
Table 3.4: Situations appropriate to use mixed-methods 
Mixed-methods are appropriate when: 
i. Complementary data are sought, either qualitative data to enhance 
understanding of quantitative findings, or quantitative data to help generalize 
or test qualitative insights. 
ii. Different methods are appropriate for different elements of the project, with 
each contributing to an overall picture. 
iii. Data are sought from multiple independent sources, to offset or counteract 
biases from each method, in order to confirm, validate or corroborate the 
results and conclusions of the study. 
iv. The goal of an evaluative study is to understand both process and outcome. 
v. One method provides data that is useful in preparation for the other, for 
example, when interviews or focus groups provide the basis for design of 
survey or scale items, or when a quantitative survey is used to design a 
sample for qualitative interviewing.  
Source: Bazeley (2008) 
Each research strategy has its own form for constructing research as shown in Table 
3.5. 
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Table 3.5: The forms of quantitative, qualitative and mixed-methods research 
Quantitative Qualitative Mixed-methods 
a. Experimental 
Researcher needs to 
design specific 
conditions to test their 
theories or 
propositions. Also, 
controlling the 
experiment is crucial to 
isolate the associations 
between the 
independent and 
dependent variables.  
b. Quasi-experimental* 
c. Correlational* 
d. Descriptive* 
 
* In (b) – (d), researchers 
study phenomena without 
the ability to control or 
manipulate variables. 
Researchers only collect 
information from existing 
data and determine 
relationships without 
inferring causality or 
develop additional 
techniques for gathering 
the information (i.e. 
surveys). 
a. Narrative 
This design is used 
when a study has a 
specific contextual 
focus such as 
classroom and 
students. Usually it 
involves 
biographical, life 
history of one or 
more individuals. 
b. Phenomenology 
Is used when the 
study involves life 
experiences of a 
concept or 
phenomenon 
experienced by one 
or more individuals. 
c. Grounded Theory 
This form of 
research is used 
when the researcher 
wants to generate or 
discover a theory. 
d. Ethnography 
This research form 
is used when the 
subject involves an 
entire cultural 
group. 
e. Case study 
Is used to study one 
or more cases within 
a bounded setting or 
context.   
a. Complementary 
Researchers 
combined the 
results of one 
method with the 
results of the other 
method. 
b. Development 
Results from one 
method help 
develop or inform 
the other method. 
c. Initiation 
Researchers recast 
the results from 
one method to 
questions or 
results from the 
other method. 
d. Expansion 
Different methods 
are used to extend 
the breadth or 
range of inquiry. 
Source: Warfield (2010, pp. 29-30) 
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3.3.4 Method of reasoning: deductive versus inductive 
Method of reasoning is another aspect worthy of discussion. In general there are two 
main reasoning methods: deductive and inductive (Hyde, 2000; Spens & Kovács, 
2006). Both of the reasoning methods entail a series of distinctive steps. 
In deductive reasoning researchers start with an “an abstract, logical relationship 
among concepts then move(s) towards concrete empirical evidence” (Neuman, 1997, 
p. 46). Accordingly, deductive researchers initiate their works on a well-established 
theory. Researchers then select variables as discussed in the theory and the literature 
for their research and investigation. Hypotheses are then developed for further 
analysis (Ali & Birley, 1999). The deductive reasoning approach is also known as a 
hypothetico-deductive method (Sekaran, 2003) and is described as a theory testing 
process (Hyde, 2000). Henwood and Pidgeon (1993) illustrate deductive reasoning as 
a perspective which emphasises “universal laws of cause and effect on an 
explanatory framework which assumes a realist ontology; that is reality consists of a 
world of objectively defined facts” (p. 15).  
Alternatively, inductive reasoning is quite the opposite. Inductive reasoning is 
described as a theory building process (Hyde, 2000; Spens & Kovács, 2006). The 
reasoning process starts with observations then generalizations about the studied 
phenomenon are made. In summary, inductive reasoning moves from a specific 
observation(s) to general law (Spens & Kovács, 2006). In this study, a deductive 
reasoning approach is used. 
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3.3.5 Interrelationship between each building block of the research 
The research philosophy, research methodology and research method represent 
building blocks of the research. The interrelationship between each of the building 
blocks is shown in the following diagram.   
Figure: 3.1 Interrelationship between building blocks of research 
          (1) Objectivism* 
 (2) Constructivism* 
 
 (1) Positivism* 
      (2)  Interpretivism* 
 
 
     (1) Quantitative method* 
     (2) Qualitative method* 
     (3) Mixed-method * 
      
     (1) Questionnaire*        (4) Observation* 
     (2) Statistical analysis*  (5) Focus group* 
     (3) Interview* 
  
      
     (1) Primary data* 
     (2) Secondary data* 
 
 
(1) Quantitative analysis* 
(2) Qualitative analysis*  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Grix (2002, p. 180) 
* Extended by the author 
Ontology 
What is out there to know? 
Epistemology 
What and how can we 
know about it? 
Methodology 
How can we go about 
acquiring that knowledge? 
Method 
Which precise procedures 
can we use to acquire it? 
Source 
Analysis* 
Which data analysis should 
be used? 
Which data can we collect? 
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3.4 Research approach adopted by current study 
In this section onwards, an explanation of the adopted research philosophy, research 
strategy and method of reasoning applied for this study is discussed in greater detail.   
Given the aims of the research, this study is based on the positions of positivism and 
objectivism. It uses a quantitative research strategy because it is commonly used in 
business ethics research and is relevant to this study. Using deductive reasoning, 
several variables from an established human behaviour theory, the theory of planned 
behaviour, and other variables as discussed in Chapter 2, are examined.   
This research is cross-sectional or also known as one-time study. Data is collected at 
one point in time to provide snapshot of a particular phenomenon. In this cross-
sectional study, data is collected using a survey (questionnaire) method and analysed 
quantitatively.  
3.5 Research populations and samples 
At present, internal auditing functions are held either internally (in-house) or 
outsourced (contracted to service providers). In order to get good and representative 
samples, responses from internal auditors from various organisations (public and 
private sectors) are targeted.  
In terms of the number of internal auditors in the U.K., the researcher faced 
difficulties in finding this information. There are no authorities or bodies in the U.K. 
that provide the statistics of internal auditors. Consequently, for the purpose of this 
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study, the researcher used the number of registered members in the Chartered 
Institute of Internal Auditors (CIIA) as the benchmark for the approximate number of 
internal auditors in the U.K. The CIIA is the professional body that is responsible for 
training, supporting and representing internal auditors in the U.K. and Ireland. As at 
July 2013, the CIIA had over 8,000 members.  
For sampling purposes, 369 surveys were sent out to internal auditors in local 
councils, FTSE100, FTSE250 and business service providers. These organisations 
were selected because information regarding their internal auditing functions was 
public and could be accessed from their websites and annual reports.  
In this study, a convenience sampling method was used. Bryman and Bell (2007)  
claim that a convenience sampling method is common in business and management 
research. The convenience sampling in this study is considered as reasonably 
representative because the internal auditors are selected from large organisations: 
local councils, FTSE100, FTSE250, UNIAC and business service providers. 
However, although there were elements of convenience in the sample design, the 
survey was targeted at actual internal auditors and not, say, trainees or students. 
3.6 Data collection method 
Survey or questionnaire has been a common medium for data collection method in 
business ethics research (Ford & Richardson, 1994; Randall & Gibson, 1990). 
According to Cowton (1998), business ethics research examines real events of 
business, management and organisations. Cowton mentions that it is common for 
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business ethics researchers to find difficulties in getting good data on attitudes and 
behaviour. He also notes that there are always possibilities that the content of the 
survey used for collecting data may raise sensitive issues to some or perhaps the 
majority of the participants. This issue has also been raised by Dalton and Metzger 
(1992) who point out that questions in surveys may make participants feel 
embarrassed, threatened, stigmatized and incriminated. It is advised that  business 
ethics researchers should carefully and delicately develop their survey otherwise the 
survey may not achieve a high response rate or the participants may not respond 
honestly (Cowton, 1998; Dalton & Metzger, 1992).   
According to Cowton (1998) increasing challenges are faced by business ethics 
researchers in obtaining valid and reliable primary data. Cowton (1998) suggests 
researchers should consider using secondary data as either complementing or 
substituting the primary data. One of the secondary data sources that researchers 
could use is previous academic research. The researcher, however, found that the 
constructive and credible suggestion by Cowton is currently difficult to implement. 
This is because at present there is no empirical data available which would provide 
the researcher with related information needed in this study. 
In this study, a personally administered survey technique is used for collecting data. 
The survey technique is chosen over other techniques, such as interview, because the 
survey technique serves more advantages to this study rather than the interview 
technique. The survey technique is cheap, quick, an easy tool to employ (Cowton, 
1998) and is suitable for relatively large samples. In addition, the survey technique 
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does not involve face-to-face interaction. The absence of the researcher during the 
data collection period gives advantages to the participants, for example, they are 
under no pressure to answer the survey. In addition, there is a high probability that 
the answers they provide are more honest and true. The use of interview technique 
would provide little benefit to this study. The presence of the researcher during the 
interview might bring pressures to the participants while answering questions. 
Participants may act in a way to please the researcher; consequently there is a high 
possibility that the participants provide dishonest and untrue answers. 
3.7 Scenario-based survey  
In the survey, participants are presented with hypothetical scenarios. Scenarios are 
defined as “stories which present hypothetical situations requiring action or judgment 
from respondents” (Wason & Cox, 1996, p. 155). Weber (1992) reports that scenario 
is a technique frequently used in empirical business research. Scenario-based surveys 
have been used in various studies including: ethical reasoning; ethical judgment and 
decision making preference; ethical behaviour (Weber, 1992) and whistle-blowing 
studies (Vadera et al., 2009). Scenarios have long been applied in social science 
research which studies attitudes, perceptions, beliefs and norms (Finch, 1987) and 
are most appropriate in studies involving judgment on sensitive issues (Robertson, 
1993). This is because scenarios can be used to evaluate ethical judgments and 
behavioural intention (George & Mallery, 2003). The use of scenario-based survey 
has been claimed by many scholars to have advantages for ethical based studies (Beu 
et al., 2003; Weber, 1992).  
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The scenarios research technique was developed to allow for the pitfalls of 
conventional questionnaire (which use direct questions) and interview research 
techniques. In these techniques, vague questions are used without any specific 
reference. As a result, respondents may answer the questions based on their own 
mental picture of the task (Poulou, 2001) which may differ from one respondent to 
another. Scenarios are said to be superior to direct-questions because scenarios (1) 
provide greater realism by offering a range of situational factors that are similar to 
real ethical decision making situations (2) supply standardized stimuli to all 
respondents which enhances internal validity and measurement reliability (3) 
improve construct validity by focusing a respondent’s attention on the research 
question (4) reduce social desirability response bias and (5) enhance a respondent’s 
involvement and dramatize issues (George & Mallery, 2003).  
As in any research technique, the hypothetical scenario technique is not without 
limitations. Despite its advantages, there is a risk when using hypothetical scenario; 
answers to hypothetical scenarios may not reflect the way a respondent may respond 
in actual situations. In other words, it is difficult to ascertain whether a participant 
would react in the real world in a similar way in which they respond to the scenarios. 
This limitation has caused researchers to study ‘whistle-blowing intention’ rather 
than actual whistle-blowing behaviour.  
According to Poulou (2001), the number of scenarios used in surveys varies and the 
nature of the scenarios ranges from short and simple to longer and more complex. As 
reviewed by Poulou (2001) the number of scenarios used has association with the 
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nature of the scenarios. If the nature of the scenario is longer and more complex, the 
numbers of scenarios used is generally smaller. In other cases, the numbers of 
scenarios are also based on the complexity of the task given to the respondents (see 
Finch, 1987; Poulou, 2001; Weber, 1992). The complexity of the task may exist in 
various forms and they include a number of questions that follow each scenario. In a 
review of 26 studies, Weber (1992) clustered the number of scenarios into three 
groups. Weber found there were ten studies which used less than five scenarios in 
their research, eight studies that used nine to eleven, and eight studies that used 
fourteen to eighteen. Subsequently, in this study, three scenarios are considered 
appropriate as there are 30-item statements that participants are required to answer in 
each scenario. The issue of the number of scenarios has also been discussed by 
O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) who found that too few scenarios may limit the 
ability of a researcher to manipulate the variables studied which later results in 
response bias. However, if too many scenarios are used respondents may feel 
overloaded.   
3.7.1 Scenario development  
A review of previous whistle-blowing research in an accounting and auditing context 
was undertaken to help the researcher identify relevant scenarios. Table 3.6 shows 
the scenarios used in previous empirical whistle-blowing studies.  
133 
 
Table 3.6: Scenario(s) used in previous whistle-blowing studies (accounting and auditing context) 
(a) Internal audit context 
Article Scenario Scenario(s) 
Arnold and Ponemon 
(1991) 
1 Scenario. 
 
 
A situation where internal auditors found a series of bogus (inflated or falsified) invoices within a 
subsidiary’s billing system. The internal auditor reports to director of internal audit who then 
promised to report to the authorities within the company, but no action was actually been taken by 
the director.   
Xu and Ziegenfuss 
(2008) 
1 Scenario. The scenario was adapted from Arnold and Ponemon (1991) 
Seifert et al. (2010) 1 Scenario. 
 
 
A situation where a senior accountant discovered a suspicious sales revenue entry in general 
ledger. The accountant investigated the entry and found it was input by the CFO. The CFO 
explained that the entry was for a contract that was in negotiation and that it was needed to meet 
the earnings forecast for the quarter. The contract would be completed soon and subsequently 
would be backdated. At the third quarter of the fiscal year the accountant had still not received the 
contract. The accountant was very concerned about the misreporting of revenues and considered 
reporting the CFO actions within the corporation. 
(b) Accounting and external audit context 
Liyanarachchi and Adler 
(2011) 
3 scenarios.  Scenario 1: Fake invoices.  
This scenario was adapted from Arnold and Ponemon (1991).  
Scenario 2: Mysterious bank*. 
A situation where an internal auditor found an unusual and large decrease in cash-flow statement 
for the quarter. The internal auditor conducted an investigation and it appeared the decrease in 
cash was due to the purchase of equipment in the last quarter. Upon further investigation, the 
internal auditor found no such purchase took place. The investigation led to a deposit of a 
significant amount of cash into an unknown bank account and also multiple one-off payments to 
this account. The internal auditor informed the director of internal audit, but nothing happened. 
Due to the lack of response, the internal auditor asked the director to take action. The director told 
the internal auditor that he would be most unlikely to receive a promotion or find other work in 
another public organisation if he disclosed the information.  
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Scenario 3: Misclassification*.  
A situation where an internal auditor found that the local community pool has a significant 
increase in sales for the past 5 years. The internal auditor discovers that the pool has been 
disclosing higher profits to avoid being closed down. The internal auditor reports this situation to 
the director of internal audit but nothing has happened. The internal auditor told the director that 
he will report this matter to the CEO of the council. The director threatened the internal auditor 
that if he proceeded with his plan, he would lose his bonus for the year along with other benefits 
(car and apartment) which are owned by the council.  
* It is not mentioned in the article whether these scenarios were developed by the researchers or 
were adapted from literature. 
Brennan and Kelly 
(2007) 
4 scenarios. 
 
Scenario 1: Uncovering a minor fraud. 
A situation of an audit senior within an audit team at Morris Ltd. The company has expanded 
rapidly over the last three years. While auditing the stock purchases the audit senior discovers that 
the Production Manager insists on paying one of the suppliers in cash only. When the audit senior 
asks the Production Manager about this situation he explains that he is able to negotiate discounts 
by paying for the goods in cash. Upon further investigation, the audit senior discovers that the 
Production Manager is overstating purchases and taking the money for himself. The scheme has 
gone unnoticed because of weak internal controls and the close relationship between the 
Production Manager and Mr. Morris, the Managing Director. The audit senior estimates the 
amount of the cash misappropriated in the current period to be €12,000. The audit senior reports 
the issue to the Audit Partner who assures him that the matter will be dealt with and is thanked for 
his diligent work. However during the final audit (six months later) the audit senior discovers that 
the scheme is still in operation. 
Scenario 2: Disagreement over the proper accounting treatment. 
A situation where an audit senior at Collins Ltd. becomes concerned about the company’s 
treatment of R&D expenditure. In particular he believes that the company is classifying some 
research expenditure as development expenditure and capitalising it in the balance sheet. This 
accounting treatment has a material impact on the financial statements. He passes on his concerns 
to the Audit Partner who subsequently invites him into his office. While noting the audit senior’s 
concern he explains that the amounts involved are not material from the overall group perspective. 
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The Audit Partner reminds the audit senior that this client is a very important client for the audit 
firm globally. Noting that the audit senior still has a year to do under the terms of his training 
contract, and concerned for his welfare and career prospects, the Audit Partner suggests that the 
audit senior ‘let sleeping dogs lie’. 
Scenario 3: Obligation to investigate suspected fraud or error. 
A situation where audit senior carries out the interim audit on First Province Bank. After detailed 
investigation he becomes concerned about irregularities in relation to the variable interest rate 
charged on mortgages to first time buyers. In particular he has noticed that in a number of 
branches the variable rate charged to this class of customer fluctuates more often than the 
underlying base rate, with the consequential effect of overcharging mortgage holders in the month 
in which the fluctuation occurs. In further examination, he recognizes that substantial sums of 
money could be raised by even a small adjustment to the variable rate. He raises these concerns 
with the Audit Partner who assures him that there is nothing to worry about citing the reputation 
of the bank and its management, but curiously did not elaborate further. 
Scenario 4: Serious public interest misdemeanour.  
A situation of an audit senior in the audit team performing an audit at Public Hospital Ltd. During 
the course of his audit work, he discovers a file relating to Hospital Waste Ltd., a specialist firm 
contracted by the hospital to safely dispose of its used surgical equipment. He discovers a memo 
from the Manager of the hospital’s Waste Disposal Unit to the Chief Executive of the Hospital, 
outlining her concerns regarding the repute of Hospital Waste Ltd. Specifically her concern relates 
to a conversation she overheard among Hospital Waste Ltd. employees indicating that all the 
waste is being buried. After reading through the file he uncovers the response from the Chief 
Executive who notes that there is no documentary evidence for her allegations and that in his 
opinion no further investigation of the matter is warranted. This reply is dated seven months ago. 
The audit senior brings his concerns to the Audit Partner who reminds him that the audit is being 
performed on Public Hospital Ltd. and not on Hospital Waste Ltd. and that there is nothing he can 
do. 
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In this study, participants were given three hypothetical scenarios. The scenarios 
were adapted from studies by Brennan and Kelly (2007) and Liyanarachchi and 
Adler (2011). The combination of three scenarios is a good range as each scenario 
represents a real life situation. This is crucial in order to get the respondents easily 
engaged with the case and give more considerate responses. In the scenario-based 
survey participants are asked how they would respond to the scenarios presented in 
the survey. Participants are required to evaluate the action taken by the actor in each 
scenario, where they need to state their agreement with the item statements that 
follow each scenario. They are asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each 
of the item statements. This study used a five-point (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = 
Strongly Agree) Likert-type scale.   
Scenario 1 describes a situation where an internal auditor encountered a series of 
bogus (inflated or falsified) invoices which have been paid to customers. The 
discovery led the internal auditor to raise the issue to the director of internal audit. 
Unsure of the action which the director assured to take, the internal auditor further 
plans to report the situation to the chief financial officer. The director threatens the 
internal auditor with losing his job if he continues with his plan.   
In Scenario 2, participants were presented with a scenario on overstating purchases 
which has occurred due to the weak internal controls of the company. At the same 
time, the close relationship between the production manager and managing director 
make the recording of overstated purchases easier. The reporting of the overstated 
purchases situation to the director of internal audit, by the internal auditor, has seen 
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unfavourable results where the director has chosen to do nothing concerning the 
situation.  
In the third scenario, participants were presented with a situation of wider concern 
involving public safety risks. Specifically, the internal auditor in the scenario 
discovered the illegal and unethical practice of dumping used syringes in an open 
space in a nearby residential area. The concern that the internal auditor has for the 
good reputation of the firm and the public’s safety has made the internal auditor meet 
with the responsible staff and asked them to take immediate corrective action. 
Realizing no action has been taken by the responsible staff, the internal auditor raises 
the issue with the chief executive officer, but still no action has been taken.     
There is enough difference between the scenarios. Scenario 1 describes a situation 
involving falsified invoices (internal issue), Scenario 2 depicts a situation on 
collusion and tiers of hierarchy (internal issue) and Scenario 3 illustrates a situation 
involving public harm (internal and external issue). Overall, there is a variation of 
seriousness in the scenarios used in this study. 
Some changes to the original scenarios were made, such as names of individuals 
changed to names common to the U.K. context. Some words or terms in the original 
scenarios were re-worded using British English. This is necessary to infuse the U.K. 
environment in the scenarios. To do this, assistance from supervisors was obtained. 
There were 30 questions following each scenario and the same questions were 
repeated for each scenario. The 30 questions covered items measuring attitude, 
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injunctive norm, descriptive norm, perceived-behavioural control, self-efficacy, 
moral intensity and intention variables. The proportion of the items to each construct 
and their sources are shown in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Number of items and sources for each variable 
Construct Number of items Source 
(A) Questions that follow each 
scenario 
  
Moral intensity 6 Singhapakdi et al. (1996)  
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 4 Taylor and Todd (1995b) 
Injunctive norm 6 Rhodes and Courneya (2003) 
Descriptive norm 4 Rhodes and Courneya (2003) 
Perceived behavioural control  2 Tavousi et al. (2009) 
Self-efficacy 4 Tavousi et al. (2009) 
Intention 4 Harding, Mayhew, Finelli, and 
Carpenter (2007) 
(B) Direct Questions   
Organisational-professional 
conflict 
4 (Aranya and Ferris (1984); 
Shafer, Park, and Liao (2002)) 
Awareness towards whistle-
blowing protection legislation 
5 Ramayah, Lee, and Lim (2012) 
Social desirability response bias  20 Steenkamp, De Jong, and 
Baumgartner (2010) 
Total of items 59  
 
3.7.2 Controlling measurement error 
This section outlines the actions taken by the researcher to minimize biases. 
3.7.2.1 Social desirability bias 
Nederhof (1985) describes social desirable response as a “tendency on behalf of the 
subjects to deny socially undesirable traits and to claim socially desirable ones, and 
the tendency to say things which place the speaker in a favourable light” (p. 264). In 
order to minimize the social desirability bias, participants were given assurance of 
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their anonymity and confidentiality. Respondents were informed that the researcher 
was very interested in their opinion; therefore there were no right or wrong answers. 
They were also informed that information derived from the survey would be kept 
confidential and used only for the purpose of the research.  
In addition, items to measure bias were included in the survey. The Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) scale, introduced by Paulhus (1991), was 
used to measure socially desirable response bias. This scale was chosen because it 
has been regarded as the best measure of socially desirable response bias (SDRB) 
(Gignac, 2013; Paulhus & Reid, 1991) and it has been widely validated (Meston, 
Heiman, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 1998). The BIDR contains 40-items which were 
originally measured using a 7-point Likert Scale. The BIDR consists of two 
subscales. First, the Self-Deception scale, which is designed to assess the tendency of 
respondents to give ‘unconscious positive bias’ responses (Steenkamp et al., 2010). 
The unconscious positive bias response may be due to personality factors such as 
anxiety, achievement motivation and self-esteem (Lee & Sargeant, 2011). Second, 
the Impression Management scale, which is designed to measure deliberate self-
presentation to an audience (Paulhus, 1991) or in other words, “responding that is 
guided by a desire to create a favourable impression on others” (Kroner & Weekes, 
1996, p. 325).  
In this study, the 40-item scale was considered lengthy, thus only 20-items were used 
with 10-items for each subscale. Items which were potentially offensive and/or 
inappropriate were excluded while retaining the balanced structure of the scale (each 
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subscale contained 5 positively worded items and 5 negatively worded items). The 
selection of the items was adopted from Steenkamp et al. (2010).  
In addition to the BIDR scale, the use of hypothetical scenarios also helped to reduce 
the social desirability bias rate (Butterfield, Trevino, & Weaver, 2000; Robertson, 
1993). Empirical evidence suggests that people react more honestly to the ethical 
problem in question if they are presented with vignettes, rather than if they are asked 
for their views using direct questions (Weber, 1992). 
3.7.2.2 Order of scenarios effect on bias 
In addition to the social-desirability response bias, the researcher was aware of other 
potential biases that required consideration. As three scenarios were presented the 
ordering of these scenarios was important to alleviate a bias effect. In this study, 
however, the use of a web-survey meant it was not feasible to use different sets of 
surveys. Also, there was a logical order to the scenarios in terms of their breadth and 
depth. Therefore, there was only one set order of the scenarios presented to all of the 
respondents and the same set was used in both online and postal surveys.  
3.7.2.3 Acquiescence and dis-acquiescence bias 
According to Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff (2012), situations more 
commonly known as acquiescence (yea-saying) and dis-acquiescence (no-saying) 
always occur in a survey that asks for a participant’s level of agreement. In this 
study, the problem of acquiescence and extreme response bias was also considered. 
In the item statements, several negatively worded items were included. The method 
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of alternating negative and positive worded items has been applied and discussed in 
previous studies (Nunnally, 1978) and is commonly used to reduce acquiescence and 
extreme response biases. It has also been found that questionnaires which contain 
both positive and negative worded statements force greater attention from the 
participants in assessing and answering the item statements. Consequently these 
methods were adopted for the research. The researcher was also aware of the need to 
reverse the scales during the data analysis process.   
3.7.2.4 Common method variance (CMV) bias 
CMV is described as “variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather 
than to the constructs the measures represent” (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003, p. 879). CMV is a common source of bias in self-reporting surveys 
and should be attended to (Chang, Van Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010) because it may 
affect validity and reliability of a study.  
In this study, the researcher used different anchor label scales in different parts of the 
questionnaires. Also, every point of the response scales was labelled (rather than 
only the end points) as Krosnick (1991) notes that labelling is also effective for 
reducing item ambiguity. Although there is a recommendation in the literature for 
researchers to use different scale formats such as Likert, Thurstone, Guttman and 
semantic differential in a survey, the suggestion is not without limitation. According 
to Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), although it is possible to translate some types of 
scale formats into other scale formats (for example: translate Likert-scales into 
semantic differential), without changing the content or properties of the items, the 
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process is not always easy and it is a worry that the conceptual meaning of the 
measures may change. Accordingly, the researcher chose to maintain content validity 
of the items otherwise the research may have been exposed to a bigger threat - a 
threat to variable validity rather than CMV, as explained in MacKenzie, Podsakoff, 
and Podsakoff (2011).  
Secondly, the mixture of positive and negative worded items used to cater for 
acquiescence and dis-acquiescence bias could also be used to cater for CMV bias.  
Thirdly, in the cover page of the questionnaire, the contents were written with care.  
This was to ensure that words and statements were written in a way which would 
encourage the participants to (voluntarily) participate and provide honest answers in 
their responses. According to Podsakoff et al. (2012) the cover story and instructions 
have their own role in persuading participants to provide accurate answers to the 
questions. In the cover page, the aim of the study was presented to inform the 
participants of the need to answer the surveys. In addition, the term ‘whistle-
blowing’ was defined as the researcher felt it was important to define the term for the 
context of the study. Refer section 2.1 for the whistle-blowing definition. 
3.7.3 Types of questions and scales of measurement 
In the survey, participants were presented with close-ended questions. Close-ended 
questions have been used in previous whistle-blowing literature and other ethics 
studies. They make analysis of responses easier and less ambiguous. A five-point 
Likert scale was used in all of the scaled question items. Likert scale is the most 
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common scale used in survey research (Neuman, 2006).  A five or seven-point Likert 
scale was frequently employed in previous studies (Malhotra & Peterson, 2006) as it 
was found adequate for most items (Hinkin, 1995). 
In this study, there were three types of label used in the five-point Likert scale. First, 
scales which denote ‘Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neutral (3), Agree (4) and 
Strongly Agree (5)’ were used to assess the respondent’s level of agreement on the 
30 questions that follow each scenario. Second, the scales of ‘Never (1), Almost 
Never (2) Occasionally/Sometimes (3), Almost Every Time (4) and Every Time (5)’ 
were used to assess the respondent’s level of frequencies regarding the 
organisational-professional conflicts they encountered during their audit work.  
Third, scales of ‘Very Untrue of Me (1), Somewhat Untrue of Me (2), Neutral (3), 
Somewhat True of Me (4) and Very True of Me (5)’ were applied in the 20-item 
BIDR. 
The selection of a five-point scale, over a seven-point scale, was based on a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the five-point scale is quite simple (Dawes, 2008) considering 
there are a large number of questions following each scenario. In addition, the tasks 
given to the participants require them to assess their level of agreement on each item 
of the examined variables. The assessment task for a large number of questions can 
be considered quite complex. Using more finely graded scales (for example, a seven-
point scale) requires participants to critically assess and answer each item statement 
and there is a concern that it may raise some drawbacks to the quality of the response 
given by the participant; and some might even give up completing the questionnaire. 
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Imposing too many questions and using a very detailed scale, at the same time, might 
cause mental fatigue and could subsequently jeopardize the answers, or the 
participants may end their participation without completing the whole survey. This 
could lead to a high non-response rate. As mentioned by Dawes (2008), there is 
sufficient evidence from previous literature which reports that reliability and validity 
of responses are improved by using five to seven-point scales. The use of a more 
finely graded scale (for example, more than seven-point scale) does not further 
improve the reliability and validity. 
3.7.3.1 Measurement of dependent variable – whistle-blowing 
intention 
Whistle-blowing intention refers to the likelihood of internal auditors to report or 
disclose any unethical and/or illegal practices in their workplaces to those who have 
authority to take remedial action(s). For the purpose of this study, internal auditors 
were asked for their intention to blow the whistle. Whistle-blowing intention was 
measured by asking participants to indicate their willingness to blow the whistle on 
the actor’s action, as presented in the three scenarios. There were four items used to 
measure the whistle-blowing intention, adapted from Harding et al. (2007).  The 
items are (1) “I intend to blow the whistle on the ...” (2) “I would not blow the 
whistle on the …”, (3) “If I had the opportunity, I would blow the whistle on the …”, 
and (4) “To the extent possible, I would try to blow the whistle on the ….”  
Participants were asked to indicate their agreement on the four item statements. 
Participants who scored higher on the (positive) item statements were more likely to 
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agree that there was a high possibility that they would blow the whistle on the actor’s 
action. Those who scored lower on the (positive) statements were more unlikely to 
agree that there was a high possibility that they would blow the whistle. The internal 
consistency, or reliability, between the items or item inter-relatedness in measuring a 
variable, was measured using Cronbach’s alpha value. Cronbach’s alpha value for 
intention in each scenario is .85 (Scenario 1), .89 (Scenario 2) and .94 (Scenario 3). 
The alpha value of 0.60 is ‘good’, 0.70 is ‘satisfactory’ and 0.80 is considered as 
‘acceptable’ (Bryman, 2012). Therefore, there is an acceptable level of internal 
consistency between the items used to measure whistle-blowing intention.    
3.7.3.2 Measurement of independent variables  
3.7.3.2.1 Attitude towards whistle-blowing 
Taken from the work by Ramayah et al. (2012), attitude refers to a respondent’s 
favourable or unfavourable position towards the behaviour being studied. The 
attitude towards whistle-blowing was measured by asking for the participant’s 
agreement on four item statements which were adapted from a study on information 
technology usage by Taylor and Todd (1995b). The items are (1) “Blowing the 
whistle on the … would be a good idea”, (2) “Blowing the whistle on the … would 
be a wise idea”, (3) “Blowing the whistle on the … would be a pleasant experience”, 
and (4) “I like the idea of blowing the whistle on the …” 
Participants who scored higher on the (positive) item statements are more likely to 
agree that blowing the whistle on the actor’s action in the scenario is appropriate. 
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Those who scored lower on the (positive) statements are more likely to agree that 
blowing the whistle on the actor’s action is inappropriate. Cronbach’s alpha value for 
attitude in each scenario is .32 (Scenario 1); .40 (Scenario 2) and .42 (Scenario 3). 
The threshold internal consistency value, suggested by Nunnally, is .70 (Ayers & 
Kaplan, 2005; Bandura, 1986). The internal consistency values for attitude gained in 
this study are far from the threshold value and are considered unacceptable (George 
& Mallery, 2003). The low internal consistency value of attitude shows there is low 
or weak inter-relatedness between the items. 
This attitude measurement, however, has been widely used in previous studies. In the 
original source, the items have Cronbach’s alpha value of .85. The items have the 
ability to measure the attitude variable. Although the internal consistency value is 
relatively low in this study, the high reliability value obtained in previous studies 
show the validity of the items in measuring attitude. In a study that measures a more 
sensitive topic, such as whistle-blowing, the items may need to be refined or 
additional items may be needed to measure attitude.  
3.7.3.2.2 Injunctive norm 
Injunctive norm refers to the perceptions of important people’s approval on the 
participant’s (whistle-blowing) behaviour (Park & Smith, 2007). This variable was 
measured using six items and were adapted from Rhodes and Courneya (2003). The 
items are (1) “ Most people in my family would want me to blow the whistle on the 
…”, (2) “Most people in my family would approve if I blew the whistle on the …”, 
(3) “Most of my friends would want me to blow the whistle on the …”, (4) “Most of 
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my friends would approve if I blew the whistle on the …”, (5) “Most of my work 
colleagues would want me to blow the whistle on the …”, (6) “Most of my work 
colleagues would approve if I blew the whistle on the …” 
In measuring this variable, the participants were asked to indicate their agreement on 
the approval they may get from their family, friends and work colleagues on their 
(participant) action to blow the whistle. Participants who scored higher on the 
(positive) item statements are more likely to agree that significant others (family, 
friends and work colleagues) agree with them concerning the action to blow the 
whistle on the actor’s action. Those who scored lower on the (positive) item 
statements are more unlikely to agree that the significant others agreed to them 
blowing the whistle on the actor’s action. Cronbach’s alpha value for injunctive norm 
in each scenario is .87 (Scenario 1), .91 (Scenario 2) and .94 (Scenario 3). This 
means there is an acceptable level of internal consistency between the six items in 
measuring the injunctive norm. 
3.7.3.2.3 Descriptive norm 
Descriptive norm refers to the participant’s perception whether the important others 
themselves perform the (whistle-blowing) behaviour (Park & Smith, 2007). There 
were four items used to measure this variable. The items were adapted from Rhodes 
and Courneya (2003). In contrast to the injunctive norm, respondents were asked 
about their agreement that their family, friends, work colleagues and most people 
who they know would actually blow the whistle. The items are (1) “Most of my 
family members would blow the whistle on the …”, (2) “Most of my friends would 
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blow the whistle on the …”, (3) “Most of my co-workers would blow the whistle on 
the …”, and (4) “Most of people I know would blow the whistle on the …”.   
Subjects who scored higher on the (positive) item statements are more likely to agree 
that the significant others would blow the whistle on the actor’s action. Those who 
scored lower on the (positive) items statements are more unlikely to agree that the 
significant other would blow the whistle on the actor’s action. Cronbach’s alpha 
value for injunctive norm in each scenario is .83 (Scenario 1), .85 (Scenario 2) and 
.91 (Scenario 3). This means there is an acceptable level of internal consistency 
between the four items in measuring the descriptive norm. 
3.7.3.2.4 Perceived behavioural control 
Perceived behavioural control refers to the participant’s perceptions of the 
controllability or power they have in performing the whistle-blowing behaviour. 
There were two items used to measure the perceived behavioural control variable. 
The items were applied from Tavousi et al. (2009). The items are (1) “To blow the 
whistle on the … would be entirely up to me” and (2) “To blow the whistle on the … 
would be entirely within my control”.  
The participants were asked about their agreement on the power they possessed to 
blow the whistle. Participants who scored higher on the (positive) items statements 
were more likely to agree that the end decision to blow or not to blow the whistle is 
totally within their control and vice versa. Cronbach’s alpha value for perceived 
behavioural control in each scenario is .60 (Scenario 1), .86 (Scenario 2) and .91 
(Scenario 3). There is a relatively lower internal consistency of perceived 
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behavioural control in Scenario 1 than in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3. This was caused 
by the variance in the scenarios. Scholars in whistle-blowing studies have found that 
respondents are sensitive to the situations presented in scenarios (Kaplan & Schultz, 
2007; Miceli et al., 1991; Near & Miceli, 1995; Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 
2004). Overall, in this study, the internal consistency of the perceived behaviour 
control ranged from good to acceptable.   
3.7.3.2.5 Self-efficacy 
Self-efficacy is about a participant’s perceptions of their capabilities to overcome a 
series of obstacles in performing the whistle-blowing behaviour. The participants 
were asked to indicate their agreement on four item statements which were adapted 
from Tavousi et al. (2009). The items are “I am confident that I would be able to 
blow the whistle on the …”, (2) “I am confident that I would be able to blow the 
whistle on the … even if my friends urged against it”, (3) “I am confident that I 
would be able to blow the whistle on the … even if I am in a situation that rejects the 
practice” and (4) “I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the … 
even if the management teams discourage the practice”. 
Participants who scored higher on the (positive) item statements were more likely to 
agree that they were capable to overcome any obstacles they faced in blowing the 
whistle on the actor’s action. Those who scored lower on the (positive) statements 
were more unlikely to agree that they were capable of overcoming obstacles in 
blowing the whistle. Cronbach’s alpha value for self-efficacy in each scenario is .90 
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(Scenario 1), .90 (Scenario 2) and .93 (Scenario 3). This means there is an acceptable 
level of internal consistency between the four items in measuring the self-efficacy. 
3.7.3.2.6 Organisational-professional conflict 
Organisational-professional conflict refers to a situation when professional loyalty is 
incompatible with organisational loyalty. For this variable, participants were asked to 
indicate the frequency in which they faced situations that put them in conflict 
between professional loyalties and organisational loyalties. The four item statements 
were adapted from Aranya and Ferris (1984) and Shafer et al. (2002). The items are 
(1) “My current employment situation gives me the opportunity to express myself 
fully as a professional”, (2) “Being an internal auditor in the organization(s) I audit 
has significantly put me under pressure to perform my work in ways that could 
directly and/or indirectly breach compliance with professional standards, (3) “In the 
organization(s) I audit, I have conflict(s) between applying the work standards and 
procedures outlined by the company that I work for and pursuing with my 
professional judgments” and (4) “There is/are situation(s) where my professional 
judgments are overridden by the demands of the organization that I work for”. The 
third and fourth items are answered in-house internal auditors. While for outsource 
internal auditors the item three and fourth are replaced by “In the organization(s) I 
audit, I have conflict(s) between applying the work standards and procedures 
outlined by the client company(ies) and pursuing with my professional judgments” 
and “There is/are situation(s) where my professional judgments are overridden by the 
demands of the client organization(s)”.  
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Participants who scored lower on the (positive) item statements have minimal or no 
conflicts during their audit work and vice versa. Cronbach’s alpha value for 
organisational-professional conflict is .30. The internal consistency values for 
organisational-professional conflict gained in this study are far from the threshold 
value and are considered unacceptable (George & Mallery, 2003). The low internal 
consistency value of organisational-professional conflict shows there is low or weak 
inter-relatedness between the items used in this study to measure the organisational-
professional conflict variable.  
The organisational-professional conflict measurement item, however, has a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of .77. The items have the ability to measure the 
organisational-professional conflict.  
3.7.3.2.7 Awareness of the whistle-blowing protection legislation  
Awareness of the whistle-blowing protection legislation refers to the participant’s 
possession of knowledge on the existence of any whistle-blowing protection 
legislation in the U.K. Specifically, participants were asked about their knowledge on 
the existence of PIDA, the legislation that provides protection to whistle-blowers, 
and PCaW, a charity that provides advice to individual(s) in a dilemma regarding 
whistle-blowing. In assessing the participant’s knowledge about the existence of 
PIDA and PCaW, they were required to state ‘Yes’ if they knew they existed and 
‘No’ if they did not know they existed. They were also required to indicate their 
agreement on three item statements regarding whistle-blowing protection legislation 
in the U.K. The three item statements were adapted from Ramayah et al. (2012). The 
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items are (1) “Whistle-blowing legislation in the U.K. helps deter unethical 
behaviour(s)”, (2) “Whistle-blowing legislation in the U.K. helps deter illegal 
behaviour(s)” and (3) “Whistle-blowing legislation in the U.K. provides effective 
protection to whistle-blowers”.  
Subjects who scored higher on the (positive) items statements were more likely to 
have a positive perception of whistle-blowing protection legislation. Those who 
scored lower on the statements were more likely to have a negative perception of 
whistle-blowing protection legislation. Cronbach’s alpha value for awareness is .68. 
In other words, there is a good level of internal consistency between the three items 
used to measure awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation. 
3.7.3.3 Measurement of moderating variable – moral intensity 
In this study, moral intensity was measured using the joint effect of all six 
components of moral intensity, as introduced by Jones (1991). Each component was 
measured using one item. The items for moral intensity were adapted from 
Singhapakdi et al. (1996). The items are (1) “The overall harm (if any) done as a 
result of the director of internal audit’s action would be very small”, (2) “Most 
people would agree that the … action is wrong”, (3) “The … action would not cause 
any harm in the immediate future”, (4) “There is very little likelihood that the …  
action would actually cause any harm”, (5) “If the … is a personal friend of the …, 
the action is wrong” and (6) “The … would harm very few people (if any)”.  
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Cronbach’s alpha value for moral intensity in each scenario is .52 (Scenario 1), .55 
(Scenario 2) and .55 (Scenario 3). According to George and Mallery (2003), an 
internal consistency value that is between 0.5 and 0.6 shows a poor level of 
reliability. 
3.7.3.4 Measurement of control variables - demographic variables 
Participants were asked to provide information on age, gender, number of years’ 
experience working in internal audit, type of client and employment position. These 
demographic characteristics are standard control variables that have been examined 
in many studies. 
3.7.4 Survey design 
The survey was fourteen pages long and divided into five sections. On the cover 
page, participants were informed about the aims of the survey, the length of time to 
complete the survey, the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants, the 
donation of £2 (provided by the Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group, 
University of Huddersfield Business School) for each response received, as a token 
of appreciation to the participants, and the contact details of the researcher and the 
supervisor. 
In the first section, participants were required to provide details of their demographic 
background. In the second section, organisational-professional conflict was assessed. 
The participant’s awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation in the U.K. was 
then evaluated in the third section. In the fourth section, respondents were presented 
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with the three hypothetical scenarios. The items of BIDR which were used to address 
the social desirability bias issue were presented in the last section (refer Appendix G 
for the survey). 
According to Brennan (1992) mail surveys are relatively cheaper than other survey 
methods such as interview. However, a low response rate has been mentioned as one 
of its pitfalls. Olson (2006) acknowledges the situation in developed countries which 
have faced low response rates over the past three decades. As this study used 
mail/postal surveys, greater care was given to minimize non-response rate. In 
addition, the researcher integrated various techniques during the survey design stage 
to help enhance response rates. These are outlined below:   
1. Each survey was printed on pale yellow (cream) colour (for initial mailing) 
and light blue colour (for reminder mailing), A3 size paper. The A3 paper 
was then folded into a booklet resulting in an A4 page size. Literature states 
that printing surveys on coloured paper increases the response rate (Fanning, 
2005). Coloured paper has a positive ‘psychological effect’, as noted by 
Hartley and Rutherford (2003). Blue and yellow have been identified as two 
primary colours which improve response rate over black and white (Dillman, 
2000). They are “viewed as [a] cool colour[s] and [typify] restrain” and 
yellow implies “warmth” (Brennan & Charbonneau, 2005, p. 5). 
2. In the cover page of the survey, the purpose of the research and the written 
instructions to complete the survey were outlined. Assurance on 
confidentiality and anonymity were given to enhance the participant’s 
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confidence to answer the survey. According to King and Bruner (2000), 
assuring participants of their anonymity would also minimise social 
desirability bias. 
3. The survey has 14 printed pages including the cover page. Although the 
survey is quite long, its length is within the recommendation from the 
literature. Neuman (2006) suggests a 15-page survey is appropriate for well-
educated respondents. 
4. As a matter of respect, a personal salutation was used for the participants 
where their names were known (especially internal auditors from local 
councils and service providers as this information is made public). There 
were 207 names of internal auditors that the researcher was able to find 
through the request of information from the Freedom of Information (FOI) 
website (WhatDoTheyKnow website) and annual reports. 
5. In the covering letter (of initial mailing), the deadline date for returning the 
survey was provided. Approximately 3 weeks were allocated for the 
participants to complete the surveys. The use of deadline dates has been 
found to be very useful in obtaining immediate response (Ferris, 1951). 
6. In each of the surveys, a return pre-paid envelope was enclosed. This has 
been widely used and seems to be generally accepted practice in mail 
surveys. 
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7. On the cover page of the survey an appeal was made to the participants for 
their response. They were informed of the importance of their honest 
response to the results generated from the survey. They were also 
acknowledged for their invaluable experience and knowledge to the study. 
8. The participants were also offered an opportunity to ask for a copy of the 
results by emailing their request to the researcher.  
9. A follow-up was done approximately one month after the deadline for 
returning the survey ended. A copy of the survey, a new covering letter and a 
pre-paid enveloped were enclosed. 
In an attempt to measure non-response bias, a simple statistical analysis was used to 
compare the answers provided by early respondents and late respondents. Late 
respondents are taken as a proxy of non-respondents. Details are discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
3.7.5 Survey administration  
In an attempt to receive as many responses as possible from participants, surveys 
were distributed using various means, one method of distribution at a time. Initially, 
this study used online survey and professional bodies with direct access to their 
members, currently working as internal auditors, were targeted for their assistance. In 
the first attempt the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) was approached. The ICAEW was chosen because it is recognized and the 
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meetings with the Ethics Manager in the professional body were held. Upon 
approval, as agreed by the Ethics Manager, the researcher emailed the link to the 
online survey to the Ethics Manager for further action. 
The researcher was not given any access to the members’ contact details. The link 
was distributed to relevant ICAEW members on behalf of the researcher. The 
researcher was informed that the link to the online survey would be copied to those 
who currently work as an internal auditor or provide internal auditing services to 
organisations. The researcher was not directly involved with the process and thus did 
not know the exact number of surveys that had been distributed. Two weeks after the 
online survey was launched (May 2013), only five participants had completed the 
survey. No additional responses were received in the following two months. Due to 
the very minimal number of responses received, the researcher had to agree with the 
Ethics Manager’s opinion that even if the reminder to the survey was sent to the 
ICAEW members, it would not help much in improving the response rate. The 
researcher then proceeded with a second plan and The Chartered Institute of Internal 
Auditors (CIIA) was approached. CIIA is the professional body that is responsible 
for training, supporting and representing internal auditors in the U.K. and Ireland. 
However, the researcher was faced with obstacles and difficulties to approach the 
key person in the CIIA. Consequently, due to the time constraint, the researcher 
proceeded with a third plan.    
In November 2013, UNIAC was approached. UNIAC is a shared service provider 
owned by eleven universities that provides internal auditing and assurance services. 
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UNIAC was selected because it is the market leader in providing internal audit 
services to the Higher Education sector in the U.K. The University of Huddersfield is 
one of UNIAC’s members. UNIAC has a team of expertise who have various 
professional qualifications and wide experience which is of extreme value to this 
study. One of the directors at UNIAC was emailed to ask for his assistance. The 
director agreed to distribute the link to the online survey to the UNIAC internal audit 
specialist team. Attached in the email was a soft copy of the survey. The soft copy 
was an alternative to the online version, considering there are people who may prefer 
a paper-version survey rather than online survey. Participants who preferred to 
answer the survey using the paper-version were asked for their kindness to print the 
survey and mail the completed survey to the researcher. Providing the respondents 
with alternative options, the online or the paper version, was essential to increase the 
response rate.  
Knowing that UNIAC could only provide a limited number of participants, another 
method for distributing the questionnaire was needed. Subsequently, in the fourth 
plan, mail surveys were used. Internal auditors in local councils, FTSE100 and 
FTSE250 and business service providers were approached. These organisations were 
selected for several reasons. First, participants from these organisations would 
provide the researcher with reasonably representative samples. For example, 
participants from local councils represent the voice of internal auditors employed in 
public organisation, while responses from FTSE represent internal auditors employed 
in private organisations. Responses from the business service providers represent the 
voice of contracted internal auditors. Secondly, information on the internal auditors 
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in these organisations was easier to obtain. Names and contact details of internal 
auditors in the local council were gained from the Freedom of Information site, 
WhatDoTheyKnow. The annual reports of the FTSE organisations were checked for 
their availability of the internal auditor position(s). Surveys were sent to the 
companies that had internal audit departments.  
Surveys were sent out using a personal salutation to the participants whose names 
were known. Where the names of internal auditors in the organisations were not 
known, surveys were addressed to Head of Internal Audit. The addresses of the 
FTSE companies were taken from the company information provided on the London 
Stock Exchange website. Twelve business service provider companies which provide 
internal audit services were also approached. These companies were selected because 
the information and contact details of the employees that provide internal audit 
services were made public in their websites. The mail surveys were posted in early 
December 2013. One hundred surveys were posted to internal auditors in local 
councils across the U.K.  Ninety-one and ninety-seven surveys were posted to 
internal auditors in the FTSE100 and FTSE250 respectively. A further eighty-one 
surveys were posted to the service provider companies located across the U.K. The 
hard-copy survey was used because it provided convenience to the participants. The 
hard-copy survey is handy and practical and does not need participants to sit in front 
of computer or to have access to the internet. Also, in an era when professionals 
receive so many unwanted emails and less post, it was thought that mailed 
questionnaires might be an attractive approach. The use of hard-copy survey enabled 
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participants to answer the survey at any time and in circumstances in which they felt 
comfortable. 
The mail surveys were attached with a covering letter which was signed 
(handwritten) by the supervisor and researcher. In the letter, four main points were 
highlighted. First, participants were given the end date by which they were expected 
to return the completed surveys. Second, participants were asked to use the enclosed 
pre-paid envelopes and return the completed surveys before the end date. Third, 
respondents were given information on the approximate time it may take to complete 
the survey. Lastly, respondents were informed about the £2 donation which was 
provided by the Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group, University of 
Huddersfield Business School for each of the responses received. The Financial 
Ethics and Governance Research Group listed four charitable bodies and the 
respondents were asked to select a body for the donation. The four charities were (1) 
Amnesty International (2) Macmillan Cancer Support (3) National Trust and (4) Save 
the Children. The idea to provide a £2 charitable donation per response was a token 
of appreciation to the respondents. 
In February 2014, a reminder to the survey was sent. A copy of the survey was 
attached to a new introductory letter and a pre-paid envelope was enclosed. In the 
reminder stage, questionnaires were printed on different coloured paper. The 
different colour (see subsection 3.7.4) enabled the researcher to easily distinguish the 
early respondents from the late respondents. A total of 359 surveys were posted in 
the reminder stage. Ten of the internal auditors from the initial mailing were 
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withdrawn from the list of samples. These included those who had returned the 
survey with letters mentioning their reluctance to participate in the survey due to 
sensitivity issues, in the first instance, which the persons individually perceived and, 
secondly, the policy of their company did not allow them to participate in any 
surveys. Table 3.8 summarizes the details of the surveys. 
Table 3.8: Survey response rate 
 Mail Online 
 First mail Reminder  
Total distributed 369 359 Unknown 
No. of responses 88 38 18 
Unusable/partially complete 2 0 10 
Usable 86 38 8 
Usable response rate 34% Unknown 
 
3.7.6 Pre-testing 
The contents of the survey were pre-tested before being sent out to actual samples. 
According to Hunt, Sparkman, and Wilcox (1982) the pre-testing is essential to 
ascertain how well the survey works. 
In this study, the purpose for conducting pre-testing was, first, to examine whether 
participants were able to understand the questions, second, whether the questions 
were understood in the same way by all participants, and third, whether there were 
any other problems which may arise from the questionnaire itself. In the pre-testing 
stage, the researcher distributed the questionnaire to ten employees in the University 
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of Huddersfield Business School. These individuals were selected based on their 
academic background and the relevant experience they possessed. The feedback 
received in the pre-testing stage was then brought to the supervisors for further 
discussions. Minor amendments to the questionnaire were made based on each of the 
supervisor’s suggestions.  
3.8 Analysis plan 
This section outlines the statistical analysis techniques used in testing the hypotheses.  
Descriptive analyses were computed for each variable. Means, standard deviations 
and frequencies were used to assess the accuracy of the data entry, identify missing 
data and data normality. Descriptive analysis was also used to present participant 
profiles.  
Parametric testing was used to compare group differences. In a situation where some 
assumptions were not met, non-parametric testing was used.  
In order to examine the direct influence of independent variables on the dependent 
variable, Pearson’s correlation and standard multiple regression analysis were used. 
Pearson’s correlations between all the variables were calculated. Pearson’s 
correlation values provide information on degree of correlation between variables. 
Pearson’s correlation values were also used to identify if there were any independent 
variables that were highly correlated to each other. A standard multiple regression 
analysis was used to examine the extent to which each of the independent variables 
influenced the internal auditors’ intention to blow the whistle.  
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Moderated multiple regression analysis was used to examine the moderating effects 
of moral intensity on each of the individual relationships between independent 
variables and dependent variable.   
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the methodology and method for the research. This study 
adopts positivistic and objectivist philosophical positions. A personally administered, 
scenario-based survey technique was used to collect the data.  Three scenarios, differ 
in the seriousness of wrongdoing, were used to measure the tested variables. 
Scenarios and items used to measure the variables were adapted from previous 
studies.  
The philosophical stance and the research method used in this study are in line with 
the previous studies of this kind. Overall, reliability of the variables was acceptable. 
However, attitude and organisational-professional conflict have unacceptable 
reliability level.  
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Chapter Four 
 Analysis of Results 
4.0 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present and explain the results of statistical analysis 
used in testing the hypothesised relationships among the studied variables. The 
chapter begins with a descriptive analysis of the respondents’ profiles. The possible 
non-response bias and the social desirability response bias are also discussed in the 
first section. In the second section, a descriptive analysis of the variables is 
presented. Statistical results for comparing group differences among respondents are 
presented in the third section. The results of the exploration of the relationship 
between independent variables and dependent variables are presented in the fourth 
section. In this section, statistical results and an analysis one provided for each of the 
hypotheses. Analyses for testing the assumptions of multiple regressions are also 
discussed in this section. In the fifth section, results for the effect of the moderator 
(moral intensity) on each of the relationships between independent variables and 
dependent variables, are explained. The key findings of this study are summarised at 
the end of the chapter. 
4.1 Descriptive statistic results for demographic profiles 
In this section, the demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented. As 
shown in Table 3.8, the total of usable returned questionnaires are 132. However, to 
analysis the demographic profiles, only 127 samples are analysed. This is because 
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five samples have not completed answering the profiles data. The profiles of the 
respondents are summarised in Table 4.1a and Table 4.1b. Table 4.1a shows details 
on age and educational background while Table 4.1b shows details on the 
background of respondents’ work experience and awareness of whistle-blowing 
protection legislation.  
Table 4.1a: Educational background of participants 
Age Females Males Unspecified Total Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
< 30 years old 2 2 3 2 0 0 5 4 
31-40 years old 10 8 18 14 3 2 31 24 
41-50 years old 13 10 32 25 5 4 50 39 
51-60 years old 8 6 32 26 1 1 41 33 
Total 33 26 85 67 9 7 127 100 
Mean 44 46 43   
Overall mean  54.73 
Highest Academic 
Qualification 
Females  Males  Unspecified Total  
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
O-level/GSCE 2 2 4 3 1 1 7 6 
A-level 8 6 16 12 0 0 24 18 
Bachelor’s degree 10 8 37 29 6 5 53 42 
Master’s degree 12 9 28 22 2 2 42 33 
PhD 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 33 26 85 66 9 8 127 100 
Professional Qualification Females  Males  Unspecified Total  Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Accounting-related 
qualification 
28 22 63 49 7 6 98 77 
Non-accounting related 
qualification 
2 2 4 3 0 0 6 5 
None  3 2 18 14 2 2 23 18 
Total 33 26 85 66 9 8 127 100 
Professional Membership Females  Males  Unspecified Total  Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Yes 30 24 82 64 8 6 120 94 
No 3 2 3 2 1 1 7 6 
Total 33 26 85 66 9 8 127 100 
 Note: Percentages are rounded.  
Seventy-two percent of the respondents who disclosed their gender details were 
male. There were nine respondents who did not provide their gender (7%). The mean 
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ages for females and males were 44 and 46 respectively. The mean for age was 
calculated by first, finding the mid-point (x) for each age group. The total age for 
each age group was calculated by multiplying the frequency (freq) with the mid-
point (x) of each age group. Lastly, the mean was obtained by dividing the subtotal 
of each age group (∑(freq*x)) with the total frequency (∑freq).  
Regardless of gender, most of the respondents had a Bachelor’s degree and a 
surprising number (33%) had a Master’s degree (compared to qualified accountants 
generally). Only one respondent had a PhD. Over three quarters (77%) of the 
respondents were registered members of accounting professional bodies. Another 
18% of the total respondents had no professional qualification, while another 5% 
held non-accounting professional qualifications. The majority of the respondents 
(94%) were current members of a professional body.   
Table 4.1b: Participants’ work experience and awareness of whistle-blowing      
protection legislation 
 
Working experience Females Males Unspecified Total 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Internal auditing  16.7 years 15.3 years 14 years 15.5 years 
General auditing  18.4 years 17.2 years 18.7 years 17.6 years 
Client categories Females Males Unspecified Total 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Public organisations 16 13 34 27 6 5 56 44 
Private companies 16 13 40 31 2 2 58 46 
Combination* 1 1 11 9 1 1 13 10 
Total 33 27 85 67 9 8 127 100 
Employment position Females Males Unspecified Total Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
In-house 26 20 61 48 7 6 94 74 
Outsource 0 0 8 6 1 1 9 7 
Consortium 5 4 13 10 0 0 18 15 
Combination** 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 
Others 1 1 2 2 0 0 3 2 
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Total 33 26 85 67 9 8 127 100 
Awareness of whistle-blowing 
protection legislation 
Females Males Unspecified Total 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) 
1998: 
       Yes 
       No 
 
 
30 
3 
 
 
24 
2 
 
 
80 
5 
 
 
63 
4 
 
 
8 
1 
 
 
6 
1 
 
 
118 
9 
 
 
93 
7 
Total 33 26 85 67 9 7 127 100 
Public Concern at Work (PCaW): 
       Yes 
       No 
 
20 
13 
 
16 
10 
 
46 
39 
 
36 
31 
 
4 
5 
 
3 
4 
 
70 
57 
 
55 
45 
Total 33 26 85 67 9 7 127 100 
Note: Percentages are rounded. 
* Respondents having both the public organisations and private companies as their clients. 
** Respondents having dual-employment positions: consortium and outsource.  
In terms of work experience, both genders had a similar length of years of 
experience. In internal auditing specifically, the mean values of work experience for 
females and males were 16.7 and 15.3 years respectively. The mean values for 
respondents with experience in general auditing were 18.4 years for females and 17.2 
years for males.  
For the types of client that the participants audit, 44% of the internal auditors audited 
public organisations and another 46% audit private organisations. Only 10% of the 
internal auditors had clients from both public and private organisations.  
With regard to the types of employment position, 74% of the respondents were 
employed by organisations (in-house). The residual percentage represents those who 
are contracted by organisations for their internal audit services. This is generally 
known as outsourcing. Outsourcing here includes specialist internal audit service 
providers, specialist business and financial service providers or a consortium8. From 
                                                 
8
 Consortium is a body formed by several internal audit departments in similar business. 
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the dataset, 7% of the total respondents were from (any) service providers while 
another 15% of the total respondents were from a consortium.   
 
In terms of awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation, 93% of the 
respondents admitted that they knew about the existence of the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act (PIDA) 1998, the whistle-blowing legislation in the U.K. However, 
only 55% of the respondents were aware of the existence of Public Concern at Work 
(PCaW), a charity in the U.K. that offers free legal advice to potential whistle-
blowers. 
From the above tables it can be considered that this study obtained a varied set of 
participants. Firstly, responses were received from actual internal auditors and the 
majority of them had the minimum educational qualification (Bachelor degree) and 
extensive experience in internal auditing works. Secondly, the dataset had responses 
from both internal auditors who were employed (in-house) and auditors who were 
contracted for their services (outsourced and consortium). Thirdly, the dataset also 
has a good mix of genders. Fourthly, while the majority of the respondents are well 
aware of the whistle-blowing legislation and the whistle-blowing facility which is 
made available for them, some are not.  
All these four elements provide advantages to this study. One of the advantages is 
that the answers given by the respondents represent the actual voice of internal 
auditors. Moreover, the educational background and the extensive work experience 
of the respondents enhances the credibility of the answers they provided in the 
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survey. In addition, the invaluable work experience of the respondents, as internal 
auditors, and their reasonable knowledge concerning whistle-blowing, increases the 
likelihood that the answers they provided were true. Further, the findings of this 
research provide valuable empirical evidence, particularly in the U.K. context, 
regarding internal auditors’ perception and intention towards whistle-blowing. As 
mentioned in the earlier chapter, there is, currently, limited empirical evidence on 
internal auditors’ perception and intention towards whistle-blowing in the U.K. 
context. The findings of this research are therefore very valuable and beneficial, 
especially as a reference for interested parties who also venture into this area of 
research. The results, however, may have limitations which will be discussed in the 
last chapter of this thesis.  
4.1.1 Non-response bias 
The measurable response rate of this study was 34%. Although the participants were 
in the minority, the response rate is reasonable given the length of the questionnaire. 
In addition, the response rate of this study was better than that of previous research 
which used mail surveys and internal auditors as subjects. Using a 25-page 
questionnaire, the response rate received by Miceli and Near (1994) was 27%. The 
response rates received by Seifert et al. (2010) and O'Leary and Stewart (2007) were 
23% and 26% respectively.  
It is impossible to know whether the respondents are representative of the population 
of U.K. internal auditors.  However, to test for non-response bias, responses from 
early respondents and late respondents were compared.  Participants who responded 
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in the first mailing were considered as early respondents while those who responded 
after the reminder mailing was sent out were considered as late respondents. There 
was a lapse of at least seven weeks from the date of the first mailing before a 
reminder was sent to the subjects. Responses from the two groups of participants 
(early respondents and late respondents) were compared using an independent T-test 
for all independent variables and the dependent variable.  
For each variable, there were no significant differences between the two groups, 
therefore the independent T-test results suggest that non-response bias is not a major 
concern for this study. 
4.1.2 Social desirability response bias 
Social desirability bias refers to the tendency of participants to answer surveys in a 
manner that makes them look good rather than give accurate and truthful answers. 
Whistle-blowing is a sensitive issue and the use of personally administered survey 
enables social desirability response bias to exist. The BIDR items which were 
included in the survey were used to determine whether respondents were trying to 
present themselves well instead of answering the questions in the survey honestly. 
Social desirability bias needs to be attended to because its presence may pose a threat 
to the validity of the findings.  
The presence of social desirability response bias was tested in two stages. First, the 
patterns of responses to each of the BIDR item statements were reviewed using 
frequency analysis. This is the basic way of detecting social desirability response 
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bias. The rule that was applied for the research was if many respondents scored high 
(positive) in most of the items, as compared to those who score low (negative), it 
could be said that social desirability response bias may exist. Table 4.2 refers to this 
analysis.   
Table 4.2 Frequency analysis for social desirability bias items 
Self-deception scale  
Items N Positive response 
(frequency) 
Neutral 
(frequency) 
Negative response 
(frequency) 
Item no.1 114  93 19 2 
Item no.2* 114 41 32 41 
Item no.3* 114 71 14 29 
Item no.4 114 72 23 19 
Item no.5 114 31 35 48 
Item no.6* 114 17 19 78 
Item no.7 114 35 27 52 
Item no.8* 114 46 40 28 
Item no.9 114 90 19 5 
Item no.10* 114 80 12 22 
Impression management scale 
Items N Positive response 
(frequency) 
Neutral 
(frequency) 
Negative response 
(frequency) 
Item no. 11* 114 68 23 23 
Item no. 12 114 66 14 34 
Item no. 13 114 82 11 21 
Item no.14* 114 39 25 50 
Item no.15 114 42 29 43 
Item no.16* 114 60 22 32 
Item no.17* 114 68 16 30 
Item no.18* 114 28 17 69 
Item no.19 114 87 8 19 
Item no.20 114 54 28 32 
*Item was reverse coded. 
The information in Table 4.2 shows some evidence of social desirability response 
bias in the study. There were a relatively high number of participants who responded 
positively in most of the Self-Deception scale items (Item no. 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10). The 
Self-Deception frequency analysis result shows an obvious presence of a situation 
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where the respondents have unconsciously given responses, where they overly 
describe themselves positively, which they themselves believe to be true. There were 
also a relatively high number of participants who responded positively in most of the 
Impression Management scale items (Item no. 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20). The 
Impression Management scale results indicate that there is high probability that the 
respondents consciously gave favourable and biased self-assessment responses 
(Dalton & Ortegren, 2011) in their efforts to ‘fake good’ (Meston et al., 1998).  
In the second stage of analysis, the existence of social desirability bias in each 
variable is further analysed. The association between the tested variables and the 
Self-Deception and Impression Management scales were examined. As suggested by 
Steenkamp et al. (2010), if the associations between the tested variables and the Self-
Deception and Impression Management scales are negligible, no social desirability 
response bias problem exists. In contrast, if the associations are non-negligible, 
social desirability response bias does exist. In relation to the Self-Deception scale, 
the Impression Management scale has been greatly used in previous research in an 
attempt to identify such bias. The Impression Management scale is relied upon 
because it is the appropriate measure to investigate social desirability effect 
(Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992) and it is the most preferred scale (Randall & 
Fernandes, 1991). The correlation between Impression Management and all the 
tested variables, for testing social desirability bias, was also used by Shafer (2009). 
In this study, the correlation between both the Self-Deception and Impression 
Management and all the tested variables are used for testing the social desirability 
bias.   
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As proposed by Steenkamp et al. (2010), the standardised regression coefficient is 
used as the guideline to identify the type of association that exists between the tested 
variables and the Self-Deception and Impression Management scales. Standardised 
coefficients that exceed .2 indicate that there is a non-negligible association between 
the variable and the SDB scale. Results from standard multiple regressions are 
presented in Table 4.3 below.  
Table 4.3: Association between the SDRB scales and the tested variables 
Variables 
Social desirability response bias (SDRB) 
Self-Deception  
Scale 
Impression Management  
Scale 
 Standardised 
coefficient 
Types of 
association 
Standardised 
coefficient 
Types of 
association 
Scenario 1: 
Attitude 
Injunctive norm 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
Self-efficacy 
Organisational-
professional conflict 
Awareness 
Intention 
Moral intensity 
 
.04 
-.29 
-.11 
 
.12 
.06 
 
-.28 
-.03 
.33 
-.23 
 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
Negligible 
 
Negligible 
Negligible 
 
Non-negligible 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
Non-negligible 
 
.16 
-.18 
.17 
 
.00 
-.21 
 
.15 
.00 
.14 
-.06 
 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Scenario 2: 
Attitude 
Injunctive norm 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
Self-efficacy 
Organisational-
professional conflict 
Awareness 
Intention 
Moral intensity 
 
.09 
-.21 
-.10 
 
.09 
-.08 
 
-.27 
-.01 
.30 
-.19 
 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
Negligible 
 
Negligible 
Negligible 
 
Non-negligible 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
Negligible 
 
.10 
-.23 
.26 
 
-.01 
-.28 
 
.01 
.12 
.11 
.09 
 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
Non-negligible 
 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
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Scenario 3: 
Attitude 
Injunctive norm 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
Self-efficacy 
Organisational-
professional conflict 
Awareness 
Intention 
Moral intensity 
 
-.04 
-.21 
-.04 
 
.25 
-.01 
 
-.27 
-.03 
.11 
-.10 
 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
Negligible 
 
Non-negligible 
Negligible 
 
Non-negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
 
-.05 
-.15 
.31 
 
.06 
-.16 
 
.08 
.13 
.05 
.17 
 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Non-negligible 
 
Negligible 
Negligible 
 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
Negligible 
 
Table 4.3 provides the regression results used to identify the possible existence of 
social desirability response bias in each of the tested variables. As demonstrated, 
some of the variables are affected by social desirability response bias. The overall 
impact of the social desirability response bias per variable is summarised in Table 
4.4. 
Table 4.4: Summary of the association results between variables and SDRB                                                     
scales 
Variable 
Type of association 
Negligible Non-negligible 
SD IM Total SD IM Total 
Attitude 3 3 6 0 0 0 
Injunctive norm 0 2 2 3 1 4 
Descriptive norm 3 1 4 0 2 2 
Perceived behavioural control 2 3 5 1 0 1 
Self-efficacy 3 1 4 0 2 2 
Organisational-professional 
conflict 
0 3 3 3 0 3 
Awareness 3 3 6 0 0 0 
Intention 1 3 4 2 0 2 
Moral intensity 2 3 5 1 0 1 
 
The most right-hand total column (the total for the non-negligible association 
between the tested variables and Self-Deception and Impression Management) as 
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shown in Table 4.4 gives information on social desirability bias. These results show 
that there is no social desirability response bias in the attitude and awareness 
variables (i.e. there are zero occasions of non-negligible association between the 
tested variables and the Self-Deception and Impression Management scales). 
However, there is evidence of an emergence of social desirability response bias for 
the injunctive norm, descriptive norm, perceived behavioural control, self-efficacy, 
intention and moral intensity variables. Injunctive norm reported the highest number 
of social desirability bias occasions (there were four non-negligible association 
occasions). Referring to Table 4.3, the biases existed across the three scenarios. 
Organizational-professional conflict is the second variable that has the highest 
occasions of social desirability bias (there were three non-negligible association 
occasions). Similar to the injunctive norm, the biases occurred in all the three 
scenarios. In addition to that, two occasions of social desirability bias were found in 
each of descriptive norm, self-efficacy and intention variables, and one occasion of 
social desirability bias in each of perceived behavioural control and moral intensity 
variables. For the descriptive norm, social desirability biases existed in Scenario 2 
and Scenario 3 while for the self-efficacy and intention variables, social desirability 
biases were found in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. Another one occasion of social 
desirability bias was reported in each Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 involving the moral 
intensity variable and perceived behavioural control variable respectively.  
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The above results show that in all the three scenarios social desirability bias 
involving a few variables has been detected. This demands caution in interpreting 
further analysis results.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics of variables 
The descriptive statistics for all of the variables are presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of all variables 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
Organisational-professional conflict 114 1.67 .60 1.00 3.75 
Awareness of whistle-blowing 
protection legislation 
114 3.30 .76 1.00 4.67 
Scenario 1: 
Attitude towards whistle-blowing 
Injunctive norm 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behaviour control 
Self-efficacy 
Intention 
Moral intensity 
 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
 
3.18 
4.08 
3.46 
4.00 
4.02 
4.28 
4.28 
 
.55 
.64 
.77 
.67 
.78 
.55 
.40 
 
1.75 
2.67 
1.25 
2.00 
1.75 
2.50 
3.17 
 
4.25 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
4.83 
Scenario 2: 
Attitude towards whistle-blowing 
Injunctive norm 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behaviour control 
Self-efficacy 
Intention 
Moral intensity 
 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
 
3.37 
4.00 
3.65 
4.49 
4.32 
4.57 
4.36 
 
.63 
.63 
.71 
.55 
.70 
.59 
.52 
 
2.00 
2.33 
1.75 
2.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.17 
 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
Scenario 3: 
Attitude towards whistle-blowing 
Injunctive norm 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behaviour control 
Self-efficacy 
Intention 
Moral intensity 
 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
114 
 
3.52 
4.30 
4.06 
4.53 
4.42 
4.59 
4.53 
 
.62 
.73 
.78 
.62 
.68 
.63 
.52 
 
2.00 
1.67 
1.75 
3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
2.67 
 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
 
For the purpose of analysing the descriptive analysis for the tested variables, only 
114 responses were analysed. Thirteen returned questionnaires which did not 
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completely answer Section C and Section D (sections on tested variables) were 
excluded from the analysis. Therefore only one hundred and fourteen responses are 
analysed. 
The information in Table 4.5 shows that, overall, respondents had low 
organisational-professional conflict. However, as reported in previous section, there 
is social desirability bias in the organizational-professional conflict variable. 
Considering the bias issue, there is a probability that respondents have higher conflict 
which they do not want to report it.  
As the seriousness of scenarios increased, the mean values for all the variables also 
increased as shown in Table 4.5. These results show that internal auditors feel 
obligated to blow the whistle in a situation that involves more serious and severe 
wrongdoing, such as wrongdoing that may harm public safety (situation in Scenario 
3). 
4.3 Statistical results for comparing group differences in relation to 
independent variables 
In this section, the results for the seven independent variables are compared between 
groups. The groups are based on gender, age, internal audit work experience, type of 
client and employment position. The statistical analysis conducted in this section is 
particularly to fulfil the first objective of this study. The results of the seven 
independent variables (listed in the left-most column in Figure 2.5) are the core of 
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the investigation. The demographic variables are among the variables tested in 
previous research. 
Parametric tests, such as ANOVA and the independent T-test, were used. However, 
in circumstances where the parametric test does not conform to the data, a non-
parametric test, such as the Mann-Whitney U test was used. The results of the 
statistical analysis of each of the five demographic variables are shown in the 
followings sections. 
4.3.1 Gender  
There was an unequal sample size in relation to gender where the ratio of males to 
females was greater than 1.5. Furthermore, there was violation of the homogeneity 
variances in the organisational-professional conflict variable. Consequently, the 
Mann-Whitney U test was used instead of the independent T-test. According to 
Laerd Statistics (2013) the use of independent T-test in this situation causes a large 
influence on the Type I 9 error rates as an extremely  unequal sample size can affect 
the homogeneity of variances. Table 4.6 provides the results for the Mann-Whitney 
U test. 
                                                 
9
 Type I error occurs when “we believe that there is a genuine effect in our population, when in fact 
there isn’t” (Field, 2009, p. 795).  
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Table 4.6: Mann-Whitney U Test results for gender groups 
Mann-Whitney U Test for gender groups (Female (F): n = 33, Male (M): n = 85) 
Independent variables U 
value 
Z 
value 
p  
(2-tailed) 
r Median 
Awareness of WPL 1133.5 -1.63 .10 .15 F: 3.33; M: 3.33 
Organisational-professional 
conflict 
1157.5 -1.49 .14 .14 F: 1.75; M :1.50 
Scenario 1: 
Attitudes towards whistle-
blowing 
Injunctive norms 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
Self-efficacy 
 
1233.5 
 
1332.5 
1383.0 
1247.5 
 
1356.5 
 
-1.03 
 
-.42 
-.12 
-.99 
 
-.28 
 
.31 
 
.67 
.91 
.32 
 
.78 
 
.10 
 
.04 
.01 
.09 
 
.03 
 
F: 3.00; M: 3.25 
 
F: 4.00; M: 4.00 
F: 3.25; M: 3.25 
F: 4.00; M: 4.00 
 
F: 4.00; M: 4.00 
Scenario 2: 
Attitudes towards whistle-
blowing 
Injunctive norms 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
Self-efficacy 
 
1079.5 
 
1399.5 
1296.0 
1358.5 
 
1325.5 
 
-1.96 
 
-.02 
-.64 
-.28 
 
-.48 
 
.05* 
 
.99 
.52 
.78 
 
.63 
 
.18# 
 
.00 
.06 
.03 
 
.04 
 
F: 3.25; M: 3.50 
 
F: 4.00; M: 4.00 
F: 3.50; M: 3.75 
F: 4.50; M: 4.50 
 
F: 4.50; M: 4.50 
Scenario 3: 
Attitudes towards whistle-
blowing 
Injunctive norms 
Descriptive norm 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
Self-efficacy 
 
  965.0 
 
1193.5 
1279.5 
1330.0 
 
1385.5 
 
-2.66 
 
-1.28 
-.75 
-.48 
 
-.11 
 
.01** 
 
.20 
.46 
.63 
 
.91 
 
.24## 
 
.12 
.07 
.04 
 
.01 
 
F: 3.25; M: 3.50 
 
F: 4.00; M: 4.33 
F: 4.00; M: 4.00 
F: 5.00; M: 5.00 
 
F: 4.25; M: 4.75 
WPL = whistle-blowing protection legislation 
*p<.1,**p<.05; p is at 2-tailed; 
Effect size (r): .1= small effect, .3 = medium effect, .5 = large effect (Pallant, 2013) 
#small effect (% of variance explained: 1%) 
## (almost) medium effect (% of variance explained: 6%) 
The Mann-Whitney U test results show there were few significant differences. There 
was significant difference in attitude towards whistle-blowing between females and 
males. The result for the attitude variable in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 demonstrate 
that attitude towards whistle-blowing is greater among males than females. Using 
Scenario 3 as example, the median of attitude towards whistle-blowing for males is 
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3.50 and females is 3.25. However, the effect size is small (r value = .24) which 
indicates there is small difference in attitudes towards whistle-blowing between 
males and females.  
The level for the attitude variable varied across scenarios; in Scenario 1 there was no 
significant difference, however, in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 there was a significant 
difference at p<.1 and p<.05 respectively. The variance in these levels is possibly due 
to the different ethical situations described in the scenarios10. As explained by Near 
et al. (2004) and Somers and Casal (2011), the seriousness of wrongdoing has an 
impact on whistle-blowing. 
The Mann-Whitney U test results also show that, apart from the attitude, there was 
no significant difference in perception, for both gender groups, on the other six 
independent variables. In this study the results reveal that, if there is a difference, 
males have a more positive attitude towards whistle-blowing than females. It will be 
recalled that attitude appears to have been free of social desirability bias. 
Table 4.7 provides mean and standard deviation values of the independent variables 
for both gender groups. The mean value refers to the average value of the individual 
variables and the standard deviation gives information of the average distance to the 
mean. This information may help readers to better understand the nature of the data. 
                                                 
10
 Scenario 1 was an examples of improper accounting treatment involving falsified invoices to 
customers. Scenario 2 involved financial statements fraud. Scenario 3 was a situation that may pose 
danger to public and environment. 
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Table 4.7: Exploratory data analysis on gender groups in relation to 
independent variables 
 
Variables 
Females Males 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Organisational professional conflict 1.85 .72 1.61 .53 
Awareness of protection legislation 3.12 .74 3.37 .76 
 
Variables 
Scenario 1 
Females Males 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.15 .45 3.21 .61 
Injunctive norm 3.99 .59 4.01 .74 
Descriptive norm 3.43 .62 3.38 .84 
Perceived behavioural control 3.88 .70 4.00 .70 
Self-efficacy 4.04 .73 3.97 .83 
 
Variables 
Scenario 2 
Females Males 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.18 .56 3.45 .67 
Injunctive norm 3.96 .60 3.96 .69 
Descriptive norm 3.53 .61 3.60 .76 
Perceived behavioural control 4.43 .59 4.46 .59 
Self-efficacy 4.29 .64 4.31 .76 
 
Variables 
Scenario 3 
Females Males 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.29 .56 3.62 .60 
Injunctive norm 4.15 .66 4.33 .70 
Descriptive norm 4.14 .70 4.02 .78 
Perceived behavioural control 4.46 .62 4.49 .67 
Self-efficacy 4.41 .57 4.37 .74 
SD = standard deviation 
As shown in Table 4.7, the mean value of organisational-professional conflict for 
males and females was not much different. However, the standard deviation value for 
females is higher than males. This means that for the organisational-professional 
conflict variable, the responses from female internal auditors were highly scattered or 
showed greater variance from the average opinion of the group members compared 
to their male counterparts.  
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In contrast, the standard deviation values for the attitudes, injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm and self-efficacy variables, across the three scenarios, for males 
were relatively higher than females. This means that a higher proportion of male 
responses varied from the mean value of the group members, compared to the female 
group. For perceived behavioural control, there was not much difference in the mean 
and standard deviation values between females and males across the three scenarios. 
This means that both gender groups seem to have mutual agreement regarding their 
control on whistle-blowing. 
The background of the respondents might well explain the findings of this study. The 
composition of respondents (see Table 4.1a) shows that the majority of the male 
respondents were in the age range of 41-60 years old (frequency = 64), while for 
females respondents, the majority were ranged between 31-50 years old (frequency = 
23). Respondents in an age range of between 41-60 years old, might have greater 
experience and/or may have received further training which would subsequently 
increase their professionalism in their career. Consequently, male respondents were 
more positive in their attitude towards whistle-blowing than females. No significant 
differences between genders were found for the other six variables.    
4.3.2 Age  
In this study, participants were grouped into three different age groups: Group 1 (31-
40 years old); Group 2 (41-50 years old) and Group 3 (51-60 years old). Participants 
who were aged 30 years old and below were excluded from the analysis as there 
were only five respondents in the group. It is likely that by including these 
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participants in the analysis the ANOVA results would be exposed to the Type I error. 
This is because the inclusion of the age group would make the ratio of largest to 
smallest sample size group greater than 1.5. An unequal sample size is a 
circumstance that needs to be avoided in any parametric test such as the ANOVA. In 
this study, the ANOVA test was used to analyse the differences in the responses by 
the participants from the three different age groups.  
Before running the ANOVA test, checks were conducted on the ANOVA 
assumptions. There are three general ANOVA assumptions which require 
examination. The first assumption is independence of observations, the second is 
normality and the third is homogeneity of variances.   
The data collection method used in this study provided no reason to assume that the 
participants were not independent. The assumption of normality was tested using the 
QQ-Plots and the graphs showed an approximately normal distribution.11 The 
homogeneity of variances was tested using the Levene Test and found to be tenable.  
 Self-efficacy (in Scenario 2) was the only variable that violated the homogeneity 
variance assumption (significance value less than .05). Although there was some 
violation in one of the assumptions, the ANOVA test is still robust, especially if the 
sample size of each group does not differ significantly. Table 4.8 provides the 
ANOVA results. 
                                                 
11
 The normality test results for the ANOVA and independent T-tests, analysed in this study, showed 
that the dataset conform to the statistical general assumptions. No (severe) violations to the statistical 
test assumptions were detected. Therefore, only a few samples of normality test results, using the QQ-
Plots graphs, are shown in the Appendix of this thesis. 
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Table 4.8: One-way ANOVA results for age groups 
One-way ANOVA for age groups (Group 1 (G1): n = 31; Group 2 (G2): n = 50;  
Group 3 (G3): n= 41) 
 Mean SD SE p (r) Levene 
test: 
F (sig) 
Variables G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
OPC 1.77 1.76 1.50 .50 .62 .54 .09 .09 .08 .06* (.05) .64 (.53) 
AW  3.37 3.32 3.23 .53 .79 .87 .09 .11 .14 .85 2.13 (.12) 
Scenario 1 
 Mean SD SE p (r) Levene 
test: 
F (sig) 
G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Attitudes  
IN  
DN  
PBC 
SE  
3.15 
3.89 
3.41 
3.87 
3.98 
3.19 
3.95 
3.28 
3.92 
3.95 
3.21 
4.27 
3.50 
4.03 
4.09 
.42 
.69 
.61 
.69 
.58 
.58 
.63 
.86 
.79 
.84 
.62 
.69 
.76 
.67 
.81 
.08 
.13 
.11 
.13 
.11 
.08 
.09 
.12 
.11 
.12 
.10 
.11 
.12 
.12 
.13 
.88 
.03** (.06) 
.39 
.65 
.65 
2.13(.12) 
.28 (.76) 
1.10 (.34) 
.70 (.50) 
1.39 (.25) 
Scenario 2 
 Mean SD SE p (r) Levene 
test: 
F (sig) 
G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Attitudes  
IN 
DN 
PBC 
SE 
3.32 
3.92 
3.58 
4.36 
4.14 
3.31 
3.95 
3.55 
4.49 
4.28 
3.51 
4.04 
3.64 
4.42 
4.44 
.51 
.62 
.58 
.60 
.50 
.67 
.70 
.79 
.57 
.80 
.68 
.59 
.70 
.60 
.68 
.09 
.11 
.11 
.11 
.09 
.10 
.10 
.11 
.08 
.11 
.11 
.09 
.11 
.10 
.11 
.29 
.45 
.62 
.59 
.19 
1.26 (.29) 
.93 (.40) 
2.02 (.14) 
.34 (.72) 
4.22 (.02) 
Scenario 3 
 Mean SD SE p (r) Levene 
test: 
F (sig) 
G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Attitudes  
IN 
DN 
PBC 
SE 
3.34 
4.07 
3.89 
4.36 
4.19 
3.54 
4.28 
4.00 
4.52 
4.35 
3.67 
4.50 
4.15 
4.54 
4.54 
.55 
.72 
.74 
.70 
.62 
.63 
.67 
.81 
.62 
.74 
.67 
.69 
.77 
.68 
.67 
.10 
.13 
.13 
.13 
.11 
.09 
.10 
.12 
.09 
.11 
.11 
.11 
.12 
.11 
.11 
.09* (.04) 
.03** (.06) 
.364 
.449 
.09* (.04) 
.51 (.60) 
.61 (.55) 
.50 (.61) 
.32(.73) 
1.02 (.37) 
OPC = organisational-professional conflict; AW = awareness, IN = injunctive norm; DN = descriptive 
norm; PBC = perceived behavioural conflict; SE = self-efficacy;  
*p<.1; **p<.05; p is at 2-tailed;  
Effect size (r): .01 = small effect, .06 = medium effect, .14 = large effect (Pallant, 2013). 
#small effect (% of variance explained: 1%) (Pallant, 2013); 
## (almost) medium effect (% of variance explained: 6%) (Pallant, 2013).  
G1: 31-40 years old, G2: 41-50 years old, G3: 51-60 years old.  
From the analysis, it was found that participants from different age groups do not 
differ significantly in descriptive norm, perceived behavioural control and awareness 
of whistle-blowing protection legislation (see Table 4.8). Based on the social 
desirability bias results, no social desirability bias was reported on the awareness 
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variable. This means that respondents in this study, regardless of their age, do not 
have significant different on their level of awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation.  
The ANOVA identified a significant difference at p<.1 in organisational-professional 
conflict between participants in Group 1 (31-40 years old) and Group 3 (51-60 years 
old). The results show that participants in young age group (Group 1) reported higher 
organizational-professional conflict in relative to participants in older age group 
(Group 3). Also, a significant difference at p<.05 was found in injunctive norm 
between participants in Group 1 (31-40 years old) and Group 3 (51-60 years old) in 
both Scenario 1 and Scenario 3. The findings show that participants in older age 
groups are more agreed than participants in younger age group that significant others 
do want them to blow the whistle.   
For the injunctive norm, using Scenario 1 as an example, the post–hoc test, Tukey 
HSD, found that the mean of injunctive norm in Scenario 1 for Group 1 is M = 3.89 
and Group 3 is M = 4.27. Group 2 (M = 3.95) was not significantly different to either 
Group 1 or Group 3. In addition, the ANOVA was also significant with F (2,119) = 
3.516, p = .033. The results provide sufficient evidence that there is a significant 
different in injunctive norms among participants from different age groups, 
specifically between participants in Group 1 (31-40 years old) and Group 3 (51-60 
years old). Using the guidelines by Cohen, the effect size of the difference between 
the groups was moderate (r = .06). In Scenario 3, the significant level for injunctive 
norm was p<.05 and the effect size of the difference was also moderate (.06).  
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In Scenario 3, the ANOVA results showed that participants in Group 1 and Group 3 
had a significant difference in attitude, injunctive norm and self-efficacy. The results 
show that older respondents have a more positive attitude towards whistle-blowing 
than the younger respondents. Also, they are more agreed that first, important people 
in their life support their decision to blow the whistle and second, they are more 
capable to blow the whistle than the younger respondents. The significance level for 
both the attitude towards whistle-blowing and self-efficacy is at p<.1 and the effect 
size is small. The significant level for injunctive norm is at p<.05 and the effect size 
is moderate. As reported in the social desirability bias section, there is no social 
desirability response bias on the attitude variable. This means that in this study, older 
respondents have a more positive attitude towards whistle-blowing than the younger 
respondents.  
Table 4.9 provides information on the mean and standard deviation.  
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Table 4.9: Exploratory data analysis on age groups in relation to independent 
variables 
Variables Age  
31-40 years old 41-50 years old 51-60 years old 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Organisational-professional conflict 1.77 .50 1.76 .62 1.50 .54 
Awareness of protection legislation 3.37 .53 3.32 .79 3.23 .87 
Scenario 1 
Variables Age 
31-40 years old 41-50 years old 51-60 years old 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.15 .42 3.19 .58 3.21 .62 
Injunctive norm 3.89 .69 3.95 .63 4.27 .69 
Descriptive norm 3.41 .61 3.28 .86 3.50 .76 
Perceived behavioural control 3.87 .69 3.92 .79 4.03 .67 
Self-efficacy 3.98 .58 3.95 .84 4.09 .81 
Scenario 2 
Variables Age 
31-40 years old 41-50 years old 51-60 years old 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.32 .51 3.31 .67 3.51 .68 
Injunctive norm 3.92 .62 3.95 .70 4.09 .59 
Descriptive norm 3.58 .58 3.55 .79 3.64 .70 
Perceived behavioural control 4.36 .60 4.49 .57 4.42 .60 
Self-efficacy 4.14 .50 4.28 .80 4.44 .68 
Scenario 3 
Variables Age 
31-40 years old 41-50 years old 51-60 years old 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.34 .55 3.54 .63 3.67 .67 
Injunctive norm 4.07 .72 4.28 .67 4.50 .69 
Descriptive norm 3.89 .74 4.00 .81 4.15 .77 
Perceived behavioural control 4.36 .70 4.52 .62 4.54 .68 
Self-efficacy 4.19 .62 4.35 .74 4.54 .67 
SD = standard deviation 
As shown in Table 4.9, the mean value and the standard deviation value for 
organisational-professional conflict for the three age groups were not much different. 
The result is consistent with the effect size value shown in Table 4.8 which indicates 
a moderate level of difference in organizational-professional conflict between 
respondents in each age group.  
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In each scenario, there was little difference in the mean value and the standard 
deviation value for the attitude, injunctive norm and perceived behavioural control 
variables. The little difference in the mean and standard deviation values between 
age groups indicates no much difference in the respondents’ opinion on these 
particular variables. However, as shown in Table 4.9, although the mean value of the 
awareness variable for the three age groups was not significantly different, the 
standard deviation for the younger age group (G1) was much lower than the other 
two groups. This shows that respondents in the older age groups (G2 and G3) do not 
have similar opinions, among group members, on the awareness variable, in 
comparison to those in the younger age group (G1). The same situation also applies 
to the descriptive norm and the self-efficacy variables. These findings suggest that as 
internal auditors get older, their views on the whistle-blowing protection legislation 
as well as their opinions on the whistle-blowing practice by their significant others 
and their own capabilities to blow the whistle change. Perhaps, their work experience 
plays a role in shaping their views.     
The results presented in Table 4.8 provide evidence that there is significant 
difference between respondents from different age groups. Significant differences 
were found in the organisational-professional conflict, attitude, injunctive norm and 
self-efficacy variables. Obvious differences were found between the younger age 
group respondents (G1) and the older age group respondents (G3). The effect size of 
the differences ranged from low to moderate. Out of these four variables, 
respondents in the younger age group reported higher organisational-professional 
conflict than the respondents in the older age groups. On the contrary, the older age 
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group respondents were likely to have a more positive attitude towards whistle-
blowing, receive more support from their significant others (injunctive norm) and 
were more certain about their capability to blow the whistle (self-efficacy) than the 
younger age group respondents. The findings suggest that a more positive view of 
whistle-blowing and confidence in themselves to blow the whistle exist among older 
internal auditors. However, in the other three variables; descriptive norm, perceived 
behavioural control and awareness, there was no significant difference between the 
respondents from different age groups. 
Caution should be given in interpreting the results of injunctive norm, descriptive 
norm, perceived behavioural control, organizational-professional conflict and self-
efficacy. This is due to the social desirability response biases that have been found in 
the analysis. The results on these variables might differ within actual situations. 
From the ANOVA results, this study suggest that internal auditors from different age 
groups vary significantly with regards to their attitudes, the support they receive from 
their significant others (injunctive norm), their capability to blow the whistle (self-
efficacy) and their organisational-professional conflict.   
4.3.3 Internal auditing work experience  
A one-way ANOVA was performed in order to examine whether there were 
significant differences, for each of the seven variables, between respondents with 
different work experience. Three groups of respondents were formed. Group 1 
comprised of internal auditors with work experience, in internal auditing, of 10 years 
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or less and Groups 2 and 3 consisted of internal auditors with 11-19 years experience 
and 20+ years experience, respectively. 
Statistical tests for normality and homogeneity of variance were conducted prior to 
ANOVA test. For normality, graphical methods using QQ-Plots showed the 
deviations of the data from the straight line are minimal. In other words, there was no 
severe violation to the normality assumption. The homogeneity of variance was 
tested using the Levene Test and the results were tenable (with exception of the 
perceived behavioural control in Scenario 2 where the significant value was .4). 
Table 4.10 provides summary of the ANOVA results.  
Table 4.10: One-way ANOVA results for internal auditing work experience 
groups 
One-way ANOVA for work experience (in internal auditing) group: 
 (Group 1 (G1): n = 35; Group 2 (G2):n = 52; Group 3 (G3): n= 40) 
 Mean SD SE p (r) Levene test: 
F (sig) Variables G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
OPC 1.62 1.71 1.71 .64 .57 .58 .11 .08 .09 .76 1.43 (.24) 
Awareness  3.67 3.22 3.11 .64 .68 .84 .11 .09 .13 .00***(.09) 1.91 (.15) 
Scenario 1 
 Mean SD SE p (r) Levene test: 
F (sig) G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Attitudes  
IN 
DN  
PBC 
SE 
3.22 
3.97 
3.45 
3.96 
4.09 
3.11 
4.03 
3.40 
3.91 
3.85 
3.26 
4.11 
3.40 
4.00 
4.10 
.57 
.79 
.92 
.59 
.72 
.54 
.59 
.71 
.72 
.80 
.61 
.73 
.76 
.81 
.80 
.10 
.07 
.16 
.10 
.12 
.08 
.09 
.10 
10 
.11 
.10 
.12 
.12 
.13 
.13 
.42 
.71 
.94 
.81 
.23 
.01 (.91) 
2.26 (.11) 
1.62 (.20) 
1.07 (.35) 
.15 (.87) 
Scenario 2 
 Mean SD SE p (r) Levene test: 
F (sig) G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Attitudes  
IN 
DN  
PBC 
SE 
3.32 
3.97 
3.69 
4.42 
4.27 
3.29 
3.97 
3.55 
4.49 
4.16 
3.51 
4.03 
3.63 
4.37 
4.48 
.64 
.73 
.85 
.61 
.62 
.55 
.61 
.62 
.49 
.76 
.77 
.66 
.72 
.66 
.69 
.11 
.12 
.15 
.11 
.11 
.08 
.09 
.09 
.07 
.11 
.12 
.10 
.12 
.11 
.11 
.25 
.89 
.69 
.57 
.10* (.04) 
.88 (.42) 
.79 (.46) 
2.34 (.10) 
3.20 (.04) 
.71 (.49) 
Scenario 3 
 Mean SD SE p (r) Levene test: 
F (sig) G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
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Attitudes  
IN 
DN  
PBC 
SE 
3.44 
4.17 
3.96 
4.50 
4.33 
3.47 
4.28 
4.04 
4.48 
4.26 
3.66 
4.39 
4.03 
4.44 
4.55 
.55 
.81 
.86 
.62 
.65 
.58 
.66 
.70 
.67 
.73 
.76 
.71 
.84 
.68 
.67 
.09 
.14 
.15 
.11 
.12 
.08 
.09 
.10 
.09 
.10 
.12 
.11 
.13 
.11 
.11 
.26 
.40 
.89 
.91 
.12 
2.26 (.11) 
.08 (.92) 
1.01 (.37) 
.35 (.71) 
.94 (.39) 
OPC = organisational-professional conflict; IN = injunctive norm; DN = descriptive norm; PBC = 
perceived behavioural conflict; SE = self-efficacy;  
*p<.1; ***p<.01; p is at 2–tailed 
Effect size (r): 0.01 = small, 0.06 = moderate, 0.14 = large (Pallant, 2013).  
G1: ten years experience or less, G2: 11-19 years experience, G3: 20+ years experience. 
The results show that only the awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation 
and the self-efficacy variables differ significantly between participants. In the former 
variable, participants in Group 1 (ten years’ experience or less) differ significantly 
from participants in Group 2 (11-19 years’ experience) and Group 3 (20+ years 
experience) at p<.01 with a moderate effect size. However, no significant difference 
was found between Group 2 (11-19 years’ experience) and Group 3 (20 years’ 
experience or more). From the results, it was found that participants in Group 1 (ten 
years’ experience or less) have a higher mean value than participants in the other two 
groups. The higher awareness on the whistle-blowing protection legislation among 
those who have less experience in internal auditing (respondents in Group 1) 
compared to those who have more experience (respondents in Group 2 and Group 3) 
might be caused by the relatively higher queries they have on the protection provided 
by the whistle-blowing protection legislation. The higher queries perhaps have led 
them to information searching on the U.K. whistle-blowing protection legislation.  
The relative higher mean value for Group 1, than for Groups 2 and 3, however, does 
not necessarily mean they have good and thorough knowledge about the whistle-
blowing protection legislation. The items statement in the survey only asked general 
questions regarding their perceptions of the PIDA 1998. The responses to the general 
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questions, however, provide no association with the depth of knowledge they have 
concerning whistle-blowing protection legislation. Any logic for explanation might 
be relevant. Perhaps, the participants who have more sound knowledge about the 
PIDA 1998 responded more wisely to the items statements than those with a more 
shallow knowledge. However, there were no further questions or information 
requested in the survey which could link the responses of the participants to the level 
of knowledge they have on the PIDA 1998.  
In the latter variable, self-efficacy, the results presented for Scenario 2 show that 
participants in Group 2 differed significantly with participants in Group 3 at p<.1 
with a small effect size. The mean score for Group 3 is greater than the other two 
groups which indicates that participants with more years of experience are convinced 
of their capability to take action (blow the whistle). 
There was no significant difference in the participants’ attitudes towards whistle-
blowing, injunctive norm, descriptive norm, organisational-professional conflict and 
the perceived behavioural control, regardless of the participants’ number of years of 
work experience. 
In addition to the ANOVA results, this study also provides information of mean and 
standard deviation (see Table 4.11) which is useful in assisting readers to understand 
the nature of the data. 
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Table 4.11: Exploratory data analysis on internal auditing work experience 
groups in relation to independent variables 
 
Variables 
Work experience 
10 years or less 11-19 years 20+ years  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Organisational professional conflict 1.62 .64 1.71 .57 1.71 .58 
Awareness of protection legislation 3.67 .64 3.22 .68 3.11 .84 
Scenario 1 
 
Variables 
Work experience 
10 years or less 11-19 years 20+ years 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.22 .57 3.11 .54 3.26 .61 
Injunctive norm 3.97 .79 4.03 .59 4.11 .73 
Descriptive norm 3.45 .92 3.40 .71 3.40 .76 
Perceived behavioural control 3.96 .59 3.91 .72 4.00 .81 
Self-efficacy 4.09 .72 3.85 .80 4.10 .80 
Scenario 2 
 
Variables 
Work experience 
10 years or less 11-19 years 20+ years  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.32 .64 3.29 .55 3.51 .77 
Injunctive norm 3.97 .73 3.97 .61 4.03 .66 
Descriptive norm 3.69 .85 3.55 .62 3.63 .72 
Perceived behavioural control 4.42 .61 4.49 .49 4.37 .66 
Self-efficacy 4.27 .62 4.16 .76 4.48 .69 
Scenario 3 
 
Variables 
Work experience 
10 years or less 11-19 years 20+ years 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.44 .55 3.47 .58 3.66 .76 
Injunctive norm 4.17 .81 4.28 .66 4.39 .71 
Descriptive norm 3.96 .86 4.04 .70 4.03 .84 
Perceived behavioural control 4.50 .62 4.48 .67 4.44 .68 
Self-efficacy 4.33 .65 4.26 .73 4.55 .67 
SD = standard deviation 
As shown in Table 4.11, the mean and the standard deviation value of the 
organisational-professional conflict and the attitude towards whistle-blowing 
variables (in Scenario 1), for the three groups of years work experience, are not 
dissimilar. This means that the respondents in each group share the same, basic, 
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opinion regarding the two variables. However, in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3, there 
are relatively higher mean and standard deviation values for attitude among 
respondents in G3 compared to the respondents in G1 and G2. The higher standard 
deviation value shows that there are relatively more respondents in that particular 
group that responded differently from the average responses given by other members 
of the group. 
For the awareness variable, respondents in G3 have a much higher standard deviation 
value (0.84) than the other two groups (.64 and .68). This indicates that there are 
more inconsistencies in opinion on the awareness between respondents who have 
more years experience in internal auditing work than other respondents with less 
work experience.   
For the injunctive norm and descriptive norm across the three scenarios and the self-
efficacy in Scenario 1, the mean and the standard deviation values for the three 
groups are relatively high compared to other variables. This means that, despite the 
high mean value, the inconsistencies in opinions between the respondents within 
each group are also high.   
For the perceived behavioural control variable, there is not much difference between 
groups with regards to the mean and standard deviation values except in Scenario 1 
where there is a higher value of standard deviation for the group of respondents with 
experience of 20 years or more.  
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The results show that the number of years of work experience plays a role in an 
individual’s perception on whistle-blowing. In this study, the number of years of 
work experience positively influences internal auditors’ ability to blow the whistle 
(self-efficacy). 
4.3.4 Client categories  
As presented in Table 4.1b, the majority of the participants were in-house internal 
auditors.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that respondents who reported that 
their client organisation was public sector were employed in the public sector and 
those whose clients were private sector were employed in the private sector.    
An independent T-test was used to explore significant differences in the seven tested 
independent variables between participants who audited public sector organisations 
(Group 1) and private sector organisations (Group 2). The private sector 
organisations group comprised of private-for-profit and private-not-for-profit 
organisations.  
Similar to the previous sections, the data was first tested for the assumptions of 
normality and homogeneity of variances. The normality was tested using the QQ-
Plots. The graphs showed an approximate normal distribution on the variables for 
both client-type groups. For the assumption of homogeneity of variances, the Levene 
Test results showed there was no violation to the assumption in all of the variables 
except for injunctive norm (Scenario 2). The T-test is a robust test and can cater for 
the normality and homogeneity of variances assumption, especially in situations 
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where the sample size of the largest group to the smallest group is not greater than 
1.5. The independent T-test results are shown in Table 4.12.  
Table 4.12: T-test results for client categories groups 
T-test for client categories (Group1 (G1): n= 56; Group 2 (G2): n = 58) 
 
Variables 
Mean SD T df p 
(2-tailed) 
95% CI Levene 
test 
F (sig) G1 G2 G1 G2 Lower Upper 
OPC 1.75 1.59 .61 .58 1.47 112 .15 -.23 1.54 .02 (.88) 
Awareness  3.17 3.43 .84 .66 -1.83 112 .07* -1.61 .06 2.41 (.12) 
Scenario 1 
 Mean SD T df p 
(2-tailed) 
95% CI Levene 
test  
F (sig) G1 G2 G1 G2 Lower Upper 
Attitudes 
IN 
DN 
PBC 
SE 
3.11 
4.14 
3.51 
3.93 
3.87 
3.24 
4.02 
3.42 
4.06 
4.17 
.54 
.62 
.77 
.72 
.74 
.55 
.67 
.77 
.62 
.80 
-1.27 
1.02 
.63 
-1.05 
-2.10 
112 
112 
112 
112 
112 
.21 
.31 
.53 
.30 
.04** 
-1.33 
-.70 
-.78 
-.76 
-2.35 
.29 
2.17 
1.50 
.23 
-.07 
.13 (.72) 
.21 (.65) 
.00 (.97) 
.06 (.80) 
.12 (.73) 
Scenario 2 
 Mean SD T df P 
(2-tailed) 
95% CI Levene 
test  
F (sig) G1 G2 G1 G2 Lower Upper 
Attitudes 
IN 
DN 
PBC 
SE 
3.32 
3.99 
3.67 
4.47 
4.30 
3.42 
4.02 
3.64 
4.51 
4.35 
.62 
.53 
.68 
.56 
.67 
.65 
.71 
.74 
.56 
.73 
-.81 
-.30 
.21 
-.43 
-.45 
112 
105 
112 
112 
112 
.42 
.77 
.84 
.67 
.66 
-1.33 
-1.61 
-.95 
-.50 
-1.28 
.55 
1.19 
1.16 
.32 
.81 
.234 (.63) 
6.74 (.01) 
1.01(.32) 
.33 (.57) 
.01 (.92) 
Scenario 3 
 Mean SD T df P 
(2-tailed) 
95% CI Levene 
test 
F (sig) G1 G2 G1 G2 Lower Upper 
Attitudes 
IN 
DN 
PBC 
SE 
3.61 
4.42 
4.26 
4.51 
4.46 
3.45 
4.18 
3.87 
4.55 
4.38 
.61 
.65 
.73 
.69 
.64 
.62 
.78 
.80 
.56 
.71 
1.41 
1.75 
2.69 
-.37 
.60 
112 
112 
112 
112 
112 
.16 
.08* 
.01*** 
.72 
.55 
-.26 
-.19 
.40 
-.55 
-.70 
1.57 
3.02 
2.67 
.38 
1.31 
.15 (.70) 
.04 (.08) 
.33 (.57) 
3.48 (.07) 
.78 (.38) 
OPC = organisational-professional conflict; IN = injunctive norm; DN = descriptive norm; PBC = perceived 
behavioural conflict; SE = self-efficacy;  
*p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01; p is at 2-tailed, 
G1: public organisations, G2: private organisations 
The T-test results found significant differences in the awareness, self-efficacy, 
injunctive norm and descriptive norm variables between respondents who audited 
public sector organisations and those who audited private sector organisations. The 
results found that respondents who audited private sector organizations have a higher 
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awareness of the whistle-blowing protection legislation than respondents who 
audited public sector organizations. The awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation between the two groups was significantly different at p<.1. For self-
efficacy, in Scenario 1, there was a significant difference between both groups at 
p<.05. The T-test results found that the perceptions on the capability to blow the 
whistle are relatively higher among internal auditors who audited private sector 
organizations than those who audited public sector organizations. Based on Cohen’s 
(1988) convention, both of the variables share a small effect size. In addition, 
injunctive norm and descriptive norm were also significantly different between both 
groups at p<.1 and p<0.01 respectively. Internal auditors who audited public sector 
organizations reported a higher influence of norms (injunctive and descriptive) than 
internal auditors who audited private sector organizations. The effect size for 
injunctive norm is small, however, descriptive norm has a moderately sized effect. 
Table 4.13 provides information on the mean and standard deviation values for the 
variables. As shown in the table, the standard deviation for the awareness variable in 
public sector organisations is relatively high than for private sector organisation. The 
high standard deviation value implies that there are more members in the particular 
group that have diverse opinions on awareness compared to the other group. In the 
other variables, there are no noticeable differences in mean and standard deviation 
values.   
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Table 4.13: Exploratory data analysis on client categories groups in relation to 
independent variables 
 
Variables 
Public organisation Private organisation 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Organisational professional conflict 1.75 .61 1.59 .58 
Awareness of protection legislation 3.17 .84 3.43 .66 
 
Variables 
Public organisation Private organisation 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.11 .54 3.24 .55 
Injunctive norm 4.14 .62 4.02 .67 
Descriptive norm 3.51 .77 3.42 .77 
Perceived behavioural control 3.93 .72 4.06 .62 
Self-efficacy 3.87 .74 4.17 .80 
 
Variables 
Public organisation Private organisation 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.32 .62 3.42 .63 
Injunctive norm 2.99 .53 4.02 .71 
Descriptive norm 3.67 .68 3.64 .74 
Perceived behavioural control 4.47 .56 4.51 .56 
Self-efficacy 4.30 .67 4.35 .73 
 
Variables 
Public organisation Private organisation 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Attitudes towards whistle-blowing 3.61 .61 3.45 .62 
Injunctive norm 4.42 .65 4.18 .78 
Descriptive norm 4.23 .73 3.87 .80 
Perceived behavioural control 4.51 .69 4.55 .56 
Self-efficacy 4.46 .64 4.38 .71 
SD = standard deviation 
The results of this study found significant differences in the awareness, injunctive 
norm, descriptive norm and self-efficacy variables between the two groups. Internal 
auditors in public sector organisation gained more support from their significant 
others (results for the Scenario 3) to blow the whistle. However, internal auditors in 
private sector organisation have more confidence in their capability (self-efficacy) to 
take action by blowing the whistle, as shown in the result for Scenario 1. Internal 
auditors in private sector organisations also have a greater awareness of whistle-
blowing protection legislation than their public sector counterparts. 
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As mentioned in the earlier sections of this chapter, some of the variables have social 
desirability bias. Although respondents from the two groups (G1 and G2) have 
significant different on the influence of injunctive norm, descriptive norm and self-
efficacy, however, there is possibility that actual situations are differ from the results 
obtained in this study. Nevertheless, the awareness variable was not exposed to the 
bias.  
4.3.5 Employment position  
An objective of this study was to identify significant differences in the tested 
variables between in-house internal auditors and outsourced internal auditors. 
However, this was not achievable due to the low number of responses received from 
outsourced internal auditors. This unequal sample size restricted the types of 
statistical tools that could be used to compare these group differences (see Table 
4.1b).  
In this study, cross-tabulation was used and the results are presented in Table 4.14 to 
Table 4.20. The information in the tables is useful as they provide readers with 
information on how the two groups of internal auditors responded to the item 
statements in the survey.  
For analysis purposes, answers to each of the item statements were grouped into 
three categories: negative/low, neutral, and positive/high. Responses of ‘1’ and ‘2’ in 
the questionnaire were combined and represent the negative/low criterion, responses 
of ‘3’ represent neutral criterion, while responses of ‘4’ and ‘5’ represent 
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positive/high criterion. Participants that declare they are from outsourced, 
consortium, combination and others are grouped together and they represent the 
outsource group. The negative-worded items were reverse-coded.   
Table 4.14 provides cross-tabulation results of organisational-professional conflict. 
Table 4.14: Cross-tabulation for organisational-professional conflict (OPC) 
 Low OPC Neutral High OPC Total 
% 
(Base) Items of OPC  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 70.08% 
(89) 
23.62% 
(30) 
3.94 % 
(5) 
1.57% 
(2) 
0% 
(0) 
0.79% 
(1) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 66.14% 
(84) 
22.83% 
(29) 
6.30% 
(8) 
3.15% 
(4) 
1.57% 
(2) 
0% 
(0) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 62.99% 
(80) 
22.05% 
(28) 
9.45% 
(12) 
3.94% 
(5) 
1.57% 
(2) 
0% 
(0) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 59.06% 
(75) 
17.32% 
(22) 
14.17% 
(18) 
7.09 % 
(9) 
0.79% 
(1) 
1.57% 
(2) 
100% 
(127) 
Item1: Full opportunity as professional (reverse coded).  
Item 2: Being put under significant pressure. 
Item 3: Conflict between work standard and professional judgment.  
Item 4: Organisation demands override professional judgment. 
 
In Table 4.14, the answers to each of the (four) item statements of organisational-
professional conflict, by the two groups of employment positions, indicates 
disagreement to all the items statements asked in the questionnaire. In other words, 
the respondents, regardless of their employment positions, experienced a low conflict 
in their work.  
Table 4.15 provides cross-tabulation results on awareness of whistle-blowing 
protection legislation.  
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Table 4.15: Cross-tabulation for awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation  
 Negative AW Neutral Positive AW Total 
% 
(Base) Items of AW  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 11.81% 
(15) 
3.94% 
(5) 
18.90% 
(24) 
7.87% 
(10) 
43.31% 
(55) 
14.17% 
(18) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 14.96% 
(19) 
3.15% 
(4 
18.11% 
(23) 
7.09% 
(9) 
40.94% 
(52) 
15.75% 
(20) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 21.26% 
(27) 
10.23% 
(13) 
25.98% 
(33) 
7.09% 
(9) 
26.77% 
(34) 
8.66 % 
(11) 
100% 
(127) 
AW = awareness 
Item 1: Whistle-blowing legislation helps deter unethical behaviours. 
Item 2: Whistle-blowing legislation helps deter illegal behaviours. 
Item 3: Whistle-blowing legislation provides effective protection. 
 
In Table 4.15, the majority of participants in the in-house position had a positive 
awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation. A high percentage of the 
participants agreed that whistle-blowing protection legislation was capable of 
deterring negative and unethical behaviours. However, with regard to the third item 
(provide effective protection) in the questionnaire, there was not much difference 
between the in-house internal auditors who agreed, disagreed and were neutral with 
the items statements.  For the outsourced group, a conclusion cannot be made due to 
the small responses received, however, from the table, they appear to have a similar 
point of view to those in the in-house group.  
Table 4.16 provides cross-tabulation results on attitude towards whistle-blowing.  
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Table 4.16: Cross-tabulation for attitude towards whistle-blowing 
Item 1= Whistle-blowing is a good idea.  Item 2 = Whistle-blowing is a wise idea. 
Item 3 = Whistle-blowing is a pleasant experience. Item 4 = I like the idea of whistle-blowing. 
In Table 4.16, all respondents, regardless of their group, agreed that whistle-blowing 
is a good and wise idea. However, they also agreed that whistle-blowing is not a 
pleasant experience. Results in Table 4.16 also show that their favourable view (Item 
4), concerning whistle-blowing itself, was very subjective to types of questionable 
behaviour or seriousness of the wrongdoings they encountered in their audit work. 
Scenario 1 
Items  
of 
attitude 
Negative attitude Neutral Positive attitude Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 0% 
(0) 
1.57%  
(2) 
5.51% 
(7) 
1.57%  
(2) 
68.50% 
(87) 
22.83% 
(29) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 6.30% 
(8) 
1.57%  
(2) 
9.45% 
(12) 
3.15% 
(4) 
58.27% 
(74) 
21.26% 
(27) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 65.35% 
(83) 
22.83% 
(29) 
7.09% 
(9) 
3.15% 
(4) 
1.57% 
(2) 
0% 
(0) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 29.13% 
(37) 
8.66% 
(11) 
22.05% 
(28) 
9.45% 
(12) 
22.83% 
(29) 
7.09% 
(9) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 2 
Items  
of 
attitude 
Negative attitude Neutral Positive attitude Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 0.79%  
(1) 
1.57%  
(2) 
3.15% 
(4) 
0.79%  
(1) 
70.08% 
(89) 
23.62% 
(30) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 7.09% 
(9) 
2.36%  
(3) 
5.51% 
(7) 
0.79%  
(1) 
61.42% 
(78) 
22.83% 
(29) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 61.42% 
(78) 
18.90% 
(24) 
9.45% 
(12) 
5.51%  
(7) 
3.15% 
(4) 
1.57% 
(2) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 22.05% 
(28) 
11.81% 
(15) 
17.32% 
(22) 
7.09% 
(9) 
34.65% 
(44) 
7.09% 
(9) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 3 
Items  
of 
attitude 
Negative attitude Neutral Positive attitude Total  
% 
(Base) In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 0% 
(0) 
0.79%  
(1) 
3.94 % 
(5) 
1.57%  
(2) 
70.08% 
(89) 
23.62% 
(30) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 4.72% 
(6) 
1.57% 
(2) 
7.87% 
(10) 
1.57%  
(2) 
61.42% 
(78) 
22.83% 
(29 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 61.42% 
(78) 
14.96% 
(19) 
9.45% 
(12) 
9.45% 
(12) 
3.15% 
(4) 
1.57% 
(2) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 18.90% 
(24) 
6.30% 
(8) 
16.54% 
(21) 
8.66 % 
(11) 
38.58% 
(49) 
11.02% 
(14) 
100% 
(127) 
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As revealed in Table 4.16, there is a noticeable increasing percentage of positive 
response on the fourth item across the scenarios. 
Table 4.17 provides cross-tabulation results on injunctive norm.  
Table 4.17: Cross-tabulation for injunctive norm 
Scenario 1 
Items 
of IN 
Negative IN Neutral Positive IN Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 6.30% 
(8) 
0.79%  
(1) 
19.69% 
(25) 
8.66% 
(11) 
48.03% 
(61) 
16.54% 
(21) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 6.30% 
(8) 
0.79%  
(1) 
14.96% 
(19) 
4.72%  
(6) 
52.76% 
(67) 
20.47% 
(26) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 3.15% 
(4) 
2.36% 
(3) 
20.47% 
(26) 
3.94% 
(5) 
50.39% 
(64) 
19.69% 
(25) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 1.57% 
(2) 
2.36% 
(3) 
12.60% 
(16) 
3.94% 
(5) 
59.84% 
(76) 
19.69% 
(25) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 5 1.57% 
(2) 
2.36% 
(3) 
13.39% 
(17) 
2.36% 
(3) 
59.06% 
(75) 
21.26% 
(27) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 6 1.57% 
(2) 
0.79%  
(1) 
9.45% 
(12) 
3.15%  
(4) 
62.99% 
(80) 
22.05% 
(28) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 2 
Items 
of IN 
Negative IN Neutral Positive IN Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 5.51% 
(7) 
2.36% 
(3) 
18.11% 
(23) 
6.30 % 
(8) 
50.39% 
(64) 
17.32% 
(22) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 4.72% 
(6) 
0.79%  
(1) 
17.32% 
(22) 
7.09 % 
(9) 
51.97% 
(66) 
18.11% 
(23) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 3.15% 
(4) 
0.79%  
(1) 
18.11% 
(23) 
7.09 % 
(9) 
52.76% 
(67) 
18.11% 
(23) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 3.15% 
(4) 
0% 
(0) 
14.96% 
(19) 
7.09 % 
(9) 
55.91% 
(71) 
18.90% 
(24) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 5 2.36% 
(3) 
0.79%  
(1) 
12.60% 
(16) 
3.15% 
(4) 
59.06% 
(75) 
22.05% 
(28) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 6 2.36% 
(3) 
0.79%  
(1) 
9.45% 
(12) 
3.15% 
(4) 
62.20% 
(79) 
21.26% 
(27) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 3 
Items 
of IN 
Negative IN Neutral Positive IN Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 3.15% 
(4) 
0% 
(0) 
10.24% 
(13) 
3.94 % 
(5) 
60.63% 
(77) 
22.05% 
(28) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 3.94 % 
(5) 
0.79%  
(1) 
9.45% 
(12) 
1.57%  
(2) 
60.63% 
(77) 
23.62% 
(30) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 2.36% 
(3) 
0% 
(0) 
12.60% 
(16) 
2.36% 
(3) 
59.06% 
(75) 
23.62% 
(30) 
100% 
(127) 
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IN = Injunctive norm 
Item 1 = My family would want me to blow the whistle. 
Item 2 = My family would approve if I blew the whistle.   
Item 3 = My friend would want me to blow the whistle. 
Item 4 = My friends would approve if I blew the whistle. 
Item 5 = My work colleagues would want me to blow the whistle. 
Item 6 = My work colleagues would approve if I blew the whistle. 
Results in Table 4.17 show that there are a considerable number of respondents in 
both groups that positively agreed with all six item statements. This result suggests 
that the respondents would not have substantial obstacles getting supportive advice 
from their family, friends and work colleagues concerning the action of blowing the 
whistle.  
Table 4.18 provides cross-tabulation results on descriptive norm. 
Table 4.18: Cross-tabulation for descriptive norm 
Item 4 2.36% 
(3) 
0% 
(0) 
10.24% 
(13) 
1.57%  
(2) 
61.42% 
(78) 
24.41% 
(31) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 5 3.15% 
(4) 
0.79%  
(1) 
7.87% 
(10) 
0.79%  
(1) 
62.99% 
(80) 
24.41% 
(31) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 6 3.15% 
(4) 
0.79%  
(1) 
6.30% 
(8) 
1.57% 
(2) 
64.57% 
(82) 
23.62% 
(30) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 1 
Items  
of DN  
Negative DN Neutral Positive DN Total  
% 
(Base) In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 7.87% 
(10) 
5.51% 
(7) 
31.50% 
(40) 
6.30% 
(8) 
34.65% 
(44) 
14.17% 
(18) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 11.02% 
(14) 
4.72% 
(6) 
30.71% 
(39) 
8.66% 
(11) 
32.28% 
(41) 
12.60% 
(16) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 13.39% 
(17) 
3.15% 
(4) 
22.83% 
(29) 
6.30% 
(8) 
37.80% 
(48) 
16.54% 
(21) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 12.60% 
(16) 
2.36% 
(3) 
36.22% 
(46) 
13.39% 
(17) 
25.20% 
(32) 
10.24% 
(13) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 2 
Items  
of DN  
Negative DN Neutral Positive DN Total  
% 
(Base) In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 6.30% 
(8) 
2.36% 
(3) 
27.56% 
(35) 
7.87 % 
(10) 
40.16% 
(51) 
15.75% 
(20) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 9.45% 1.57% 25.98% 9.45% 38.58% 14.96% 100% 
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DN = Descriptive norm 
Item 1 = My family would blow the whistle. 
Item 2 = My friends would blow the whistle. 
Item 3 = My work colleagues would blow the whistle. 
Item 4 = Most people I know would blow the whistle. 
The results in Table 4.18 show that there are a significant number of participants who 
neither agree nor disagree (neutral level of agreement) with the four item statements, 
particularly in the first two scenarios. However, across the scenarios, the neutral level 
agreement percentage, particularly by the in-house participants, increasingly 
declines. The decreases have instead brought increases in the percentage of the in-
house participants who agree with the items statements. The different types of ethical 
situations as illustrated in each of the scenarios probably play a role in this matter. 
The results show that, in a situation that involves relatively severe and serious 
matters, respondents believe that their significant others would be more likely to take 
action by blowing the whistle, than in a situation involving less severe matters.  
Table 4.19 provides cross-tabulation results on perceived behavioural control. 
(12) (2) (33) (12) (49) (19) (127) 
Item 3 5.51% 
(7) 
2.36% 
(3) 
22.83% 
(29) 
6.30% 
(8) 
45.67% 
(58) 
17.32% 
(22) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 6.30% 
(8) 
1.57% 
(2) 
33.86% 
(43) 
11.02% 
(14) 
33.86% 
(43) 
13.39% 
(17) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 3 
Items  
of DN  
Negative descriptive 
norm 
Neutral Positive descriptive 
norm 
Total  
% 
(Base) In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 4.72% 
(6) 
1.57% 
(2) 
14.96% 
(19) 
4.72% 
(6) 
54.33% 
(69) 
21.26% 
(27) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 6.30% 
(8) 
0.79%  
(1) 
17.32% 
(22) 
3.94% 
(5) 
50.39% 
(64) 
21.26% 
(27) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 3.15% 
(4) 
1.57% 
(2) 
16.54% 
(21) 
2.36% 
(3) 
54.33% 
(69) 
22.05% 
(28) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 5.51% 
(7) 
0.79%  
(1) 
19.69% 
(25) 
2.36% 
(3) 
48.82% 
(62) 
22.83% 
(29) 
100% 
(127) 
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Table 4.19: Cross-tabulation for perceived behavioural control 
 
 
PBC = perceived behavioural control 
Item 1 = To blow the whistle would be entirely up to me. 
Item 2 = To blow the whistle would be within my control. 
Table 4.19 presents results for perceived behavioural control. The majority of the 
respondents in each group share a similar point of view on their controllability or 
power to blow the whistle. Overall there was agreement between the respondents that 
they themselves hold the power to blow the whistle.  
Table 4.20 provides cross-tabulation results on self-efficacy. 
Scenario 1 
Items of  
PBC 
Negative PBC Neutral Positive PBC Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 6.30% 
(8) 
3.15% 
(4) 
3.15% 
(4) 
5.51% 
(7) 
64.57% 
(82) 
17.32% 
(22) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 7.09% 
(9) 
3.94% 
(5) 
4.72% 
(6) 
2.36% 
(3) 
62.20% 
(79) 
19.69% 
(25) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 2 
Items of  
PBC 
Negative PBC Neutral Positive PBC Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 3.15% 
(4) 
1.57% 
(2) 
2.36% 
(3) 
3.94% 
(5) 
68.50% 
(87) 
20.47% 
(26) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 2.36% 
(3) 
1.57% 
(2) 
4.72% 
(6) 
3.15% 
(4) 
66.93% 
(85) 
21.26% 
(27) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 3 
Items of  
PBC 
Negative PBC Neutral Positive PBC Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 4.72% 
(6) 
3.15% 
(4) 
2.36% 
(3) 
5.51% 
(7) 
66.93% 
(85) 
19.69% 
(25) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 3.15% 
(4) 
3.15% 
(4) 
1.57% 
(2) 
5.51% 
(7) 
69.29% 
(88) 
19.69% 
(25) 
100% 
(127) 
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Table 4.20: Cross tabulation for self-efficacy 
Scenario 1 
Items of  
SE 
Negative SE Neutral Positive SE Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Item 1 4.72% 
(6) 
0.79%  
(1) 
3.94 % 
(5) 
5.51% 
(7) 
65.35% 
(83) 
19.69% 
(25) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 6.30% 
(8) 
0% 
(0) 
3.15% 
(4) 
5.51% 
(7) 
64.57% 
(82) 
20.47% 
(26) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 8.66% 
(11) 
3.94 % 
(5) 
9.45% 
(12) 
7.09% 
(9) 
55.91% 
(71) 
14.96% 
(19) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 10.24% 
(13) 
4.72% 
(6) 
6.30% 
(8) 
7.87% 
(10) 
57.48% 
(73) 
13.39% 
(17) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 2 
Items of  
SE 
Negative SE Neutral Positive SE Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 3.94 % 
(5) 
0.79%  
(1) 
0.79%  
(1) 
4.72% 
(6) 
69.29% 
(88) 
20.47% 
(26) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 3.94 % 
(5) 
0% 
(0) 
1.57% 
(2) 
5.51% 
(7) 
68.50% 
(87) 
20.47% 
(26) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 7.87% 
(10) 
3.15% 
(4) 
6.30% 
(8) 
7.09% 
(9) 
59.84% 
(76) 
15.75% 
(20) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 7.87% 
(10) 
3.94 % 
(5) 
7.09% 
(9) 
6.30% 
(8) 
59.06% 
(75) 
15.75% 
(20) 
100% 
(127) 
Scenario 3 
Items of  
SE 
Negative SE Neutral Positive SE Total  
% 
(Base) 
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
In-house 
 (n = 94) 
Outsource 
(n = 33)  
Item 1 1.57% 
(2) 
0% 
(0) 
2.36% 
(3) 
2.36% 
(3) 
70.08% 
(89) 
23.62% 
(30) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 2 3.15% 
(4) 
0% 
(0) 
3.94 % 
(5) 
3.15% 
(4) 
66.93% 
(85) 
22.83% 
(29) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 3 6.30% 
(8) 
1.57% 
(2) 
8.66% 
(11) 
3.15% 
(4) 
59.06% 
(75) 
21.26% 
(27) 
100% 
(127) 
Item 4 3.94 % 
(5) 
1.57% 
(2) 
8.66% 
(11) 
3.94 % 
(5) 
61.42% 
(78) 
20.47% 
(26) 
100% 
(127) 
SE = Self-efficacy 
Item 1 = Confident able to blow the whistle. 
Item 2 = Confident able to blow the whistle even friends against it. 
Item 3 = Confident able to blow the whistle even I am in a situation that rejects the practice.  
Item 4 = Confident able to blow the whistle even though management discourage. 
The results in Table 4.20 show that more than half of the participants in each group 
believe that they could confront the constraints that hinder them from blowing the 
whistle.  
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4.3.6 Results summary 
The above sections (subsection 4.3.1 to subsection 4.3.5) present the statistical 
results for comparing group differences. The results are summarized in Table 4.21. 
Table 4.21: Summary of group differences results  
Groups Variables 
Attitude IN DN PBC SE Awareness OPC 
Gender √ X X X X X X 
Age √ √ X X √ X √ 
Work 
experience 
X X X X √ √ X 
Client 
categories 
X √ √ X √ √ X 
√ = significant difference 
X= insignificant difference 
4.4 Results on the intention to blow the whistle 
In this section, the overall internal auditors’ intention to blow the whistle is 
presented. Although not included as part of the research objectives, presenting these 
results might provide additional useful information to the reader.  
Across the three scenarios, the mean (standard deviation) value for the intention to 
blow the whistle-blow in Scenario 1, Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 is 4.28 (.55), 4.57 
(.59) and 4.59 (.63) respectively. The high mean values of intention (above 4.00) 
show that internal auditors in the U.K. have a high intention to blow the whistle. 
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4.5 Statistical results for exploring relationship between variables 
In section 4.3, the researcher was looking at variables in isolation which was 
interesting because it provides information on variables that have significant 
difference based on groups such as gender, age, work experience and client 
categories.    
In this section, the seven individual-level variables, which were tested in isolation in 
the previous section, were analysed for their influence on the dependent variable; the 
intention to blow the whistle. Statistical analysis performed in this section provides 
answers to the first seven hypotheses that were presented in the previous chapter. 
The analysis was conducted to correspond to the second objective of this study.   
Standard multiple regression was used to examine the influence of all seven 
independent variables on the intention towards whistle-blowing. Standard multiple 
regression was chosen over hierarchical regression and stepwise regression as it is 
the most common method used, according to the literature (Pallant, 2013). 
Hierarchical regression is based on theoretical grounds that guide a researcher on the 
sequence of variables that need to be inserted in the regression analysis. This 
requirement, however, is irrelevant to this study as no discussion on this issue has 
been raised in literature. Also, the minimum number of samples needed for stepwise 
regression is not sufficient.12  
                                                 
12
 A ratio of 40 cases per independent variable are needed for stepwise regression (Pallant, 2013). 
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In ensuring that the results produced by the multiple regressions are the best possible, 
accurate, and free from excessive bias, the dataset was first checked for multiple 
regression assumptions to ensure conformity with the regression test, before the 
hypotheses testing proceeded. There are three main criteria which statisticians ask 
researchers to check prior to using the multiple regressions test. The three criteria 
are: minimum sample size needed for the test; multicollinearity; and finally, linearity, 
normality, homoscedasticity and outliers. The results of the multiple regression 
assumption tests are discussed in the following sections. 
4.5.1 Assumptions of standard multiple regressions  
The standard multiple regressions analysis is a sensitive statistics analysis tool. The 
multiple regressions require any dataset to meet the three general minimum 
requirements prior to using the statistical tool. These requirements are tested in the 
following sections.  
With regards to the missing data, there was a small number of missing data in the 
dataset of this study. This was predominantly missing data or incomplete answers 
from the demographic profile, where several respondents had not provided their 
gender. Also, five respondents did not complete the survey in its entirety; 
consequently they were excluded in the following analysis.   
4.5.1.1 Minimum sample size  
The issue of the minimum sample needed for multiple regressions has been raised by 
many scholars. Following the guide provided in Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), taking 
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into account that there are seven independent variables tested in this study, the 
minimum sample size required, therefore, was 106. There were 127 responses in this 
study and therefore sufficient for the multiple regression test.  
4.5.1.2 Multicollinearity and correlation  
Multicollinearity is a situation where two or more independent variables are highly 
correlated (r = .7 and above) (Pallant, 2013). In a case where the multicollinearity 
exists, only one of the variables should be maintained. From the correlation tables 
produced by the multiple regressions test (see Table 4.22 (Scenario1), Appendix C 
(Scenario 2) and Appendix D (Scenario 3)), there was no critical multicollinearity 
problem identified. In Scenario 3, the correlation table showed that the injunctive 
norm and the descriptive norm had a Pearson coefficient value of slightly higher than 
.7. Further examination, using the Tolerance and VIF13 value (see Appendix E), 
showed no multicollinearity existed between the two norm variables. Therefore, all 
of the seven independent variables were retained for further analysis. 
In addition to multicollinearity, the relationship between the independent variables 
and dependent variable were also examined. According to Pallant (2013), the 
independent variables should show at least some relationship with the dependent 
variables (preferably r >.3). As presented in the correlation tables, both the 
                                                 
13
 A tolerance value of less than .1 and VIF value of above 10 indicates a problem of multicollinearity 
(Pallant, 2013). In this study, the tolerance values and VIF values were between .294 and .972 and 
1.029 to 3.398 respectively. 
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organisational-professional conflict and awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation variables have a weak relationship with the dependent variable (r<.3). 
As shown in Table 4.22, in Scenario 1, there was no significant correlation between 
the dependent variable (intention) and four demographic variables (age, gender, work 
experience and client categories. A significant correlation at p<.01 was found 
between intention and employment position. In Scenario 2, there was a significant 
correlation between intention and gender and employment position, while in 
Scenario 3, a significant relationship existed between intention and age. The 
correlation results for Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 are provided in Appendix C and 
Appendix D respectively. 
Correlation provides information about the existence of a relationship between two 
variables. However, it does not indicate that one variable causes the other. The 
correlation information is used to describe the strength and the direction of the 
relationship between two variables.     
The information presented in Table 4.23 summarises the association and the strength 
of the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable. In 
all three of the scenarios, five of the seven independent variables had a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable. The other two variables, organisational-
professional conflict and awareness, had a negative relationship with the dependent 
variable, though not in all of the scenarios. The strength of the relationships were 
varied. Using Cohen’s guidelines, correlation values of .1 to .29 denote a small 
strength, .3 to .49 denotes a medium strength and .5 to 1.0 denotes a large strength 
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(Pallant, 2013). A positive association between variables implies that if one variable 
increases, the other variable also increases. Similarly, if one variable decreases, the 
other variable also decreases. As an example, an increase in attitude towards whistle-
blowing would increase the intention to blow the whistle. 
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Table 4.22: Means, standard deviations and correlations among control, independent and dependent variables (Scenario 1) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Controls                
1 Age 3.03 .86 1.00             
2 Gender 1.79 .56 .11 1.00            
3 Exp. 2.05 .76 .54*** -.08 1.00           
4 Client  1.51 .50 -.30*** -.06 -.37*** 1.00          
5 Position 1.46 .98 -.08 -.03 .17** -.33*** 1.00         
Dependent                
6 Intention 4.28 .55 .03 -.04 -.05 .11 -.13* 1.00        
Independents                
7 Attitude 3.18 .55 .05 .02 .09 .12** -.09 .31*** 1.00       
8 IN 4.07 .64 .19** .12 .04 -.10 .11 .41*** .36*** 1.00      
9 DN 3.46 .77 -.04 .03 -.02 -.06 .18** .34*** .32*** .60*** 1.00     
10 PBC 4.00 .67 .01 .06 .04 .10 -.02 .31*** .18** .21** .17** 1.00    
11 SE 4.02 .78 .05 .02 -.00 .20** -.09 .50*** .41*** .37*** .35*** .26*** 1.00   
12 OPC 1.67 .60 -.19** -.16** .11 -.14** .16** -.01 -.01 -.13** -.11 -.06 -.25*** 1.00  
13 Awareness 3.30 .76 -.04 .16** -.25*** .17** .00 .01 .03 -.01 .10 -.03 .04 -.09 1.00 
Exp = experience, IN = injunctive norm, DN = descriptive norm, PBC = perceived behavioural control, SE = self-efficacy,  
OPC = organisational-professional conflict 
*p<.1, **p<.05,***p<.01 
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Table 4.23: Summary of the correlation between each independent variable and 
dependent variable 
Dependent variable: intention 
Scenario 1 
Independent variable Association Strength 
Attitude  Positive Medium 
Injunctive norm  Positive Medium 
Desriptive norm  Positive Medium 
Perceived behavioural control  Positive Medium 
Self-efficacy  Positive Large 
Awareness  Positive Small 
Organisational-professional conflict  Negative Small 
Scenario 2 
Independent variable Association Strength 
Attitude  Positive Medium 
Injunctive norm  Positive Medium 
Desriptive norm  Positive Medium 
Perceived behavioural control  Positive Medium 
Self-efficacy  Positive Large 
Awareness  Positive Small 
Organisational-professional conflict  Negative Small 
Scenario 3 
Independent variable Association Strength 
Attitude  Positive Large 
Injunctive norm  Positive Large 
Desriptive norm  Positive Large 
Perceived behavioural control  Positive Large 
Self-efficacy  Positive Large 
Awareness  Negative Small 
Organisational-professional conflict  Positive Small 
 
Across the three scenarios, there were notable increases in the strength of the 
correlation between the intention variable and four of the independent variables: 
attitude, injunctive norm, descriptive norm and perceived behavioural control. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Scenario 3 illustrated a more serious, unethical 
practice, than Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, and concerned public safety and welfare. 
The correlation results show that the four independent variables correlate relatively 
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highly in the third scenario. In other words, respondents appear to react more 
sensitively towards situations that bring harm to the public than situations that do 
not. Self-efficacy was the only variable that consistently correlated largely with the 
intention. In contrast, the organisational-professional conflict and the awareness 
variables had small correlations with intention across the scenarios. 
4.5.1.3 Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and outliers 
The P-P Plot of the regression standardised residual is used to compare the 
distribution of residuals against a normal distribution. The P-P Plot graph for all 
three scenarios showed that all points lie in a reasonably straight diagonal line from 
bottom left to top right. This means that the normality assumption has not been 
violated. Below is an example of the P-P Plots of regression standardised residual 
graph for the intention variable in Scenario 1. The P-P Plots regression standardised 
residual graphs for Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 are shown in Appendix B.  
Figure 4.1:  Normal P-P plot of regression standardised residual graph for 
intention (Scenario 1) 
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The above P-P plot graph shows a plot check on normality. The plotted points 
suggest there is no serious departure from the straight line.  
Figure 4.2: Scatterplot graph for intention (Scenario 1) 
 
A scatterplot graph was used to examine the linearity, homoscedasticity and outliers. 
The use of scatterplot for this purpose is common and widely used (Pallant, 2013). In 
each scenario, the scatterplot graph shows a rectangular shape of residual 
distributions with most of the scores approximately along the 0 point line. This 
means no critical violations to the linearity and homoscedasticity has occurred. The 
scatterplot graph was also used to check for outliers. There were minimal outliers 
appearing in the graph. For the decision to either retain or omit the outliers, 
Mahalanobis and Cook’s Distance value rules were used. The critical value for 
evaluating Mahalanobis distance value, for seven independent variables (see 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), is 24.32. This means any case with a Mahalanobis value 
exceeding 24.32 is strongly recommended to be excluded from analysis. 
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Subsequently, six respondents were discarded and not included in the analysis. In 
Scenario 3, one case with a Mahalanobis value that was slightly greater than 24.32 
was retained. The Cook’s Distance value of the case was not greater than 1, which 
meant, if included in the analysis, it would not have any undue influence on the 
analysis results (Pallant, 2013).   
4.5.2 Standard multiple regression results 
With regard to testing the hypotheses, further analysis using the standard multiple 
regression is detailed in this section. The regression outputs are presented in Table 
4.24. 
Table 4.24: Standard multiple regression results of whistle-blowing intention 
Model & 
Variables 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
B SE Β PCC B SE β PCC B SE Β PCC 
M
od
el
 
O
ne
 
Cons. 6.04 1.82 
 
 -.45 2.01   1.58 1.90   
ATT .04 .09 .04 .04 .16 .08 .17 
** 
.13 .13 .10 .13 .09 
IN .11 .06 .20 
* 
.15 .19 .06 .30 
*** 
.20 .20 .07 .34 
*** 
.19 
DN .05 .07 .07 .05 -.04 .08 -.05 -.03 .02 .10 .03 .01 
PBC .26 .13 .16 
* 
.15 .68 .16 .32 
*** 
.29 .55 .17 .27 
*** 
.23 
SE .27 .07 .38 
*** 
.32 .27 .07 .32 
*** 
.27 .17 .08 .18 
** 
.14 
OPC .12 .07 .13 .12 .10 .07 .10 .09 .11 .08 .11 .10 
AW .01 .08 .01 .01 .12 .08 .12 
* 
.11 .08 .08 .07 .07 
R2  .36 .52  .50  
Adjusted 
R2 
.32 .49 .47 
F-value 8.33*** 16.36*** 15.41*** 
M
od
el
 
Tw
o
 
Cons. 6.89 2.11   -.11 2.25   2.58 2.26   
ATT .03 .09 .03 .02 .13 .08 .14 .11 .17 .10 .16 .11 
IN .12 .06 .21 
* 
.15 .18 .06 .29 
*** 
.19 .19 .08 .33 
*** 
.17 
DN .07 .07 .10 .08 -.01 .08 -.01 -.01 .02 .11 .02 .01 
PBC .27 .13 .16 .16 .69 .16 .32 .29 .54 .17 .27 .22 
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* *** *** 
SE .25 .07 .36 
*** 
.30 .28 .07 .33 
*** 
.28 .16 .09 .17 
** 
.13 
OPC .15 .08 .16 
* 
.14 .15 .07 .15 
* 
.13 .11 .08 .11 .07 
AW .00 .08 .00 .00 .09 .08 .09 .08 .08 .08 .07 .09 
Age .12 .27 .05 .04 .06 .25 .02 .02 .17 .28 .06 .04 
Gender -.32 .32 -.08 -.08 .30 .30 .07 .07 -.41 .34 -.09 -.08 
Exp. -.24 .30 -.09 -.06 -.28 .28 -.09 -.07 -.27 .31 -.08 -.06 
Client -.00 .41 .00 .00 -.12 .38 -.03 -.02 -.15 .43 -.03 -.02 
Post. -.33 .20 
-.15 -.13 -.39 .18 -.16 
** 
-.14 -.04 .20 -.01 -.01 
R2  .39  .56  .52  
Adjusted 
R2 
.32 .50 .46 
F-value 5.33*** 10.57*** 8.92*** 
Const = constant, ATT = attitude, IN = injunctive norm, DN = descriptive norm, PBC = perceived behavioural 
control, SE = self-efficacy, OPC = organisational-professional conflict, AW = awareness, Exp. = experience, 
Post.= position. 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
In the multiple regression analysis, two models were produced. In Model One, only 
the main independent variables were included in the analysis, while in Model Two 
both the main independent variables and control variables were included. The control 
variables were included to better isolate the influence of the variables of interest.   
Prior to explaining the results and analysis for each individual hypothesis, attention 
should first be given to the R2 value. The R2 value provides information on how 
much of the whistle-blowing intention is explained by the independent variables 
listed in the model. The R2 value measures the goodness-of-fit of the model with the 
data. 
Model One in Scenario 1 explains 36% (R2 = .36) variance of whistle-blowing 
intention among internal auditors in the U.K. The residual percent (64%) indicates 
that there are other variables, which are not tested in this study that may also 
contribute to the whistle-blowing intention prediction. The result is quite a 
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respectable result particularly if comparison is made to previous studies. Any study 
regarding human behaviour, and factors that potentially influence behaviour, such as 
this, are diverse. A study by Liyanarachchi and Adler (2011), who studied 
accountants’ whistle-blowing intention, obtained an adjusted R2 of 18%. Keenan 
(1990) who studied determinants of upper-level manager’s whistle-blowing, obtained 
an adjusted R2 value of 30%. In another study of whistle-blowing, conducted by Park 
and Blenkinsopp (2009), an R2 value of 24.9% was obtained. In a thesis by Syahrul 
Ahmar (2011), who studied internal auditors’ intention to whistle-blow internally, R2 
values of between 13% and 34% were obtained (R2 values differed in three different 
scenarios used by the researcher). 
The model for this present study is a good model for predicting whistle-blowing 
intention. This can be seen from the increasing R2 value of Model One in Scenario 2 
and Scenario 3. In addition, in Model Two, there is a slight increase in the R2 value 
compared to Model One in each scenario. Although the increment is very small, it 
indicates that demographic variables play a role in influencing intention to blow the 
whistle. In all three scenarios, both Model One and Model Two are significant at 
p<.01.  
The beta value (β) is used to compare the contribution of each independent variable 
on the dependent variable. The β values are used instead of the B values because the 
former is standardised coefficients which mean that the values have been converted 
to the same scale so that comparison can be made. However, the latter is 
unstandardized coefficient that usually used for the purpose of constructing a 
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regression equation. The squared value of PCC (part correlation coefficients) 
provides information on the contribution of that variable to the total R square.  
4.5.2.1 Attitude 
In this study, it was hypothesised that attitude towards whistle-blowing has a positive 
relationship with the intention to blow the whistle. As predicted, the positive 
standardised regression coefficients β value for attitude (see Table 4.24) shows that, 
in all the three scenarios, attitude towards whistle-blowing has a positive association 
with intention. However, the statistical analysis only found a significant relationship 
between attitudes and intention in Scenario 2 (Model One). No significant 
relationship was found in Scenario 1 and Scenario 3. This means that hypothesis 1 
(H1) was only slightly supported. 
The β value of attitude in Model One of Scenario 2 is .17. This value demonstrates 
that attitude contributes 17% in explaining intention, when all other variables are 
controlled. In other words, attitude provides a strong unique contribution to the 
intention prediction. The relationship between attitude and intention is significant at 
p<.05.  
The squared value of the part correlation coefficients (PCC) explains the contribution 
of the variable to the total R2 value.  For example, Model Two of Scenario 1 shows 
that attitude contributes a very small amount of .0169 (1.69%) to the total R2 value. 
Although the result provides evidence that slightly support H1, the statistical finding 
shows that attitude has a positive and significant influence on whistle-blowing 
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intention. In Scenario 2 the attitude contributes 17% to the whistle-blowing intention 
and the value can be considered as high. This finding suggests attitude as one of the 
variables that need further examination in future research. 
4.5.2.2 Injunctive norm 
This study hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between injunctive norm 
and whistle-blowing intention. The statistical analysis results in Table 4.24 show that 
there is a positive and significant relationship between injunctive norm and intention 
across each of the three scenarios. Both Model One and Model Two of Scenario 2 
and Scenario 3 show that injunctive norm has a significant contribution to whistle-
blowing intention at p<.01. In addition, injunctive norm also has a significant 
positive association with whistle-blowing intention at p<.1 as appeared in Model One 
and Model Two of Scenario 1. Therefore, hypothesis 2a (H2a) was fully supported. 
Furthermore, the squared value of the PCC shows that the contribution of injunctive 
norm to the total R2 value ranges from 2.25% to 4.00%.  
The results provide evidence that show social injunctive norm has a positive and 
significant relationship with the intention to blow the whistle. Additionally, the β 
value of injunctive norm is within the range between 20%-34%. The β values of 
injunctive norm are among the highest in the research model which mean that 
injunctive norm is the one of the biggest contributor to the whistle-blowing intention. 
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4.5.2.3 Descriptive norm 
It was also hypothesised that descriptive norm has a positive relationship with 
whistle-blowing intention. The regression results in Table 4.24, however, rejected 
this hypothesis (H2b). The contribution of descriptive norm was minimal to the R2 
value (between .01% and .64%).  
The regression analysis did not find any significant influence of descriptive norm on 
whistle-blowing intention. The findings suggest that in making decision either to 
blow or not to blow the whistle, the influence or permission of significant others play 
important role than their belief that the significant others do themselves blow the 
whistle.  
4.5.2.4 Perceived behavioural control   
In this study, it was hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between 
perceived behavioural control and whistle-blowing intention. Across the three 
scenarios, the regression results found a positive association between perceived 
behavioural control and whistle-blowing intention.  The regression analysis found 
that there was a significant positive association at p<.01 between the variables 
(perceived behavioural control-intention) in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3, and at p<.1 in 
Scenario 1. These results provide evidence that fully support hypothesis 3 (H3).  
The significant unique contribution of the perceived behavioural control to the R2 
value ranges from 2.25% to 8.41%.  
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The results show that perceived behavioural control has a positive and significant 
association with intention to blow the whistle. Moreover, the β value of perceived 
behavioural control is within 16%-32%. The β value implies the contribution of 
perceived behavioural control to whistle-blowing intention is also high.  
4.5.2.5 Self-efficacy 
This study also hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between self-
efficacy and whistle-blowing intention. As presented in Table 4.24, the regression 
results showed a significant relationship between self-efficacy and intention at p<.01 
(Scenario 1 and Scenario 2) and at p<.05 (Scenario 3). Therefore, the regression 
results provide evidence that fully support hypothesis 4 (H4). 
The squared value of the PCC shows that self-efficacy contributes between 1.69% 
and 10.24% to the R2 value.   
The results show that self-efficacy has a positive and significant relationship with 
whistle-blowing intention. The β value of self-efficacy is within 17%-38%. The β 
value shows that self-efficacy contributes up to 38% to whistle-blowing intention. In 
this study, self-efficacy is the highest contributor to the whistle-blowing intention.  
4.5.2.6 Organisational-professional conflict  
This study hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between organisational-
professional conflict and whistle-blowing intention. As shown in Table 4.24, in 
Model 1 across the three scenarios, no significant relationship was found between 
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organisational-professional conflict and whistle-blowing intention. However, 
positive and significant results at p<.1 were found in Model 2 for both Scenario1 and 
Scenario 2.  However, in Scenario 3 of Model 2, the relationship was not significant. 
The regression results in Table 4.24 provide evidence that slightly support hypothesis 
5 (H5).  
In addition, the correlation analysis revealed a weak relationship between 
organisational-professional conflict and intention. This variable contributes between 
0.49% and 1.96% to the R2 value.  
The regression results found evidence of a positive and significant relationship 
between organisational-professional conflict and whistle-blowing intention. 
Although significant results were only found in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 (Model 
Two), the findings suggest that being in a situation where the instructions or orders 
from a person or a group of people in organizations in conflict with the demands of 
internal auditing professionalism may lead internal auditors to blowing the whistle.      
4.5.2.7 Awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation  
In this study, it was hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between 
awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation and whistle-blowing intention. 
Results in Model One of Scenario 2 show a significant positive relationship between 
awareness and intention at p<.1. However, regression results in Model One for 
Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 show that the relationship between awareness of whistle-
blowing protection legislation and whistle-blowing intention is not significant. In 
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Model Two, no significant relationship was found across the three scenarios. 
Therefore, hypothesis 6 (H6) was slightly supported.  
The contribution of the awareness to the R2 value is relatively lower (ranges in 
between 0% to 1.21%) than the other variables.  
Overall, the regression results fully support H2a, H3 and H4 and slightly support H1, 
H5 and H6. The regression results however rejected H2b. The summary of the 
regression results is shown in section 4.7. 
4.5.2.8 Regression results for control variables 
The statistical results presented in Model Two (see Table 4.24) provide answers to 
the question: ‘to what extent do the control variables influence an individual’s 
intention to blow the whistle?’ which has traditionally been examined in previous 
behavioural research. These variables were used mainly as control variables, as a 
means to examine their potential influence (along with the main independent 
variables) on the whistle-blowing intention.  
As explained in the last part of section 4.5.2, across each scenario, there is an 
increase in the R2 value in Model 2. The increasing R2 value indicates that the 
inclusion of these control variables provides evidence that they also play their own 
role in influencing intention to blow the whistle. For example, in Scenario 1, the R2 
value in Model One (where there are only seven main independent variables tested) 
is 36%, and the R2 increased by 3% in Model Two (where there were an additional 5 
control variables tested simultaneously with the other seven independent variables). 
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The effect of each control variable on the intention to whistle-blow is best illustrated 
by multiplying the B value with the value that represents each group of the control 
variables. This is the value that the researcher used in categorising the groups of the 
control variables during the preparation of the dataset (see Table 4.25). The long 
form of the linear equation for predicting the intention is also included in Table 4.25. 
The long form equation was generated from the basic form of linear equation as 
follows:  
Y = Constant + independent variablesa + control variablesb + error 
Y = Intention to blow the whistle 
A = Attitude, injunctive norm, descriptive norm, perceived behavioural  
control, self efficacy, organisational-professional conflict, awareness 
B = Age, gender, experience in internal auditing, client categories, 
 employment position 
 
The results of the influence of the control variables on whistle-blowing intention are 
summarised in Table 4.25.  
Table 4.25: Summary of the influence of the control variables to whistle-blowing 
intention 
Scenario 1 
Y = 6.89 + [.03Att +.12IN+.07DN+ .27PBC+.25SE + .15OPC) + .00AW)] +  
[(.12Age) + (-.32Gender)  + (-.24Experience) + (-.00Client + (-.33Position)] + error 
 Age  
(years old) 
1: 31-40  
2: 41-50  
3: 51-60  
Gender 
1: Female 
2: Male 
Experience 
(years) 
1: < 10  
2: 11-19  
3: 20+ 
Client 
1: Public  
2: Private  
3: Combination 
Position 
1: In-house 
2: Consortium 
3: Outsource 
4: Others 
B values .12 -.32 -.24 -.00 -.33 
Conclusion Younger 
internal 
auditors 
have a lower 
intention to 
blow the 
whistle than 
Female 
internal 
auditors 
have a 
higher 
intention to 
blow the 
Internal 
auditors with 
less years 
experience 
have a 
higher 
intention to 
Internal auditors 
who have both 
types of clients 
have a lower 
intention than 
internal auditors 
who hold only 
In-house 
internal auditors 
have a higher 
intention 
compared to 
other types of 
employment 
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older 
internal 
auditors.  
whistle 
than male 
internal 
auditors.  
blow the 
whistle than 
internal 
auditors with 
more years 
experience.  
one type of 
client. Or 
internal auditors 
who audited 
private 
organisations 
have a higher 
intention in 
comparison  to 
those who 
audited public 
organistions.  
positions.   
Scenario 2 
Y = -.11 + [.13Att +.18IN+(-.01DN)+ .69PBC+.28SE + .15OPC + .09AW)] +  
[.06Age + .30Gender  + (-.28Experience) + (-.12Client + (-.39Position)] + error 
 Age 
(years old) 
1: 31-40  
2: 41-50  
3: 51-60  
Gender 
1: Female 
2: Male 
Experience 
(years) 
1: < 10  
2: 11-19 
3: 20+ 
Client 
1: Public  
2: Private  
3: Combination 
Position 
1: In-house 
2: Consortium 
3: Outsource 
4: Others 
β values .06 .30 -.28 -.12 -.39 
Conclusion Younger 
internal 
auditors 
have a lower 
intention to 
blow the 
whistle than 
older 
internal 
auditors.  
Female 
internal 
auditors 
have a 
lower 
intention to 
blow the 
whistle 
than male 
internal 
auditors.  
Internal 
auditors with 
less years 
experience 
have a 
higher 
intention to 
blow the 
whistle than 
internal 
auditors with 
more years 
experience.  
Internal auditors 
who have both 
types of clients 
have a lower 
intention than 
internal auditors 
who hold only 
one type of 
client. Or 
internal auditors 
who audited 
private 
organisations 
have a lower 
intention in 
comparison to 
those who 
audited public 
organisations.   
In-house 
internal auditors 
have a higher 
intention 
compared to 
other types of 
employment 
positions.   
Scenario 3 
Y = 2.58 + [.17Att +.19IN+.02DN+.54PBC+.16SE + .11OPC + .08AW)] +  
[.17Age +(-.41Gender)  + (-.27Experience) + (-.15Client + (-.04Position)] + error 
 Age 
(years old) 
1: 31-40  
2: 41-50  
3: 51-60  
Gender 
1: Female 
2: Male 
Experience 
(years) 
1: < 10  
2: 11-19  
3: 20 + 
Client 
1: Public  
2: Private  
3: Combination 
Position 
1: In-house 
2: Consortium 
3: Outsource 
4: Others 
β values .17 -.41 -.27 -.15 -.04 
Conclusion Younger 
internal 
auditors 
have a lower 
intention to 
Female 
internal 
auditors 
have a 
higher 
Internal 
auditors with 
less years 
experience 
have a 
Internal auditors 
who have both 
types of clients 
have a lower 
intention than 
In-house 
internal auditors 
have a higher 
intention 
compared to 
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blow the 
whistle than 
older 
internal 
auditors.  
intention to 
blow the 
whistle 
than male 
internal 
auditors.  
higher 
intention to 
blow the 
whistle than 
internal 
auditors with 
more years 
experience.  
internal auditors 
who hold only 
one type of 
client. Or 
internal auditors 
who audited 
private 
organisations 
have a lower 
intention in 
comparison to 
those who 
audited public 
organisations.   
other types of 
employment 
positions.   
Att=Attitude, In=injunctive norm, DN=descriptive norm, PBC=perceived behavioural control, 
SE=self-efficacy, OPC=organisational-professional conflict, AW=awareness of whistle-blowing 
protection legislation 
 
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that, apart from the seven tested main 
independent variables, demographic variables are factors that may influence whistle-
blowing intention. Regression results in Table 4.24 show that employment position is 
the control variable that has a significant influence on the whistle-blowing intention. 
As a set, however, they add relatively little to R2.   
4.6 Statistical results for moderating effects of moral intensity 
In this study, moderated multiple regression was used for analysing the moderation 
effects of a moderating variable, moral intensity. The purpose of this analysis is to 
identify whether moral intensity affects the direction and/or the strength of the 
relationship that exist between dependent variable (intention) and the independent 
variables (e.g., attitude, injunctive norm, descriptive norm).  
All the variables - independent, dependant and moderator - were continuous 
variables. In particular, work by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003) and Aiken 
and West (1991) (who are by far the most popular moderating regression scholars in 
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social science (Whisman & McClelland, 2005)), is referred to and applied in this 
study. This means the transformation approach, also known as mean-centering, to the 
independent variables was used in the analysis. Mean-centering involves subtracting 
the sample mean from each observed value on the regressor variables (Kromrey & 
Foster-Johnson, 1998).   
According to Echambadi and Hess (2007), the moderator (interaction) effect in the 
moderated regression model is evaluated by including a cross-product term as an 
additional predictor variable to the existing model. Cross-product term is a 
multiplicative function of the individual independent variables (predictors) with the 
moderator variable, for example, ATT*MI (ATT here is attitude and MI is moral 
intensity).    
Dalal and Zickar (2012) highlight that the mean-centering helps to reduce the 
nonessential ill-conditioning multicollinearity but not the essential ill-conditioning 
multicollinearity. The nonessential ill-conditioning multicollinearity exists due to the 
scaling of the variables, while the essential ill-conditioning multicollinearity arise 
from the substantive relationship between variables (Dalal & Zickar, 2012). The 
essential multicollinearity problems which are normally caused by skewed data do 
not disappear even after centering (Cohen et al., 2003). This means that prior to using 
the mean-centering, the data itself should fit with the multiple regression tests (refer 
to Appendix F for the sample of the normality test results). In other words, the data 
should not critically violate the general assumptions of the multiple regression tests 
(the assumptions have been explained in subsection 4.5.1). 
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Echambadi and Hess (2007) note that mean-centering does not harm the results and 
conclusions drawn by the previous literatures. Although they do not seem to favour 
mean-centering, they do not show any sign of resistance to the approach. In addition,  
Dalal and Zickar (2012) conclude that mean-centering does not have an impact on 
the fit of the regression model nor does it change the reliability of the product terms. 
In the same paper, Dalal and Zickar mention the current and wide use of mean-
centering by scholars in the related field, such as Aiken and West (1991), Cohen et 
al. (2003) and Jaccard and Turrisi (2003). Dalal and Zickar also state one of the 
positive effects of mean-centering is the increased interpretability of the results. 
Dalal and Zickar (2012) along with Cohen et al. (2003) and Whisman and 
McClelland (2005), further recommend that researchers apply mean-centering to 
their independent variables prior to conducting moderated regression analysis. 
In this study, mean-centering of the independent variables, including the moderator 
variable, was implemented prior to the moderated regression analysis. In relation to 
the ways the moderated regression analysis was conducted, firstly, the (seven) 
independent variables and control variables were regressed (Model 1). Secondly, the 
(seven) independent variables, control variables and the moderator variable were 
entered into the multiple regression to test for their main effects (Model 2). In this 
stage, the moderator was treated as an independent variable. This was essential to 
examine whether the moderator variable may also play a role in predicting intention. 
Next, the interactions of the cross-product terms were added into the regression 
(Model 3). Cross-product terms were generated by multiplying each independent 
variable with the moderator (e.g. Attitude x moral intensity, injunctive norm x moral 
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intensity). In the moderated regression analysis, the main effects and the interaction 
effects were conducted at separate steps. The main effects were tested prior to the 
cross-product terms.  Tables 4.26, 4.27 and 4.28 provide the moderated regression 
analysis results.  
According to Cohen et al. (2003), the moderator effect exists when, first, the 
coefficient for cross-product terms are not equal to zero, and second, when there is a 
change in the coefficients of the independent variables. The issue of which 
coefficient  value should be referred to is discussed by Cohen et al. (2003) and 
Whisman and McClelland (2005). Whisman and McClelland state that the 
standardised regression coefficients were not generalised to the moderator model. 
Due to the complications that the standardised form may bring to the interpretation of 
the results, Whisman and McClelland (2005) further recommended that the raw 
(unstandardised) coefficients should be referred to instead of the standardised 
coefficients, in reading the results of the moderator models. The use of raw 
coefficients is also supported by Cohen et al. (2003).  
Table 4.26: Moderated regression analysis results of the main effects and 
moderating effects of internal auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions (Scenario 1) 
Scenario 1 
Dependent variable:  Intention to blow the whistle 
Independent variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B p B p B p 
Attitude  .05 .55 .05 .55 .05 .57 
Injunctive norm .12 .03** .12 .04** .10 .11 
Descriptive norm .09 .24 .09 .24 .09 .22 
Perceived behavioural control  .19 .12 .19 .12 .27 .04** 
Self-efficacy .24 .00*** .24 .00*** .20 .00*** 
Organisational-professional conflict .13 .11 .13 .11 .13 .11 
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Awareness .01 .90 .01 .90 -.04 .63 
Control variables:       
Age -.01 .97 -.01 .97 .04 .89 
Gender -.30 .34 -.30 .34 -.15 .65 
Working experience -.12 .68 -.12 .68 -.19 .52 
Client categories .01 .97 .01 .97 .09 .65 
Employment position -.35 .06* -.35 .06* -.26 .16 
Moderator:       
Moral intensity (MI)   .00 .99 .04 .56 
Cross-product term:       
Attitudes x MI      -.01 .76 
Injunctive norm x MI     -.03 .13 
Descriptive norm x MI     -.01 .51 
Perceived behavioural control x MI     .06 .18 
Self-efficacy x MI     -.02 .52 
Organisational-professional  
conflict x MI 
    .04 .12 
Awareness x MI     .03 .27 
Constant 18.38 18.38 17.91 
F value (sig)  6.35 (.00***) 5.81 (.00***) 4.33 (.00***) 
Durbin-Watson 1.76 1.76 1.79 
R2 .40 .40 .45 
Adjusted R2 .34 .33 .35 
*p<.1, ***p<.01 
Table 4.27: Moderated regression analysis results of the main effects and 
moderating effects of internal auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions (Scenario 2) 
Scenario 2 
Dependent variable:  Intention to blow the whistle 
Independent variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B p B p B p 
Attitude  .11 .18 .09 .25 .14 .10 
Injunctive norm .16 .00*** .16 .00** .14 .03** 
Descriptive norm -.03 .76 -.03 .71 -.03 .74 
Perceived behavioural control .54 .00*** .51 .00*** .59 .00*** 
Self-efficacy .30 .00*** .31 .00*** .28 .00*** 
Organisational-professional conflict .08 .28 .08 .31 .06 .48 
Awareness .07 .39 .06 .45 .09 .30 
Control variables:       
Age .01 .96 -.04 .89 .05 .84 
Gender .25 .42 .25 .41 .28 .38 
Working experience -.07 .82 -.05 .87 -.07 .82 
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Client categories -.06 .77 -.05 .79 -.02 .90 
Employment position -.30 .09* -.30 .09* -.27 .14 
Moderator:       
Moral intensity (MI)   .06 .27 .04 .45 
Cross-product term:       
Attitudes x MI      .02 .53 
Injunctive norm x MI     -.02 .32 
Descriptive norm x MI     .06 .05 
Perceived behavioural control x MI     -.05 .34 
Self-efficacy x MI     -.03 .26 
Organisational-professional  
conflict x MI 
    -.02 .40 
Awareness x MI     -.04 .12 
Constant 18.32 18.42 18.04 
F value (sig)  9.44 (.00***) 8.83 (.00***) 6.23 (.00***) 
Durbin-Watson 1.62 1.61 1.57 
R2 .50 .50 .54 
Adjusted R2 .45 .45 .45 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
Table 4.28: Moderated regression analysis results of the main effects and 
moderating effects of internal auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions (Scenario3) 
Scenario 3 
Dependent variable:  Intention to blow the whistle 
Independent variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B p B p B p 
Attitude  .18 .06* .16 .10 .19 .06* 
Injunctive norm .20 .00*** .19 .00*** .16 .04** 
Descriptive norm .02 .87 .01 .91 -.00 .98 
Perceived behavioural control .40 .02** .38 .02** .48 .00*** 
Self-efficacy .19 .03** .19 .03** .17 .04** 
Organisational-professional conflict .06 .42 .07 .41 .11 .19 
Awareness .11 .17 .10 .25 .08 .35 
Control variables:       
Age  -.03 .93 -.05 .86 .02 .63 
Gender -.50 .14 .-.47 .16 -.22 .65 
Working experience -.01 .97 .02 .94 .01 .80 
Client categories -.18 .40 -.20 .36 -.17 .64 
Employment position -.13 .50 -.13 .50 -.05 .64 
Moderator:        
Moral intensity (MI)   .08 .23 .05 .48 
Cross-product term:       
Attitudes x MI      .00 .99 
Injunctive norm x MI     -.07 .00*** 
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Descriptive norm x MI     .06 .05* 
Perceived behavioural control x MI     .03 .60 
Self-efficacy x MI     -.02 .53 
Organisational-professional 
conflict x MI 
    -.01 .71 
Awareness x MI     .02 .56 
Constant 19.71 19.70 19.00 
F value (sig)  9.85 (.00***) 9.24 (.00***) 6.92 (.00***) 
Durbin-Watson 1.88 1.89 2.09 
R2 .51 .52 .57 
Adjusted R2 .46 .46 .48 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
The non-zero coefficients of the moral intensity in Model 2 of Scenario 2 and 
Scenario 3 show that the variable has a direct influence and impact on whistle-
blowing intention. The coefficient values of the moral intensity in Scenario 2 and 
Scenario 3 are 0.6 and 0.8 respectively. The positive coefficient values show a 
positive relationship between moral intensity and whistle-blowing intention. In 
contrast, in Scenario 1 the unexpected result of zero coefficient value for moral 
intensity-whistle-blowing intention was obtained. The difference in the substance of 
the ethical issues raised in each of the scenarios might explain the inconsistent 
results. In other words, the association between moral intensity and whistle-blowing 
intention is subject to the type of ethical and questionable behaviour being discussed. 
In addition to the coefficient value, the R2 value, which illustrates the goodness-of-fit 
of the model in predicting the intention, provides further explanation. As presented in 
Table 4.26 to Table 4.28, the R2 value in Model 1 and in Model 2, for both Scenario 
1 and Scenario 2, does not really change, whereas in Scenario 3 there is a slight 
increment. These results provide additional evidence that moral intensity does not 
demonstrate any significant effect or contribute towards influencing whistle-blowing 
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intention. Overall, the small coefficient values for moral intensity in Model 2, across 
the three scenarios (ranges from .00 to .08), and the minimal increment to the R2 
value in Model 2, as compared to the value in Model 1, as found in Scenario 1 and 
Scenario 2, explains the minimal contribution of moral intensity to the whistle-
blowing intention. 
As discussed in the above paragraph, the moderating effect of moral intensity is 
evaluated in Model 3. Specifically, the coefficient values of the cross-product terms 
in Model 3 are used as a means to examine the moderating effect of moral intensity. 
As presented in Table 4.26 to Table 4.28, the coefficient values for all seven cross-
product terms in each of the scenarios are non-zero (except for the cross-product 
term of attitude-moral intensity in Scenario 3). As explained by Cohen et al. (2003), 
the non-zero coefficient value of the cross-product terms implies that moral intensity 
has a moderating effect on the relationships between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable. Conversely, the zero coefficient value of the cross-product 
term involving attitude-moral intensity indicates that there is no moderating effect of 
moral intensity on the relationship between attitude and intention to blow the whistle 
(B = .00, p = .99). In summary, the results, in general, provide evidence that slightly 
support H7. 
In addition, the results identified a significant cross-product effect in Scenario 3 
involving injunctive norm-moral intensity (B = -.07, p = .00 significant at p<.01). 
This implies that, in Scenario 3, the moral intensity significantly moderates the 
positive relationship between injunctive norm and intention to blow the whistle. The 
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result also reveals that moral intensity significantly moderates the positive 
relationship between descriptive norm and intention to blow the whistle (B=.06, p = 
.05 significant at p<.1). However, there is no significant moderating effect of moral 
intensity in the relationship involving perceived behavioural control and intention to 
whistle blow (B = .03, p = .60); self-efficacy and intention to whistle blow (B = -.02, 
p = .53); organisational-professional conflict and intention to whistle blow (B = -.01, 
p = .71); and awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation and intention to 
whistle blow (B = .02, p = .56). Summary of the results are presented in Table 4.29. 
Table 4.29: Summary of moderating effect results 
Dependent variable: Intention to blow the whistle 
Moderating variable: Moral intensity 
Independent variable Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Sig. 
result 
Sig. 
level 
Sig. 
result 
Sig. 
level 
Sig. 
result 
Sig. 
level 
Attitude X  X  -  
Injunctive norm X  X  √ p<.01 
Descriptive norm X  X  √ p<.1 
Perceived behavioural 
conflict 
X  X  X  
Self-efficacy X  X  X  
Organizational-
professional conflict 
X  X  X  
Awareness X  X  X  
X = insignificant; √ = significant; - = no moderating effect 
 
The graphs displayed in Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.9 show the moderating effects of 
moral intensity on the relationship between each independent variable and dependent 
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variable (whistle-blowing intention)14. Graphs for the Scenario 3 results are used as 
examples. 
                                                 
14
 There is not much difference in the results of Scenario 1 with the results of Scenario 2 and Scenario 
3. In this chapter, only graphs on moderating effects of moral intensity on Scenario 3 are shown.  
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Figure 4.3:  Plot of moderating effect of moral intensity and attitude towards 
whistle-blowing on whistle-blowing intention 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Plot of moderating effect of moral intensity and injunctive norm on 
whistle-blowing intention 
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Figure 4.5: Plot of moderating effect of moral intensity and descriptive norm on 
whistle-blowing intention 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Plot of moderating effect of moral intensity and perceived 
behavioural control on whistle-blowing intention 
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Figure 4.7: Plot of moderating effect of moral intensity and self-efficacy on 
whistle-blowing intention 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Plot of moderating effect of moral intensity and organizational- 
professional conflict on whistle-blowing intention 
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Figure 4.9: Plot of moderating effect of moral intensity and awareness of 
whistle-blowing protection legislation on whistle-blowing intention 
 
 
In Figure 4.3, the line graphs are parallel with each other and there is no interception 
between the line graphs.  This depicts no interaction effect of moral intensity on the 
relationship between attitude and intention to whistle blow. In contrast to that, line 
graphs shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 shows non-parallel line graphs where one 
or two of the line graphs (in each figure) is or are steeper than the other and there is 
an interception points between the lines. Graphs in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 
illustrate significant moderating effect of moral intensity on the relationship between 
intention to blow the whistle and injunctive norm and descriptive norm, respectively. 
Graphs in Figure 4.6 to Figure 4.9 also show non-parallel line graphs. However, the 
interaction effect of moral intensity on the relationship between intention to whistle 
blow and perceived behavioural control (Figure 4.6), self-efficacy (Figure 4.7), 
organizational-professional conflict (Figure 4.8) and awareness of whistle-blowing 
protection legislation (Figure 4.9) is not significant. 
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Overall, these findings suggest that the total moral intensity of the ethical situations 
may interrupt the relationship between the individual–level variables and the 
intention of internal auditors to blow the whistle. The total moral intensity of an 
ethical situation here refers to all six dimensions as suggested by Jones (1991): 
magnitude of consequences; temporal immediacy; social consensus; proximity; and 
probability of effect. However, this study found little evidence that moral intensity 
directly influences the intention to blow the whistle. 
In conclusion, these results suggest that moral intensity has no direct impact on 
whistle-blowing intention. However, the moral intensity variable has the ability to 
moderate some of the individual relationships between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable. Future researchers should consider testing the moderating 
effect of moral intensity in their research framework.  
4.7 Hypothesis results summary 
The results of the hypotheses tested are summarised in Table 4.30. 
Table 4.30: Hypothesis results summary 
Dependent variable: Intention to blow the whistle 
Part A: Results on significant level 
Variables H Model Significant/Insignificant level 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Attitude H1 One Insignificant Sig at p<.05 Insignificant Two Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
IN H2a One Sig at p<.1 Sig at p<.01 Sig at p<.01 
Two Sig at p<.1 Sig at p<.01 Sig at p<.01 
DN H2b One Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Two Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
PBC H3 One Sig at p<.1 Sig at p<.01 Sig at p<.01 
Two Sig at p<.1 Sig at p<.01 Sig at p<.01 
SE H4 One Sig at p<.01 Sig at p<.01 Sig at p<.05 
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Two Sig at p<.01 Sig at p<.01 Sig at p<.05 
OPC H5 One Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Two Sig at p<.1 Sig at p<.1 Insignificant 
Awareness H6 One Insignificant Sig at p<.1 Insignificant 
Two Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
MI H7a - Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
H7b - Insignificant Insignificant Sig at p<.01 
H7c - Insignificant Insignificant Sig at p<.1 
H7d - Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
H7e - Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
H7f - Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
H7g - Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Part B: Results on hypotheses approval/rejection 
Variables H Model Relationship direction Hypothesis 
Status Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Attitude H1 One Positive Positive Positive Slightly 
support Two Positive Positive Positive 
IN H2a One Positive  Positive  Positive Fully 
support Two Positive Positive Positive 
DN H2b One Positive Negative Positive Rejected 
Two Positive Negative Positive 
PBC H3 One Positive Positive Positive Fully 
support Two Positive Positive Positive 
SE H4 One Positive Positive Positive Fully 
support Two Positive Positive Positive 
OPC H5 One Positive Positive Positive Slightly 
support Two Positive Positive Positive 
Awareness H6 One Positive Positive Positive Slightly 
Support Two Positive Positive Positive 
MI H7a - Negative Positive Positive Rejected 
H7b - Negative Negative Negative Slightly 
support 
H7c - Negative Positive Positive Slightly 
support 
H7d - Positive Negative Positive Rejected 
H7e - Negative Negative Negative Rejected 
H7f - Positive Negative Negative Rejected 
H7g - Positive Negative Positive Rejected 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the analysis of the results. The descriptive analyses of the 
profile of the respondents showed that this study obtained a good set of participants. 
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In the comparison of group differences there were significant differences between 
respondents from different groups. For example, males were found to have a 
significantly different attitude towards whistle-blowing than females, and older 
internal auditors were found to have a significantly different attitude, received 
greater support from their significant others and had more confidence in their 
capability to blow the whistle, than those in younger age groups.  
The results from standard multiple regressions revealed that some of the hypotheses 
were fully supported, while some were only slightly supported and others were 
rejected. It was found that the descriptive norm variable had no significant influence 
on whistle-blowing intention. The support received from significant others, perceived 
control and ability to blow the whistle were the variables that were found to have a 
significant influence on whistle-blowing intention in all the three scenarios. In one or 
two of the three scenarios, attitudes, awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation and organizational-professional conflict significantly influence whistle-
blowing intention.   
The moderated multiple regression analysis found that moral intensity significantly 
moderated the positive relationship between injunctive norm and whistle-blowing 
intention and descriptive norm and whistle-blowing intention. Moral intensity, 
however, has no direct influential impact on the intention. 
A discussion of the results is presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Discussion of Findings 
5.0 Introduction 
This study aims to identify factors that influence internal auditors’ whistle-blowing 
intention. This study has examined seven independent individual-level factors that 
influence internal auditors’ intention to whistle-blow. In this chapter, the results, 
presented in the earlier chapter, are discussed. The discussion will relate the findings 
of this study with the points which have been discussed in related literature. Review 
papers are mainly referred to as part of and summary of previous literature used in 
discussing the findings of this study.  
This chapter is organised into four sections. The first section discusses the results of 
the differences of the seven tested variables between respondents from different 
demographic backgrounds (gender, age, internal auditing work experience, client 
categories and employment position). The second section discusses the results of the 
relationship between the individual-level variables and the dependent variable. The 
third section discusses the moderating effect of moral intensity on the individual 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The 
conclusion is presented in the last section. 
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5.1 Statistical results of comparing group differences in relation to 
the independent variables 
One of the research aims of this study was to examine whether there were any 
significant differences between participants (from different gender, age, years of 
work experience, client categories and employment position) with regard to the 
seven independent variables examined in this study.  
5.1.1 Gender 
Loe et al. (2000) and O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) reported findings that there 
were no significant gender differences and if differences are found, females tend to 
be more ethical than males. However, in this study, the results showed that males 
have a greater positive attitude towards whistle-blowing than females.  
Although results from this study contrast with the findings reported in the review 
articles particularly in the ethical decision making discipline, the results of males 
being more ethical conscious on whistle-blowing than females is explainable. In 
social-role theory, males are usually associated with heroic behaviour (Hyde, 2005) 
which, in turn, associates males as risk-takers. Females, on the other hand, are 
commonly associated as being risk-averse. Being risk-takers might have convinced 
the male internal auditors to hold more ethical stands regarding the whistle-blowing 
issue, which is very sensitive and complex in nature. Also, whistle-blowing involves 
a high likelihood of retaliation upon one’s involvement with the whistle-blowing 
practice which is not so severe, if at all, in other ethical types of behaviour studied. 
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These points might explain why males have more positive attitude than females 
towards whistle-blowing. In this study, only the attitude variable has significant 
difference between genders. This is consistent with assertions by Hyde (2005)  who 
reported that males and females are much alike on most, but not all, psychological 
variables. 
Caution needs to be exercised in comparing the results of this present study with the 
findings reported in Loe et al.’s (2000) review paper. Almost half of the papers 
reviewed by Loe et al. used students as their samples. In comparison, this present 
study used actual personnel (internal auditors) in organisations. Students are usually 
younger and less experienced than actual personnel in organisations; actual internal 
auditors have more life and work experience. The age and experience gap may create 
a knowledge gap between actual internal auditors and students which might cause a 
gap in their cognitive ability, particularly their ethical judgement. 
Although there is small amount of research on whistle-blowing that examines the 
influence of gender (Keenan, 2000) the results of this present study appear to have 
some consistencies with what Keenan suggested in his article. According to Keenan 
(2000) there is some preliminary evidence that indicates males have a greater 
tendency to blow the whistle than females, such as findings by Keenan (1989) and 
Miceli, Dozier and Near (1987). In addition, research by Miceli and Near (1988) also 
reported that whistle-blowing was more likely to occur when the observer of the 
wrongdoings was male. 
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The average value of attitude for both males and females was above 3.0 which 
indicates that both groups have a positive attitude towards whistle-blowing. Based on 
the social desirability response bias result, the attitude variable is not affected by the 
bias. This means that there is a high probability that the result illustrates the actual 
attitude of the participants. 
Overall, the results show that internal auditors in the U.K. are very concerned with 
the illegal and unethical practices that occur in organisations and agreed that whistle-
blowing is a good and wise idea for reporting questionable practices. Both gender 
groups also reported positive responses on the other six variables. This means that 
internal auditors, regardless of their gender, receive support from their significant 
others in their decision to blow the whistle, have high perceived behavioural control, 
self-efficacy, low organisational-professional conflict and high awareness of the 
whistle-blowing protection legislation. 
5.1.2 Age 
With regards to age, this study found that younger group participants and older group 
participants differed significantly in terms of attitude, injunctive norm, self-efficacy 
and organisational-professional conflict. The younger group here refers to internal 
auditors between 31-40 years old and the older group refers to those between 51-60 
years old. Overall results showed that older participants possess more positive 
attitudes towards whistle-blowing, receive support from significant others (injunctive 
norm) and they are more confident in their capability (self-efficacy) to embark on 
any complex and serious ethical decision making, such as whistle-blowing. The 
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younger participants, however, have a higher organisational-professional conflict 
than the older participants. An explanation to these findings includes a range of 
rationales, including the amount of exposure they have had in their work-life. 
Perhaps, the older respondents in this study have more experience and have had 
greater exposure to questionable practices in their audit works which have made 
them more courageous than the younger participants. Serwinek (1992) stated that 
older people were more exposed to either overt or implied ethical standards. 
Serwinek also mentioned that an older person is more likely to comply with ethical 
standards. In the same article, Serwinek also associated older people with financial 
security obsession. According to Serwinek (1992), older people were less likely to 
put themselves into a situation which may jeopardise them. Also, people in the older 
group, at their best, would avoid taking part in any unethical activity. They believed 
that involvement in any unethical behaviour would eventually make them suffer and 
they would be likely to get caught and punished. 
Overall, the results of this study are consistent with the findings reported in the 
review articles both in ethical decision making literature (Loe et al., 2000; O'Fallon 
& Butterfield, 2005) and whistle-blowing literature (Vadera et al., 2009). As 
predicted, the older participants responded more positively compared to the younger 
participants.    
5.1.3 Internal auditing work experience 
Significant results were found on the awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation and self-efficacy variables. As presented in the analysis of results chapter, 
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participants with less work experience have a relatively higher awareness of whistle-
blowing protection legislation than participants with more work experience. The 
limited experience in internal audit may have prompted them to seek more in-depth 
information related to whistle-blowing particularly the whistle-blowing protection 
legislation. However, in contrast to the self-efficacy results, participants with more 
work experience were more convinced of their capability to blow the whistle. In the 
other five variables, no significant results between participants from different work 
experience groups were obtained. 
The results of this study found that respondents with more years of work experience 
had a more positive score on self-efficacy than the respondents who had fewer years 
of work experience. A greater number of years of work experience might have given 
them more exposure in directly dealing with, or knowing the existence of, unethical 
and illegal behaviours in their workplace. The experiences may have motivated them 
to gain as much knowledge as they could with regard to the action which they should 
and could take. For instance, they could gain as much knowledge as they could about 
whistle-blowing if they regard whistle-blowing as one of the possible resorts they 
could take. The knowledge would make them aware that they are potentially 
protected by whistle-blowing legislation, subject to how they make the disclosure. 
Consequently this could increase their confidence in their capability (self-efficacy) to 
raise their concerns. 
The results of this present study do not stray too far from results reported in the 
review papers related to ethical decision making. As mentioned in O'Fallon and 
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Butterfield (2005) and Weeks, Moore, McKinney, and Longenecker (1999), 
individuals in the more senior years of their career displayed a higher ethical 
judgment than those in the early years of their career.  
5.1.4 Client categories 
For the client category variable, the results found significant differences in the 
injunctive norm, descriptive norm, awareness of the whistle-blowing legislation and 
self-efficacy variables.  
Internal auditors who audit public sector organisations perceived they would have 
more support from their significant others than what their counterparts in the private 
sector organisations perceived. Public-sector organizations are different from private-
sector organizations in many ways such as governance (Baarspul & Wilderom, 
2011). The differences subsequently bring dissimilarity in the working environment 
in both sectors. Different working environment between public-sector organizations 
and private-sector organizations then contributes some implications to the 
individuals’ work motivation, expectation as well as potential risks which ones 
exposed to. Working in the public sector organizations prioritizes a higher sense of 
community service which encourages workers to do something valuable for society. 
Being in this work environment and sharing the same work motives, work climates 
and organizational culture with their work colleagues, in particular, and with others 
who close and important to them, in general, contribute confidence to blow the 
whistle. The support gained from their significant others is also possibly rooted in the 
belief that blowing the whistle on any questionable organizational practices is 
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consistent with the public sector organizations’ policies and therefore find no 
difficulties to obtain support from their significant others.   
This study also found that internal auditors who audited private sector organisations 
are more aware of the whistle-blowing legislation and believed in their capability 
(self-efficacy) to whistle-blow. In contrast to public-sector organizations, most of 
private-sector organizations are profit-oriented and this has subsequently brings to 
the different work motives, work motivation and risks. Realizing that there is 
probability that they might have a conflict in performing duties as internal auditors 
(such as produce a faithful report versus window dressing audit report) and knowing 
that probability for losing job, if they do not follow what their organizations asked 
them to do, is higher in the private sector than in public-sector encouraged internal 
auditors to be aware of any protection legislation that provides protection to them. 
This includes situation involving whistle-blowing. The information assists them to 
understand their rights in reporting any questionable organizational practices and to 
know the right procedure for making any report of questionable organizational 
practices. Having that information consequently helps boost their confidence to 
whistle-blow.       
As mentioned in the previous chapter, no whistle-blowing studies have studied or 
discussed the difference between internal auditors in public sector and private sector 
organisations. Referring to the article in public management literature such as articles 
by Andersen (2010) and Rainey et al. (1995) the findings of this present study 
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support the findings by these authors that differences exist between employees in 
private and public sectors.  
Although past research has not empirically examined the difference between internal 
auditors in public-sector organisations and internal auditors in private-sector 
organisations, results from this study provide some evidence that differences exist 
between internal auditors from different organisations. This study therefore suggests 
that the organisational environment (public sector versus private sector) might be one 
of the significant predictors that can explain an individual’s perception of whistle-
blowing. Any future research should include an investigation of the differences 
between internal auditors in different organisational sectors.  
5.1.5 Employment position 
With regard to employment position the cross-tabulation analysis did not find much 
difference between in-house internal auditors and outsourced internal auditors in 
relation to the seven tested variables. Mahzan et al. (2012) also found minimal 
differences between in-house and outsourced internal auditors. However, caution 
should be exercised in concluding the results of this present study as a minimal 
number of outsourced internal auditors participated in this survey. 
Outsourcing is now becoming more common in organizations and this includes 
outsourcing the internal auditing function. This fact along with the results obtained in 
this study suggests that the investigation of differences between in-house and 
outsourced internal auditors should be looked at again in future research.  
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5.2 Statistical results for exploring relationship between variables 
The results in Chapter Four show that positive and significant relationships exist 
between whistle-blowing intention and attitude (H1), injunctive norm (H2a), 
perceived behavioural control (H3), self-efficacy (H4), organisational-professional 
conflict (H5) and awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation (H6). 
However, the relationship between whistle-blowing intention and descriptive norm 
(H2b) was rejected. 
Injunctive norm, perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy are three variables 
that had a positive and significant influence in all of the three scenarios. In contrast, 
the results on attitude, awareness and organisational-professional conflict only 
showed significant results in one or two of the scenarios. The results, however, 
provide evidence that shows potentiality of attitude, awareness and organisational-
professional conflict to significantly influence whistle-blowing intention. The 
summary of the results is shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Results of hypothesis analysis 
Scenario 
Independent variables 
Attitude IN DN PBC SE OPC Awareness 
Scenario 1 X √ X √ √ √ X 
Scenario 2 √ √ X √ √ √ √ 
Scenario 3 X √ X √ √ X X 
IN= injunctive norm; DN = descriptive norm; PBC = perceived behavioural control, SE = self-
efficcacy; OPC = organizational-professional conlict 
√ = significant; X = insignificant  
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The findings of each of the seven tested variables are discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  
5.2.1 The influence of attitude towards whistle-blowing on the 
intention to blow the whistle 
Regression results show mix findings on the significant association between attitude 
and whistle-blowing intention. A significant influence of attitude on the intention 
was found in the Scenario 2. In Scenario 1 and Scenario 3, the results found 
insignificant influence of attitude on the whistle-blowing intention. The study, 
however, predicted that in all the scenarios attitude has a significant influence on the 
intention.  The unexpected insignificant influence of attitude on intention as found in 
Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 might be due to the ethical situations described in the 
scenarios. As compared to Scenario 1 and Scenario 3, ethical situations described in 
Scenario 2 mentioned about ‘material’. However, no materiality concern was 
mentioned in the other two scenarios.   
Although only in Scenario 2 the association between attitude and whistle-blowing 
intention is significant, the results provide empirical evidence that attitude has the 
potential to significantly influence whistle-blowing intention.   
This result is consistent with most previous research, for example, a study by Park 
and Blenkinsopp (2009). In the study, the authors found a significant positive result 
on the association between attitude towards whistle-blowing and the intention to 
blow the whistle. Similarly, a study by Randall and Gibson (1991) also found that 
attitude has a significant influence on intention. However, Chang (1998) found that 
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attitude had a positive but insignificant contribution than the perceived behavioural 
control variable in predicting intention. Findings in the present study provide 
additional evidence that show attitude may play a role in influencing behavioural 
intention including risky behaviour such as whistle-blowing.     
The following paragraphs provide an explanation of the significant influence of 
attitude, among internal auditors in the U.K., on the whistle-blowing practices.  
In the U.K. whistle-blowing is no longer a new occurrence. Vinten and Gavin (2005) 
mention that at present more whistle-blowing cases are reported than compared to 
the past 25 years where whistle-blowing was relatively rare. Whistle-blowing has 
achieved an unprecedented reception from both the political and organisational level  
(Vinten & Gavin, 2005). Due to the recognition of whistle-blowing practices and 
also the on-going improvements in the whistle-blowing legislation (the PIDA 1998), 
the term ‘whistle-blowing’ is no longer unusual for organisational members in the 
U.K., including internal auditors. Additionally, whistle-blowing practices have 
received strong support from the Institute of Directors, the Confederation of British 
Industry, the Committee Standards in Public Life and the Trades Union Congress 
(Public Concern at Work, 2013b). The encouragement given by regulators of 
organisations, to provide whistle-blowing policies and procedures, to some extent 
assists in cultivating a positive attitude towards whistle-blowing. All these 
determined efforts and available support have contributed advantages, such as 
promoting whistle-blowing practices.  It is believed that one of the implicit aims of 
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these efforts is to instil positive views and attitudes among all workers, organisations 
and the public, in general, toward whistle-blowing practices.       
The positive attitude among individuals in the U.K., toward whistle-blowing 
practices, was also reported in one of the recent whistle-blowing surveys conducted 
by YouGov on behalf of PCaW, the U.K.’s leading authority on whistle-blowing. 
The survey found that 1 in 10 workers in the U.K. have a concern regarding possible 
wrongdoings in their organisations. It is interesting to note that, in the survey, the 
majority of the workers report a positive view on the whistle-blowing practice which 
demonstrates a positive attitude towards whistle-blowing practices  (Public Concern 
at Work, 2013c).  
In addition to the above justification, the predicted positive attitude towards whistle-
blowing is consistent with the claim by Schmidt (2005) that common law countries, 
such as the U.K., seem to regard whistle-blowing practice as a valuable device for 
strengthening ethical conduct in the workplace. 
5.2.2 The significant influence of injunctive norm and insignificant 
influence of descriptive norm on the intention to blow the whistle 
This study found a positive and significant relationship between the injunctive norm 
and intention to blow the whistle. These results are consistent with the findings from 
previous research such as by Park, Klein, Smith, and Martell (2009) who found a 
positive association between the injunctive norm variables on the intention to limit 
alcohol consumption. In the present study, it was found that descriptive norm had an 
insignificant relationship with whistle-blowing intention. In the study by Park et al. 
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(2009), the authors report that both norm variables are unique to each other which 
indicate that they measure two different things. A study by Sotiropoulos and 
D’Astous (2013) also found a positive influence of the descriptive norm on the 
intention to overspend on credit cards. In a study by Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) 
that investigated the whistle-blowing intention among police officers, the general 
social norms variable played an important role in predicting the intention to blow the 
whistle. In a different study conducted by Rhodes and Courneya (2003), the authors 
found that the general social norms variable played a role in predicting intention.   
As discussed in Chapter Two, previous research reports mixed findings on the 
significant influence of social norms in intention prediction. In this study, it was 
found that injunctive norm is the variable that has a significant influence on the 
intention to blow the whistle. However, the regression results showed that in relation 
to injunctive norm, the descriptive norm had an insignificant impact on the intention 
to blow the whistle. In other words, participant perceptions of whether their 
important others approve or support their decision to blow the whistle plays a more 
significant role than the perception of whether their important others would blow the 
whistle if they themselves were put in the same situation. The results of this study 
provide additional evidence that support the important role of support received from 
significant others, such as family members and peers, in influencing an individual’s 
whistle-blowing intention. This result is consistent with previous research such as  
Finlay et al. (1999), Carpenter and Reimers (2005) and Kautonen et al. (2013) who 
also found a significant influence of the social norms variable in intention prediction. 
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The following paragraphs provide possible explanations of the significance of the 
above findings. One possible explanation of the significant influence of the 
injunctive norms variable on the internal auditors’ intention to blow the whistle is the 
way whistle-blowing is reported in the media. Based on a content analysis of U.K. 
national newspapers from 1997 to 2009, it was found that whistle-blowing activities 
are broadly reported in the media and, interestingly, most of the reports highlight the 
whistle-blowing action in a neutral or positive mode (Wahl-Jorgensen & Hunt, 
2012). This can be regarded as a form of support given by the media on the culture of 
raising concern on ethical wrongdoing (Wahl-Jorgensen & Hunt, 2012). It is 
undeniable that the media provide the main source of daily information to any 
individual; therefore, the way they describe and justify whistle-blowing practices 
might impact on how the individual perceives whistle-blowing. The perception an 
individual has of whistle-blowing is very valuable as it may influence the kind of 
action they would take if they were in a situation that required them to blow the 
whistle, or in a situation to persuade/advise someone in relation to blowing the 
whistle. 
In addition, in the present day, the merits of whistle-blowing practices are actively 
promoted by the government and regulators in the U.K. These can be seen from the 
concerted efforts made by regulators and the government which are discussed in the 
following section. The efforts have indeed added additional advantages in 
disseminating a better view about whistle-blowing practices among the public in 
particular. One of the subsequent positive implications is the cultivation of the 
positive attitude towards whistle-blowing practice among the society in the U.K. The 
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nature of the whistle-blowing practice, which is complex and sensitive to individuals,  
needs a very delicate and convincing approach to ensure the core and the positive 
side of the whistle-blowing is shared thoroughly among the society at large.  
It is also possible that popular whistle-blowing films may further influence society’s 
perceptions on whistle-blowing practices. Among the popular whistle-blowing films 
are The Insider (1999) and The Whistleblower (2010) which might have successfully 
shared the positive value of whistle-blowing and the significance of whistle-blowing 
practices. In the films, whistle-blowing is described as an action that uncovers illegal 
and unethical behaviour in organisations taken to safeguard stakeholders’ interests 
particularly the public.   
5.2.3 The influence of perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy 
on the intention to blow the whistle 
This study found that the two variables, perceived behavioural control and self-
efficacy significantly influence the internal auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. 
The results of this study are consistent with previous research. A study by Trafimow 
et al. (2002) reported that perceived difficulty (self-efficacy) is a better predictor of 
most behavioural intentions than the perceived controllability (perceived behavioural 
control). Similarly, the same output was reported by Rhodes and Courneya (2003). In 
a study by Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), perceived behavioural control has a 
significant positive association with intention to blow the whistle.  
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In this study, the results show that internal auditors in the U.K. appear to have strong 
confidence in their controllability and ability to whistle-blow. One of the possible 
reasons for this outcome is the mechanism for whistle-blowing which is currently 
provided in most organisations. In recent years, regulators and the government have 
legislated new rules that encourage organisations to provide whistle-blowing policies 
and procedures. The effective whistle-blowing policies and procedures play a crucial 
role in encouraging workers to raise their concerns (Public Concern at Work, 2013a). 
The effective whistle-blowing policies and procedures act as a reference for 
organisational staff members to place trust that their management teams promote the 
whistle-blowing practice. Furthermore, this helps create a positive and open culture 
towards whistle-blowing practices in the organisation. In addition, it helps increase 
the self-confidence among employees to voice their concerns, using their right as a 
staff member who wants to see unethical and/or illegal action rectified before it 
escalates. However, the effectiveness of the whistle-blowing policies and procedures 
is much dependent on the management. There are some organisations that seriously 
create a whistle-blowing culture in their workplace by putting in place whistle-
blowing policies and procedures. However, some organisations provide whistle-
blowing policies and procedures just as a tool to prevent themselves from any legal 
liability. This is where the organisations are merely paying lip service to whistle-
blowing practices. The importance of establishing a whistle-blowing mechanism in 
organisations is reported by Hartman, Elm, Radin, and Pope (2009).  
The U.K. legal environment also provides an explanation as to the confidence of 
internal auditors on their controllability and ability to raise their concern. PIDA 1998 
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was enacted with the main purpose to provide protection to whistle-blowers. 
Knowing that there is legislation that provides protection to whistle-blowers sends a 
message that whistle-blowing is encouraged. The protection provided by the 
legislation should help remove any fear or worry to blow the whistle (Hartman et al., 
2009). All of the efforts made by the government and regulators have indeed sent a 
strong message to workers in the U.K. that they have a human right to come forward 
and voice their concerns. 
This study also found that in circumstances involving a more serious unethical and 
illegal organisational practice, such as bringing harm to public safety, the confidence 
among internal auditors of their controllability and ability to raise their concern is 
relatively high. 
5.2.4 The influence of the awareness of the whistle-blowing 
legislation on the intention to blow the whistle  
For the awareness of the whistle-blowing legislation variable, the results presented in 
Chapter Four found evidence that only slightly supported the hypothesis. In other 
words, there were mixed findings. In Scenario 1 and Scenario 3, unpredicted 
insignificant results on the relationship between awareness and whistle-blowing 
intention were found. However, in Scenario 2 there was a positive and significant 
relationship between the awareness variable with the intention to blow the whistle. 
This study’s findings on the positive and significant relationship are consistent with 
previous research. For example, Lee and Shin (2010). Lee and Shin reported a 
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positive association between consumers’ awareness of CSR activities and the 
purchase intention. A similar finding was also reported by Golnaz, Phuah, 
Zainalabidin, and Mad (2012) where the authors investigated an awareness of the 
green concept and the intention to go green in food consumption. Additionally, in a 
study of recycling behaviour, conducted by Garces, Lafuente, Pedraja, and Rivera 
(2002), the authors found a positive relationship between environmental awareness 
and recycling behaviour. 
Significant results of awareness’s influence on intention or behaviour are mainly 
reported in marketing research studies such as by Grewal, Krishnan, Baker, and 
Borin (1998) and Aaker and Keller (1990). Overall, the findings from this study 
provide evidence that awareness plays an important role in influencing individual’s 
behavioural or intention. The following paragraphs provide an explanation of the 
above findings.  
The U.K. is presently very serious and active in its efforts to strengthen governance 
in organisations; one such effort concerns whistle-blowing practice. The continuous 
efforts in promoting whistle-blowing practice have kept whistle-blowing protection 
legislation at the forefront of mind of organisational members in the U.K. Thus, this 
might explain the significant influence of awareness on the whistle-blowing 
intention. Many efforts from various parties are continuously taken in ensuring good 
governance in organisations. Much attention is given to organisations in both the 
public and the private sectors and groups of high profile positions (this includes 
internal auditors) in the effort to protect and increase organisational good 
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governance. This further combats any illegal and unethical practices in organisations. 
For example, in the financial services industry the Financial Conduct Authority 
encourages organisations to have whistle-blowing arrangements in place. In addition, 
the Financial Reporting Council, in its U.K. Corporate Governance Code 2012, 
encourages listed companies to have whistle-blowing policies in place, or, if they do 
not have such policies, they will need to explain the reason why in their annual 
reports. Although there is no certainty that having whistle-blowing arrangements in 
place in organisations will ensure that workers will come forward to raise their 
concerns, putting in place whistle-blowing procedures might send out a positive 
message to workers of the paths they could use to raise their concern. These efforts 
indicate to internal auditors the high expectation which is placed upon them to come 
forward and raise their concerns. Although the right for workers in the U.K. to blow 
the whistle is not explicitly stated, the concerted efforts by various parties, including 
the government, can be regarded as one of the factors that should have driven 
workers, including internal auditors, to follow whistle-blowing practice. The 
seriousness of this country to strengthen organisation governance has provided a way 
for the PIDA to get closer to the heart of potential whistle-blowers.   
The PIDA 1998 is the only whistle-blowing protection legislation in the U.K. and it 
was established to give protection to whistle-blowers. Since the first draft of the 
legislation, the PIDA has received various constructive comments from several 
parties, particularly among regulators on the coverage of the protection given by the 
PIDA. As a result, PIDA was amended accordingly with a purpose to provide a 
better and more effective protection. One of the recent amendments was made in 
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2013 by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act where the good faith requirement 
was removed and replaced with the public interest requirement. The removal of the 
good faith requirement indicates that currently in the U.K. whistle-blowing should be 
done on the grounds of public interest for the whistle-blowers to be protected by the 
PIDA. In other words, the motive of disclosure by the whistle-blowers is no more a 
major concern. The amendment was made with the hope that organisational members 
would feel more motivated towards whistle-blowing.   
5.2.5 The influence of organisational-professional conflict on the 
intention to blow the whistle 
This study found mixed findings on the relationship between organisational-
professional conflict and whistle-blowing intention. The regression analysis found a 
positive and significant relationship between the variables in Scenario 1 and Scenario 
2. In Scenario 3, a non-significant relationship was found. The mix findings of 
significant and insignificant results might due to the ethical situations described in 
each scenarios. Scenarios 1 and 2 described about bad practices of accounting and 
involve the misuse of organization’s financial resources. In these two scenarios, the 
impacts of the ethical situations to the organizations are indeed very close. The 
conflict which internal auditors have in these two scenarios is more intense than the 
situation described in Scenario 3. Compared to ethical situation in the Scenario 1 and 
scenario 2, the ethical situation in scenario 3 is more intense than in the other two 
scenarios. However, the ethical situation in Scenario 3 does not yet impose bad effect 
to the organization as the matter has not yet reached the external parties knowledge. 
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Internal auditor needs to take immediate action before the matter escalates. The 
current situation faced by the internal auditors as presented in Scenario 1 and 
Scenario 2 caused more conflict to internal auditors compared to situation in 
Scenario 3 where the current effect to the organization is not yet occurred. The 
ethical situations described in Scenario 1 and Scenario put more conflict on the 
internal auditors than the ethical situation in Scenario 3.  
These findings are consistent with previous research. For example, a positive 
relationship between organisational-professional conflict and turnover intention was 
reported in a study by Aranya and Ferris (1984). A similar finding was also reported 
in Shafer (2002) who found that there was a positive relationship between ethical 
pressure and organisational-professional conflict. Furthermore, the higher 
organisational-professional conflict the higher the turnover intention.   
Previous research in the accounting field that investigates the organisational-
professional conflict mainly reports that accountants, in general, have a high 
organisational-professional conflict. However, from the previous studies, no 
information on the significant influence of the organisational-professional conflict on 
behavioural intention has been reported. In this study, the finding of the significant 
influence of organisational-professional conflict (in Model 2 of both Scenario 1 and 
Scenario 2) provides preliminary empirical evidence on the significant influence of 
the organisational-professional conflict on whistle-blowing intention.  
In this study, most of the internal auditors reported that they had been given a 
massive opportunity to hold their professionalism during their audit works and they 
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faced minimal conflict during their work. This finding is consistent with what was 
asserted by Vinten (2004), that British workers in general:   
have less fear of, and respect and obedience to, their seniors and those in 
positions of power, they are more able to cope with ambiguity and uncertainty, 
more tenacious, more independent, less emotional, less fatalistic, more 
arrogant, more reserved, and they care more for other people (Vinten, 2004, p. 
148) 
In addition, internal auditing is commonly recognised as a profession and internal 
auditors are generally highly educated with a sound knowledge of their 
responsibilities and duties. Also, they are under close scrutiny from professional 
bodies and this might have made them consciously aware to always uphold the code 
of ethics of internal auditors. The code of ethics provides guidelines for internal 
auditors in rationally taking action parallel to their professionalism whenever they 
are faced with ethical issues.  
5.2.6 The intention to blow the whistle among internal auditors in 
the U.K. 
With regards to the level of intention, this research found a highly positive intention 
among internal auditors to blow the whistle in all the three scenarios.  
One explanation for this finding is the culture factor. According to Bierstaker (2009), 
Hofstede defines culture as a “collective programming of the mind which includes 
ethical values” (p.242). In Hofstede’s original cultural dimensions, there are four 
culture values that best describe the effects of society’s culture on values and the 
subsequent behaviour of the members in that particular culture. The four culture 
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values are: individualism-collectivism; uncertainty avoidance; power distance; and 
masculinity-femininity. 
Based on Hofstede’s cultural dimension theory, the U.K. is a country that scores high 
in individualism and masculinity-femininity culture dimensions but scores low in the 
remaining dimensions. Cross-cultural studies by previous researchers reports that in 
individualism culture, everyone is expected to look out for him/herself as well as 
his/her family (see Tavakoli, Keenan, & Cranjak-Karanovic, 2003). In the 
workplace, workers are independent from the organisation which means that 
individual achievements are stressed rather than group achievements. In addition to 
individualism, the U.K. is also masculine in culture. This means individuals feel 
more comfortable in taking action and directly confronting a situation of conflict 
(Tavakoli et al., 2003). In other words, the individualism and masculinity culture 
dimensions illustrate that individuals in the U.K use their human right to speak out or 
take action, when they consider necessary, and this includes whistle-blowing action. 
Scoring low in power-distance illustrates that individuals in the U.K. assume 
everyone is relatively equal in terms of power. Workers and supervisors are 
considered as equal in status. In a case where there is dispute on certain issues, 
individuals are more likely to challenge the authority. Apart from that, a low score in 
the uncertainty-avoidance dimension means that individuals in the country perceive 
that every problem can be solved by using the existing rules or regulations. Mistakes 
that occur are considered as normal and part of the learning process. Also, 
individuals have a high tolerance of ambiguity and further high risk situations. These 
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traits of the U.K culture may help explain the high intention of internal auditors to 
blow the whistle. 
It was also found that intention level among respondents was relatively higher in 
Scenario 3 than in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. This might have been caused by the 
different nature of ethical situation presented in each of the scenarios (see Near et al., 
2004; Somers & Casal, 2011). As mentioned earlier, Scenario 1 presented a situation 
involving improper accounting treatment, Scenario 2 involved financial statements 
fraud and Scenario 3 involved a situation that may pose danger to the environment 
and public in general. A considerable amount of previous research contends that 
what individuals perceive to be right or wrong and ethical or unethical differs 
between cultures. Evidence to this claim is provided by Robertson and Schlegelmilch 
(1993) who found that respondents in the U.S.A and the U.K differ in their 
perceptions. According to the authors, although the U.K. and the U.S.A. are in the 
same cluster – they are Anglo-Saxon - in the U.K. problems involving quality 
control, environment pollution, plant closings and layoffs, conflict of interest and 
misuse of propriety information (in that order) are considered as serious ethical 
misbehaviours. In contrast, in the U.S.A., problems involving drug and alcohol 
abuse, employee theft, conflict of interest, quality control, discrimination, misuse of 
propriety information and abuse of expense accounts (in that order) are considered as 
a serious ethical misbehaviour. Based on the findings, as predicted, this study found 
that more internal auditors scored in the higher end of the whistle-blowing intention 
scale in Scenario 3 than in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.   
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5.3 The influence of moral intensity as moderator 
As reported in Chapter Four, it was found that moral intensity has moderating effects 
on some of the individual relationships between the individual-level variables 
(independent variables) and the intention to blow the whistle (dependent variable). A 
significant moderating effect of moral intensity was found in the relationship 
between injunctive norm and intention. Injunctive norm is one of the variables that 
significantly influences the whistle-blowing intention. A significant moderating 
effect of moral intensity was also found in the relationship between the descriptive 
norm and whistle-blowing intention, although the descriptive norm did not 
significantly influence the whistle-blowing intention. In the regression analysis, it 
was also found that moral intensity plays a minimal role on the intention to blow the 
whistle.  
In general, the result is consistent with previous research that has investigated the 
moderating role of moral intensity. For example, in a study by Chen, Pan, and Pan 
(2009), the authors found that the joint moderating effect of moral intensity and 
moral judgment moderated the positive relationship between consumers’ attitudes 
towards software piracy and the consumers’ intention of using pirated software. In 
the same article, the authors also reported that the joint moderating effect of moral 
intensity and moral judgment also moderated the positive relationship between 
subjective norms and the consumers’ intention of using pirated software. A study by 
Flannery and May (2000) revealed that moral intensity moderates the relationship 
between each of five variables (attitudes, subjective norms, self-efficacy, financial 
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costs and ethical climate) and the managers’ environmental ethical decisions 
intentions.   
As discussed previously, injunctive norm is one of the variables that has a significant 
influence on whistle-blowing intention. This study also found that whistle-blowing 
intention level was higher in Scenario 3 than in the other two scenarios. Consistent 
with conclusions by Robertson and Schlegelmilch (1993), the results of the present 
study show that respondents perceived the situations presented in Scenario 3 were 
more ethical and intense than in the other two scenarios (the mean of intention in 
Scenario 3 is much higher than in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. See section 4.2).  
The results of the moderating effects of moral intensity show that the issue-
contingent (the joint effect of all the six components of moral intensity) of ethical 
situation plays a crucial role on an individual’s intention to blow the whistle. The 
results suggest that the higher the moral intensity of the organisational questionable 
practices, the higher the influence of the important others surrounding those who 
intend to blow the whistle. One of the explanations of these findings is because 
whistle-blowing is a very risky decision for any individual to make, and the 
significant others of the decision maker are a big influence in the decision making 
process.    
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the findings of this study. In this study, positive attitude 
towards whistle-blowing is reported by first, male internal auditors and second, 
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internal auditors in older age group. The positive attitude toward whistle-blowing 
among males in relative to female internal auditors is consistent with social-role 
theory that asserts males are usually associated with heroic action which in turn 
refers them as risk-takers. The positive attitude among older internal auditors is 
associated with the exposure and experience they have gained in their work-life. 
Older internal auditors are more likely to comply with ethical standards and are less 
likely to put themselves in a situation that may put them into trouble and jeopardise 
their career. Internal auditors in older age group also have a higher confidence on 
their ability to whistle-blow. Confidence to blow the whistle is also higher among 
those who have a greater work experience.    
Injunctive norm, perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy are three 
independent variables that have significant influence on intention to whistle-blow in 
all the three scenarios. Attitude, awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation 
and organizational-professional conflict also significantly influence whistle-blowing 
intention, however not in all the three scenarios.  
The significant influences of these factors on whistle-blowing intention are resulted 
from the efforts that have been taken by regulators and government in the U.K. The 
establishment of the PIDA 1998, the formation of Public Concern at Work and the 
continuous improvement to the PIDA are among the efforts that have fostered a good 
view of whistle-blowing among internal auditors in the U.K.  
Findings of this study contribute valuable inputs to the literature and also provide 
recommendations to various parties such as government, government bodies, private 
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organizations, regulators and policy makers. The contributions and recommendations 
of this study are presented in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
6.0 Introduction 
The practices of illegal and unethical activities in any organization can bring bad 
impact to various parties such as the organization itself, employees and society. 
Therefore, measures to address such practices are needed. Whistle-blowing is one of 
the tools that has been introduced to attend such situation. Whistle-blowing needs an 
individual who has any knowledge of the practice of illegal and unethical activities 
in their organizations to disclose the information to the appropriate parties which in 
turn may help the organization to take remedial action. Despite the good of the 
whistle-blowing practice, blowing the whistle is a risky action. Therefore, 
investigation of factors that may influence one to blow or not to blow the whistle is a 
valuable study and it contributes valuable inputs to various parties.  
This study examined factors affecting U.K. internal auditors’ whistle-blowing 
intentions. Based on discussions from literature, seven individual-level independent 
variables (attitude towards whistle-blowing, injunctive norm, descriptive norm, 
perceived behavioural control, self-efficacy, organisational-professional conflict and 
awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation) were examined for, first, their 
relationship with whistle-blowing intention and second, their significant influence on 
whistle-blowing intention. This study also examined the moderating effect of moral 
intensity on each of the relationships between the seven independent variables and 
whistle-blowing intention. In addition, the independent variables were examined for 
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significant differences based on the internal auditors’ demographic backgrounds 
(gender, age, work experience, client categories and employment position).  
This chapter provides the summary of the study, the contributions of the study to the 
body of knowledge, recommendations for practice, limitations of the study and 
suggestions for future research. The chapter concludes by addressing the fulfilment 
of the research objectives.  
6.1 Summary of the study 
Literature in business ethics, management and auditing has discussed the role of 
internal auditors in organisations. Due to the unique position of an internal audit 
function and its role in an organisation, internal auditors have long been described as 
the eyes and ears of the management and the board. The role of internal auditors has 
expanded and, at present, internal auditors are one of the pillars of good 
organisational governance. Good governance is a means to develop confidence 
among various parties towards organisations. Through good governance, 
organisations send a message to stakeholders that the organisations are, first, run 
efficiently, effectively and ethically, and secondly, comply with all the applicable 
rules and regulations. With regards to good governance, and as part of their role, 
internal auditors need to make a report on any type of questionable practices that 
have taken place in their workplace. However, the decision to make a report, or blow 
the whistle, on the questionable practice is not an easy decision to make.   
This research is the first study to investigate whistle-blowing intention among 
internal auditors in the U.K. The objective of this study was to identify factors that 
may influence whistle-blowing intention. In achieving the aim, the relationship 
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between seven independent variables on the whistle-blowing intention was 
examined. Then the significant influence of the independent variables on whistle-
blowing intention was examined. In addition, the moral intensity was tested for its 
moderating effect on the relationship between each of the seven independent 
variables and the dependent variable. This study also investigated significant 
differences in the seven independent variables among internal auditors based on their 
demographic background.  
The results of the study showed that individual-level factors play a significant role in 
influencing internal auditors to blow the whistle. Six independent variables had a 
positive and significant relationship with the whistle-blowing intention. Three of the 
variables (injunctive norm, perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy) had a 
positive and significant relationship in all of the scenarios; the remaining three 
variables (attitudes towards whistle-blowing, awareness of whistle-blowing 
protection legislation and organisational-professional conflict) had a positive and 
significant relationship with whistle-blowing intention in one or two scenarios. The 
descriptive norm, however, had an insignificant relationship with whistle-blowing 
intention in all three scenarios. The moral intensity had a significant moderating 
effect on the relationship between the injunctive norm and whistle-blowing intention, 
and the descriptive norm and whistle-blowing intention. 
With regard to demographic background, the study found that men and women had a 
significant difference in their attitudes towards whistle-blowing, while internal 
auditors in the age group of 51-60 years old differed significantly  in their attitudes 
towards whistle-blowing, injunctive norm, self-efficacy and organisational-
professional conflict than those in the age group of 31-40 years old. Older internal 
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auditors had more positive attitudes towards whistle-blowing, received more support 
from their significant others (injunctive norm) and were more confident in their 
capability (self-efficacy) to blow the whistle. Conversely, younger internal auditors 
reported higher organisational-professional conflict. In addition, internal auditors 
with more years work experience had greater awareness of the whistle-blowing 
legislation and higher self-efficacy than those with less years work experience. 
Furthermore, internal auditors that audit public sector organisations perceived they 
gained more support from their important others than their counterparts in private 
sector organisations. It was also found that internal auditors that audit private sector 
organisations perceived a greater awareness of whistle-blowing protection legislation 
and reported a higher capability (self-efficacy) to whistle-blow. The study, however, 
was unable to perform statistical analysis in examining the difference between in-
house internal auditors and outsourced internal auditors due to the small participation 
of outsourced internal auditors. 
6.2 Contributions of the study 
The results of this study make several contributions to the body of knowledge. 
Firstly, a considerable amount of previous research has mainly focused on 
organisational-level and situational-level factors with regard to whistle-blowing 
intention. There is limited research that investigates individual-level factors in 
whistle-blowing literature. By investigating the seven individual-level factors the 
findings from this study provide evidence of the influence of individual-level factors 
on whistle-blowing intention. This study provide evidence that whistle-blowing 
intention is not solely influenced by externally-based factors, for instance, the 
amount of rewards provided (Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008) or the level of personal costs 
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involved for reporting (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001) 
which have gained wide attention in previous research. Factors that are relatively 
closer to individuals or named as individual-level factors also play roles in 
influencing whistle-blowing intention. This is evident from the results of this study 
which found that individual-level factors such as: (1) social norm – the approval 
from significant others to blow the whistle; (2) perceived behavioural control – the 
controllability of individuals to blow the whistle; (3) self-efficacy – the ability of 
individuals to blow the whistle under a series of obstacles; (4) attitudes; (5) 
organizational-professional conflict; and (6) awareness of whistle-blowing protection 
legislation are the factors that may significantly influence whistle-blowing intention. 
Therefore, this study recommends that, in future, whistle-blowing researchers should 
also give attention on individual-level factors in line with the organisational-level 
factors and situational-level factors in their research work. Consideration of the 
individual-level factors along with organizational-level and situational-level factors 
provides a better and extensive view of factors that may influence whistle-blowing 
intention. Investigating all the three level factors is also essential in developing 
whistle-blowing theory. In addition, results of this study show that extended TPB is 
compatible with whistle-blowing study. Apart from studying direct relationship 
between independent and dependent variables, it is also important to investigate the 
effect of moderating variable(s).  
Secondly, this study provides evidence that internal auditors in the U.K. have a 
positive attitude towards whistle-blowing practice. Despite the secrecy culture and 
limitations to the freedom of speech that generally describe U.K culture, the practices 
do not prohibit internal auditors from having a positive perception towards whistle-
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blowing and in turn mould a positive attitude towards whistle-blowing. This finding 
also contrast with the assertion by Appelbaum (2006) that whistle-blowing is not 
favoured by the British. The positive attitude towards whistle-blowing might explain 
the results of high intention among internal auditors in the U.K. to blow the whistle. 
Thirdly, this study shows that the extended TPB model can be employed for 
investigating whistle-blowing intention. In previous whistle-blowing research, the 
original TPB model has been widely used, for instance by Park and Blenkinsopp 
(2009) and Randall and Gibson (1991). The inclusion of self-efficacy to the research 
conceptual framework found it to be one of the significant factors influencing 
whistle-blowing intention. In addition, the inclusion of moral intensity as a 
moderator in the research model provides important information on the moderating 
effect of moral intensity to the relationship that exists between both the injunctive 
and descriptive norm and whistle-blowing intention. The extended TPB thus gives a 
broader picture of the factors that might influence whistle-blowing intentions.  
6.3 Recommendations 
In addition to the contributions listed in the previous section, the findings of this 
study also provide valuable recommendations to a wide range of groups.  
First and foremost, this study recommends some ideas to government, media, 
organisations and other responsible parties on what they could do in their attempts to 
encourage whistle-blowing practice in organisations. In other words, the results 
provide organisations with information on aspects that should be emphasised in an 
effort to cultivate a whistle-blowing spirit among their employees. Results of this 
study show that injunctive norms, perceived behavioural control, self-efficacy and 
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attitude are significant factors that influence whistle-blowing intention. With regard 
to the injunctive norms and attitude towards whistle-blowing, government, media, 
and other responsible parties should start to take progressive and consistent actions in 
promoting whistle-blowing. This is vital in disseminating the positive value of 
whistle-blowing and ensuring a positive perception towards whistle-blowing is 
shared among society. Organisations should also put effort into convincing their 
internal auditors that an internal whistle-blowing culture is very much welcome. This 
is one of the means to infuse the spirit of whistle-blowing among internal auditors in 
particular (and to all other staff in general). Amongst the efforts that organisations 
could take would be to frequently highlight the encouragement of whistle-blowing 
practice in meetings with internal auditors. In addition, news on whistle-blowing 
practice could be published in weekly newsletters and/or monthly bulletins. In this 
way, organisations would help internal auditors to have a sense of confidence that the 
whistle-blowing culture is strictly and seriously cultivated in their workplace and 
convey a message that their colleagues and management teams support the action of 
employees to raise their concerns. 
With regard to perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy, findings from this 
study indicate what organisations could do to help increase the confidence for their 
employees to blow the whistle. In the U.K. there is no requirement for organisations 
to institutionalise whistle-blowing polices (Hassink et al., 2007). Nevertheless, as 
reported by Seifert et al. (2010), whistle-blowing policies and mechanisms that 
incorporate higher levels of procedural justice, distributive justice and interactional 
justice are one of the points that may increase confidence among staff to blow the 
whistle. Similarly to the point reported by Public Concern at Work (2013a), effective 
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whistle-blowing policies are very important in encouraging staff to blow the whistle. 
The results of this study provide additional evidence that putting in place effective 
whistle-blowing policies and mechanisms is very important and beneficial to the 
whistle-blowing practice. By putting in place effective whistle-blowing policies and 
procedures, internal auditors will have an increased awareness of what they should 
and could do with regard to raising their concerns. Cultivating the whistle-blowing 
practice culture and simultaneously providing effective whistle-blowing policies and 
mechanisms helps to increase an internal auditor’s perceived controllability and 
ability to blow the whistle. In addition, not only the policies and mechanisms should 
provide ways and channels for blowing the whistle, the policies should also 
guarantee appropriate response to the reports. This can be performed via 
investigating the reports fully and fairly and providing feedback to the whistle-
blowers (if it is non-anonymous reporting).  
Secondly, this study recommends Public Concern at Work to increasingly promote 
its work. From the findings, it was found that there is low awareness among internal 
auditors (in this study) on the existence of Public Concern at Work - a charity that 
provides advices on whistle-blowing to potential whistle-blowers. More intensive 
efforts should be made by the charity to ensure its existence is widely known by 
potential whistle-blowers. For example, Public Concern at Work could take a more 
rigorous step in promoting their organisation and its services in the media. They 
could also visit organisations in an effort to develop collaboration opportunities 
which also help promote the charity. Their work might also be promoted by public 
bodies. 
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6.4 Limitations of the study 
Despite the above mentioned contributions of the study, a number of limitations need 
to be noted. These limitations in some ways represent opportunities for future 
research. The following are the main limitations of this present study: 
1. The use of convenience sampling method 
The use of convenience sampling method means only internal auditors that 
were easy to access were included in the sampling frame. In other words, the 
convenience sampling method exposes this study to various sources of bias. 
For instance, the sample might over/under represent one particular group. 
Therefore the convenience sampling exposes this research to a limitation in 
generalising the results of the populations. Nevertheless, the sample in this 
study is not a bad sample as it obtained a varied set of participants.    
2. The existence of social desirability bias 
As mentioned previously, the use of self-reported survey might provide this 
study with a dataset that contains social desirability bias. Although the 
researcher has taken several appropriate measures to address this bias 
problem, there will always be a possibility that participants give undetected 
social desirability bias responses. When biases exist, results of the study need 
to be interpreted with caution. This is because the results may differ from the 
actual situations. In this study, no social desirability response bias was found 
in the attitude and awareness variables. The analysis, however, found 
evidence that social desirability response bias existed in the injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm, perceived behavioural control, self-efficacy, intention and 
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moral intensity variables. Injunctive norm recorded the highest number of 
social desirability bias (four occasions) followed by organizational-
professional conflict (three occasions), descriptive norm, self-efficacy and 
intention (two occasions for each variable) and perceived behavioural control 
and moral intensity (one occasion for each variable). It is recommended, 
therefore, that future studies include suitable measures in their research 
instrument.     
3. Whistle-blowing intention and not actual whistle-blowing behaviour 
As mentioned earlier, whistle-blowing is a very sensitive issue. Individuals 
might feel uncomfortable if they are asked about their actual whistle-blowing 
behaviour. Therefore, instead of studying actual whistle-blowing behaviour, 
whistle-blowing intention was investigated in this study. The findings from 
the research might not accurately illustrate the actual whistle-blowing 
behaviour among internal auditors in the U.K. However, according to Ajzen 
and Madden (1986), intention is the immediate antecedent of any behaviour. 
4. The use of hypothetical scenarios 
The use of scenarios is said to be most widely used in ethics research 
(O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), and is suitable for studies that investigate 
sensitive topics (Alexander & Becker, 1978). However, it brings some 
limitations to the research (Hughes, 1998). Scenario is a narrative of a 
selected given situation. However, the narrative might not mirror a real life 
situation and respondents might respond differently in a real life situation 
(Hughes, 1998). Although scenarios are only a snapshot of a selected 
285 
 
situation, no research tool is able to entirely capture real life events (Hughes, 
1998). Further, the use of vignettes encourages “satisficing” (Stolte, 1994, p. 
727). Satisficing is “a tendency for subjects to process vignette information 
less carefully and effectively than they would under ideal or real conditions” 
(Stolte, 1994, p. 727). In other words, there is some doubt that responses in 
scenarios are similar to responses to real life situations. Nevertheless, the use 
of hypothetical scenarios in ethics-based research have been supported in 
literature (see Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 
2005), and the researcher took care to devise a set of scenarios that were 
realistic and people would take seriously.   
5. Low reliability value of attitude and organisational-professional conflict 
In this study, the reliability or internal consistency of the items to measure 
attitudes towards whistle-blowing and organisational-professional conflict 
were very low. The items may not accurately measure the variables. 
However, the items were adapted from previous studies and have acceptable 
reliability value. Future studies should revise the items or add more items. 
Statistical analysis by Ayers and Kaplan (2005) found that “alpha is very 
much a function of the number of items in a scale” (p.101)(p. 102).  
6.5 Suggestions for future research 
This study is the first research that empirically investigates whistle-blowing intention 
among internal auditors in the U.K. However, the research focused only on 
individual-level factors. Many other variables from the individual-level, such as 
cognitive moral development (Rest, 1986), as well as variables from organisational-
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level, such as whistle-blowing policy (Barnett, 1992), and situational, such as 
perceived support (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998), as discussed in the literature, could be 
considered in future research.  
Future research could also plan for a more extensive sampling of internal auditors in 
public sectors and private sectors, as well as internal auditors in in-house positions 
and outsourced positions. As mentioned in the contribution section, outsourcing the 
internal auditing function has been practised in both the public and private sectors in 
the U.K. Investigating the dilemma faced by internal auditors in the public and 
private sector, as well as those in in-house positions and outsourced positions, might 
give some interesting results. Future research also should consider other countries 
beyond U.S.A. and U.K. and whether there are significant cultural effects. In 
addition, complementary research methods, such as interviews – though these might 
encounter challenges and candour – should also be considered. This is essential in 
complement the limitations of questionnaire survey.   
6.6 Conclusion of the study 
 Findings from this study provide valuable information that internal auditors in the 
U.K. have positive perceptions on the whistle-blowing practice. Six individual-level 
factors have been identified that significantly influence their intention to blow the 
whistle. This study suggests additional variables should be tested in future research. 
Despite investigating the direct influence of the factors on the whistle-blowing 
intention, this study also suggests future research to test the moderating effects of 
moral intensity. 
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Appendix A: Q-Q plot graphs for Scenario 1 
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Appendix B: P-P plot and scatterplot for Scenario 2 and Scenario 3  
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Appendix C: Means, standard deviations and correlations among control, independent and dependent variables (Scenario 2) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Controls                
1 Age 3.03 .86 1.00             
2 Gender 1.79 .56 .11 1.00            
3 Exp. 2.05 .76 .54*** -.08 1.00           
4 Client  1.51 .50 -.30*** -.06 -.37*** 1.00          
5 Position 1.46 .98 -.08 -.03 .17** -.33*** 1.00         
Dependent 
               
6 Intention 4.57 .59 .07 .12* -.05 -.09 -.13* 1.00        
Independents 
               
7 Attitude 3.37 .63 .16 .14* .19** .08 -.07 .47*** 1.00       
8 IN 4.00 .63 .09 .10 .02 .03 .09 .44*** .49*** 1.00      
9 DN 3.65 .71 .03 .14* .01 -.02 .17** .37*** .43*** .68*** 1.00     
10 PBC 4.49 .55 -.01 -.02 -.05 .04 .06 .47*** .19** .11 .19** 1.00    
11 SE 4.32 .70 .15 .02 .12 .04 -.07 .54*** .39*** .24*** .25*** .36*** 1.00   
12 OPC 1.67 .60 -.19 -.16** .11 -.14* .16** -.01 .03 .07 -.10 -.06 -.21** 1.00  
13 AW 3.30 .76 -.04 .16** -.25*** .17** .00 .03 -.07 -.14* .05 -.10 .01 -.08 1.00 
Exp. = experience, IN = injunctive norm, DN = descriptive norm, PBC = perceived behavioural control, SE = self-efficacy, OPC = organizational-professional 
conflict, AW = awareness  
*p<.1, **p<.05,***p<.01 
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Appendix D: Means, standard deviations and correlations among control, independent and dependent variables (Scenario 3) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Controls                
1 Age 3.03 .86 1.00             
2 Gender 1.79 .56 .11 1.00            
3 Exp. 2.05 .76 .54*** -.08 1.00           
4 Client  1.51 .50 -
.30*** 
-.06 -.37*** 1.00          
5 Position 1.46 .98 -.08 -.03 .17** -.33*** 1.00         
Dependent 
               
6 Intention 4.59 .63 .19** -.01 .06 -.09 .04 1.00        
Independents 
               
7 Attitude 3.52 .62 .24*** .19** .21** -.13** .10 .52*** 1.00       
8 IN 4.30 .73 .29*** .10 .15* -.16** .08 .57*** .63*** 1.00      
9 DN 4.06 .78 .16** .10 .07 -.25*** .17** .53*** .59*** .81 1.00     
10 PBC 4.53 .62 .12 .03 -.01 .04 -.03 .52*** .32*** .32*** .35*** 1.00    
11 SE 4.42 .67 .16** -.02 .14* -.06 .03 .50*** .45*** .37*** .42*** .53*** 1.00   
12 OPC 1.67 .60 -.19** -.16** .11 -.14* .16** .00 .-.01 -.14* -.16** -.06 -.14* 1.00  
13 AW 3.30 .76 -.04 .16** -.25*** .17** .00 -.00 -.09 -.16** -.06 .01 -.00 -.08 1.00 
Exp. = experience, IN = injunctive norm, DN = descriptive norm, PBC = perceived behavioural control, SE = self-efficacy, OPC = organizational-professional  
conflict, AW = awareness *p<.1, **p<.05,***p<.01 
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Appendix E: Multiple regression results for tolerance (VIF) and Durbin-Watson 
values among the independent variables 
Scenario Tolerance 
(range) 
VIF (range) Durbin-Watson 
Scenario 1 .580 - .972 1.029 – 1.724 1.773 
Scenario 2 .461 - .922 1.085 – 2.169 1.561 
Scenario 3 .294 - .950 1.052 – 3.398 1.842 
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Appendix F: P-P plot for moderated multiple regression  
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Appendix G: Questionnaire 
 
A Survey on Intention towards Whistle-Blowing Among Internal Auditors in 
the United Kingdom 
Dear Participant, 
I am a PhD student from FEGReG, at the University of Huddersfield, conducting 
research, supervised by Professor Chris Cowton. The aim of this study is to 
investigate the factors that influence internal auditors’ intention to whistle-blow. 
Whistle-blowing here refers to reporting to appropriate parties either internally or 
externally, any illegal and/or unethical behaviour that internal auditors encounter 
during their audit works. 
You are selected to participate in this survey due to your invaluable knowledge and 
experience. Please read the instructions for each section carefully and answer all 
questions. There are no right or wrong answers as I am only interested with your 
opinion. Choose a response that gives the best indication of how you would typically 
think, feel and experience. You will require about 15 to 20 minutes completing the 
questionnaire. This survey is completely anonymous. Your individual responses and 
other information derived from this survey will be kept confidential and only used 
for the research purposes. If you would like to receive a summary of the results, 
please email me. 
For every response received, the University will donate £2 to a charity of your 
choice (please circle one): (1) Amnesty International (2) Macmillan Cancer Support 
(3) National Trust (4) Save the Children. You will be able to check the overall 
donation to each of the charity body on the FEGReG websites.  
http://www.hud.ac.uk/research/researchcentres/fegreg// 
I am very grateful for your participation in this important study as the higher the 
response rate will contribute to its success. If you have any further questions, please 
contact: 
Zakiyah Sharif      Professor Chris Cowton 
PhD Student      Dean of the Business School 
FEGReG,      University of Huddersfield 
University of Huddersfield Business School  Queensgate, Huddersfield 
Queensgate, Huddersfield    HD1 3DH, U.K. 
HD1 3DH, U.K.  
Email: U1074921@hud.ac.uk    Email: c.j.cowton@hud.ac.uk 
Yours sincerely, 
Zakiyah Sharif 
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Please answer ALL questions 
 
Section A 
          
This section relates to demographic information and your organisation. Please tick (√) the appropriate 
box. All answers will remain strictly confidential and anonymous. 
 
A1: Age          
            
  30 years old or below        31 - 35 years old 
            
  36 - 40 years old     41 - 45 years old 
            
  46 - 50 years old      51 - 55 years old 
            
  56-60 years old      61 years old and above  
       
A2: Gender         
            
  Female       Male   
  
A3: Highest Academic Qualification (Please tick one) 
     
  O-level/GCSE (or equivalent)   A-levels (or equivalent) 
     
 Bachelor's Degree in ____________  Master's Degree in ______________  
 
 PhD in ____________________________  Other, please specify ____________
    
  
A4: Professional Qualifications (You may tick more than one)    
  
Professional Qualifications Still a member? 
(You may tick more than one) Yes No 
  
    
  
 
  
  
  
    IIA (Institute of Internal Auditors - UK and Ireland)       
 
    
  
    
  
 
  
  
  
    ICAEW (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales)       
 
    
  
    
  
 
  
  
  
    ICAS (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland)       
 
    
  
    
  
 
  
  
  
    ICAI (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland)       
 
    
  
    
  
 
  
  
  
    CIPFA (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy)       
 
    
  
    
  
 
  
  
  
    ACCA (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants)       
 
    
                                                                                                                                                
A Survey on Internal Auditors’ Whistle-blowing Intentions 
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    CIMA (Chartered Institute of Management Accountants)       
 
    
  
    
  
 
  
  
  
    AAT (Association of Accounting Technicians)       
 
    
  
    
  
 
  
  
  
    Other (Please specify)______________________________       
 
    
                      
  
A5: Work Experience (Audit in General)         
            
  Less than 5 years  5 - 9 years    10 - 14 years   
                                                                                                                                                                
 15 – 19 years   20-24 years     25 years or more  
 
A6: Work Experience (Internal audit)          
            
  Less than 5 years  5 - 9 years    10 - 14 years   
    
 15 - 19 years   20-24 years     25 years or more  
 
A7: Type of Organization(s) you internally audit (You may tick more than one)   
    
   Public Sector        
            
   Private For-Profit Sector        
            
   Private Not-For-Profit Sector 
 
A8: Current Employment Position as an Internal Auditor (You may tick more than one) 
       
 
   In-house (i.e. employed wholly by the organization you audit).   
      
            
   Outsourced (i.e.: employed by an external organization(s) that is contracted to  
   provide all aspects of the full internal audit services to the organization(s) that you 
  audit).  
    
  Consortium (i.e. formed by a group of independent organizations (or several  
  internal audit departments) that join forces to provide internal audit services to  
  the organization(s) that you audit). 
  Other (Please specify) _______________________________________________
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Section B 
Instructions: In this section, the level of organizational-professional conflict faced by internal auditor 
will be measured.  Please CIRCLE the number corresponding to your level of agreement with each 
statement.  
 
Part B(i): Compulsory to be answered by all kinds of current employment positions: 
(Inhouse/outsource/consortium/others) 
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1 My current employment situation gives me the opportunity to 
express myself fully as a professional. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 
Being an internal auditor in the organization(s) I audit has 
significantly put me under pressure to perform my work in ways 
that could directly and/or indirectly breach compliance with 
professional standards. 
1 2 3 4 5 
   
Part B(ii): If you are in-house internal auditors, please answer these questions: 
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1 
In the organization(s) I audit, I have conflict(s) between applying 
the work standards and procedures outlined by the company 
that I work for and pursuing with my professional judgments. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
There is/are situation(s) where my professional judgments are 
overridden by the demands of the organization that I work 
for. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Part B(iii): If you are outsource/consortium/others, please answer these questions: 
 
Instructions: In this section, the level of awareness of whistle-blowing legislation in the UK will be 
measured.  Please TICK one box for each of the questions.  
 
 I am aware of the existence of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA 1998) as the whistle-
blowing law in the UK.                                                  Yes           No 
 
I am aware of the existence of Public Concern at Work (PCaW) as a charity body in the UK that offers 
free legal advice for potential whistle-blower.                Yes   No 
 
For the following questions, please CIRCLE the number corresponding to your level of agreement 
with each statement. 
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1 
In the organization(s) I audit, I have conflict(s) between applying 
the work standards and procedures outlined by the client 
company(ies) and pursuing with my professional judgments. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 There is/are situation(s) where my professional judgments are 
overridden by the demands of the client organization(s). 1 2 3 4 5 
Section C 
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1 Whistle-blowing legislation in the UK helps deter unethical behaviour(s). 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Whistle-blowing legislation in the UK helps deter illegal behaviour(s). 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Whistle-blowing legislation in the UK provides effective protection to whistle-blowers. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Instructions: Please read the following scenarios and answer ALL following questions. The study is 
about perception. There is no right or wrong answers. Please CIRCLE the number you feel best 
reflects your opinion.  
Scenario 1:         
You are Mike and you are an internal auditor for a firm that carries out contract work for a 
government department. You recently completed an audit of a subsidiary business unit (ABC plant) 
which is contracting in large values for various agencies. The invoicing of the subsidiary has been 
audited previously and no major problems were detected. During the present audit, you discovered, 
within the subsidiary's billing system, a series of bogus (inflated or falsified) invoices to customers 
that have already been paid. You reported this finding to the director of internal audit. The director 
said that he would report it to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). After a few days, you asked the 
director what has become of you findings but the director told you to forget about it. Doubts about the 
director's action in reporting the falsified invoices to the CFO have driven you to report in person to 
the CFO. When the director knows about the action you propose to take, he tells you that if you 
disclose the findings, you will lose your job. 
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1 
  
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the director of internal audit’s 
action would be very small. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Most people would agree that the director of internal audit’s action is 
wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The director of internal audit's action would not cause any harm in the immediate future. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 There is very little likelihood that the director of internal audit’s actions 
would actually cause any harm. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 
If the director of internal audit is a personal friend of the CFO, the action 
is wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
The director of internal audit's action would harm very few people (if 
any). 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Blowing the whistle on the director of internal audit's action would be a good idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Blowing the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action would be a 
wise idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Blowing the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action would be a pleasant experience. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 I like the idea of blowing the whistle on the director of internal audit’s 
action. 1 2 3 4 5 
Section D 
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11 Most people in my family would want me to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Most people in my family would approve if I blew the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Most of my friends would want me to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Most of my friends would approve if I blew the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Most of my work colleagues would want me to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
16  Most of my work colleagues would approve if I blew the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action.  1 2 3 4 5 
17 Most of my family members would blow the whistle on the director of internal audit. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 
Most of my friends would blow the whistle on the director of internal 
audit. 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Most of my co-workers would blow the whistle on the director of internal 
audit. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
20  Most people I know would blow the whistle on the director of internal 
audit. 1 2 3 4 5 
21 To blow the whistle on the director of internal audit would be entirely up to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
22 To blow the whistle on the director of internal audit would be entirely 
within my control. 1 2 3 4 5 
23 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit.  1 2 3 4 5 
24 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit even if my friends urged against it. 1 2 3 4 5 
25 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit even if I am in a situation that rejects the practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
26 
I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the director of 
internal audit even if the management teams in the government 
department discourage the practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
27 I intend to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s behaviour.  1 2 3 4 5 
28 I would not blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
29 If I had the opportunity, I would blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
30 To the extent possible, I would try to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Scenario 2:       
You are Doris and you have been appointed as an internal auditor at Ferris Ltd. The company has 
expanded rapidly over the last three years, growing its sales in Eastern Europe by in excess of 50% 
per annum. The draft financial statements for the current period show that Turnover was £5.8 million 
and Profit after Tax was £0.57 million. While auditing the stock purchases you discovered that the 
Production Manager insists on paying one of the suppliers in cash only. When you asked the 
Production Manager about this situation, he explained that he was able to negotiate discounts by 
paying for the goods in cash. However, upon further investigation you discovered that the Production 
Manager was in fact overstating purchases from this supplier and took the money for himself. The 
328 
 
scheme has gone unnoticed because of weak internal controls and the close relationship between the 
Production Manager and Mr. Ferris, the Managing Director. You estimated the amount of the cash 
misappropriated in the current period to be £52,000 and the amount was material. You reported the 
issue to the director of internal audit who assures you that the matter will be dealt with and thanks you 
for your diligent work. However, during the final audit (six months later) you discover that the 
scheme is still in operation because the director of internal audit chose to do nothing about it. 
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1 
  
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the director of internal audit's 
action would be very small. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Most people would agree that the director of internal audit’s action is 
wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The director of internal audit’s action will not cause any harm in the immediate future. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 There is very small likelihood that the director of internal audit’s actions 
will actually cause any harm. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 
If the director of internal audit is a personal friend of the Managing 
Director, the action is wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 The director of internal audit’s action will harm very few people (if any). 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Blowing the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action would be a good idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Blowing the whistle on the director of internal audit’s would be a wise idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Blowing the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action would be a pleasant experience. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 
 
I like the idea of blowing the whistle on the director of internal audit’s 
action. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Most people in my family would want me to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Most people in my family would approve if I blew the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Most of my friends would want me to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Most of my friends would approve if I blew the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Most of my work colleagues would want me to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
16  Most of my work colleagues would approve if I blew the whistle on the director of internal audit’s action.  1 2 3 4 5 
17 Most of my family members would blow the whistle on the director of internal audit. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Most of my friends would blow the whistle on the director of internal 1 2 3 4 5 
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audit. 
19 Most of my co-workers would blow the whistle on the director of internal 
audit. 1 2 3 4 5 
20  Most of people I know would blow the whistle on the director of internal 
audit. 1 2 3 4 5 
21 To blow the whistle on the director of internal audit was entirely up to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
22 To blow the whistle on the director of internal audit was entirely within 
my control. 1 2 3 4 5 
23 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
24 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit even if my friends urged against it.  1 2 3 4 5 
25 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit even if I am in a situation that rejects the practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
26 
I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the director of 
internal audit even if the management teams in Ferris Ltd. discourage the 
practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
27 I intend to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
28 I would not blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
29 If I had the opportunity, I would blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s behaviour. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
30 To the extent possible, I would try to blow the whistle on the director of internal audit’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
    
Scenario 3:         
          
 You are David, an internal auditor at Medical Waste Ltd., a specialist firm responsible for safely 
disposing of used surgical equipment. During the course of your audit work, you discovered 
documents revealing that, for the past two years, used surgical equipment received from clients had 
not been disposed of in a way that follows regulations. This included dumping used syringes in an 
open space near a residential area. This is a very serious matter because it is illegal and the firm can be 
sued if found guilty. You were very concerned about the good reputation of the firm and public safety. 
You had a meeting with Mark who is the member of staff responsible for this process and informed 
him that the company must comply with Health and Safety Legislation and as such must alter the 
current procedure used to dispose of used surgical equipment with immediate effect. Two months later 
you noticed that Mark had not altered the procedure. You bring your concerns to the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and still no action has been taken by the CEO. 
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1 
  
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the CEO's action would be 
very small. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Most people would agree that the CEO’s action is wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The CEO's action would not cause any harm in the immediate future. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 There is very little likelihood that the CEO's actions would actually cause 
any harm. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 
If the CEO has friends in the nearby neighbourhood in which the dumping 
takes place, the action is wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 The CEO's actions would harm very few people (if any). 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Blowing the whistle on the CEO’s action would be a good idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Blowing the whistle on the CEO’s action would be a wise idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Blowing the whistle on the CEO’s action would be a pleasant experience. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10 
 
I like the idea of blowing the whistle on the CEO’s action. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 Most people in my family would want me to blow the whistle on the CEO’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Most people in my family would approve if I blew the whistle on the CEO’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Most of my friends would want me to blow the whistle on the CEO’s 
action. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Most of my friends would approve if I blew the whistle on the CEO’s 
action. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Most of my work colleagues would want me to blow the whistle on the CEO’s action. 1 2 3 4 5 
16  Most of my work colleagues would approve if I blew the whistle on the CEO’s action.  1 2 3 4 5 
17 Most of my family members would blow the whistle on the CEO’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Most of my friends would blow the whistle on CEO’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Most of my co-workers would blow the whistle on the CEO’s behaviour.  1 2 3 4 5 
20  Most of people I know would blow the whistle on the CEO’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
21 To blow the whistle on the CEO would be entirely up to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
22 To blow the whistle on the CEO would be entirely within my control. 1 2 3 4 5 
23 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the CEO.   1 2 3 4 5 
24 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the CEO even if my friends urged against it.  1 2 3 4 5 
25 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the CEO even if I am in a situation that rejects the practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
26 I am confident that I would be able to blow the whistle on the CEO even if the management teams at Medical Waste Ltd. discourage the practice. 1 2 3 4 5 
27 I intend to blow the whistle on the CEO’s behaviour.  1 2 3 4 5 
331 
 
28 I would not blow the whistle on the CEO’s behaviour.  1 2 3 4 5 
29 If I had the opportunity, I would blow the whistle on the CEO’s behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
30 To the extent possible, I would try to blow the whistle on the CEO’s behaviour.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
Thank you. 
Have you selected your charity for the donation by the University? 
Section E 
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1 My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
3 I have not always been honest with myself. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
4 I always know why I like things. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my 
opinion. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
7 I never regret my decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 I rarely appreciate criticism. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
9 I am very confident of my judgments. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
11 I sometimes tell lies if I have to. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
12 I never cover up my mistakes. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 I always obey laws, even if I am unlikely to get caught. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
15 When I hear people taking privately, I avoid listening. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
17 When I was young I sometimes stole things. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
18 I have done things that I don't tell others about. (*) 1 2 3 4 5 
19 I never take things that don't belong to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
20 I don't gossip about other people's business. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix H: Cover letter  
18 November 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
Invitation to participate in a survey on whistle-blowing 
 
Internal auditors play a crucial role in business, but their contribution is often ignored 
in debates about good governance and management.  Recognising the important 
work that internal auditors do, we would be very grateful if you would complete the 
enclosed questionnaire and return it in the pre-paid envelope. 
 
Further information is provided on the front of the questionnaire itself, but I would 
like to highlight: 
  It shouldn’t take long to complete – about 15 minutes;  We will use the results only for academic purposes and will ensure 
anonymity and confidentiality;  For each response received, we will make a donation to charity;  Please let me know separately of you would like a summary of the findings. 
 
We would be very grateful for your response by 20th December 2013.  If you have 
any questions about the research, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
Professor Christopher J Cowton  Zakiyah Sharif 
BA, MA, MScEcon, PhD, DLitt,   BAcct(Hons), MBA(Accounting) 
ACIS, FHEA, FRSA    PhD Student 
Dean          
University of Huddersfield Business School 
Tel: 01484 473063 
Fax: 01484 472753 
Email: c.j.cowton@hud.ac.uk 
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Appendix I: Cover letter (reminder) 
22nd January 2014 
Our Ref: CJC/JC/1314     
To whom it may concern, 
Before Christmas we sent out nearly 400 questionnaires, including one to yourself.  
If you have responded (we don’t know because responses are anonymous), please 
ignore this letter and accept our sincere thanks for your help.  We are delighted to 
report that we have already achieved a response rate of 20%, which is very 
encouraging for this kind of research. 
If you have not yet had an opportunity to respond, there is still time to do so.  All 
further responses will add to the research’s quality and credibility.  We enclose a 
further copy of the questionnaire in case you no longer have the original one, 
together with a prepaid envelope for its return.  We estimate that it will take 15-20 
minutes to complete. 
We know that you will be very busy, but if you could find time to return the 
questionnaire, we would be very grateful.  As mentioned previously, for every 
response received we will make a donation to charity, the responses will be kept 
confidential, and the research will be used only for academic purposes.  The cover 
of the questionnaire gives more information. 
If you have any questions about the research, please do not hesitate to contact us.  
We do hope you will be able to participate. 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Professor Christopher J. Cowton, PhD, DLitt  Zakiyah Sharif 
Dean       BAcct(Hons),     
University of Huddersfield Business School  MBA(Accounting) 
Tel: +44(0)1484 473 063  
Fax: +44(0)1484 472 753 
Email: c.j.cowton@hud.ac.uk 
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Appendix J: Details of samples 
List of local councils, FTSE100, FTSe250 and service provider companies in actual sample. 
 
List of local councils: 
 Local councils Numbers of samples 
1 Aberdeen City Council 1 
2 Aberdeenshire Council 1 
3 Argyll & Bute Council 1 
4 Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 1 
5 Birmingham City Council 1 
6 Blackpool City Council 1 
7 Bridgend County Borough Council 1 
8 Brighton & Hove City Council 1 
9 Caerphilly County Borough Council 1 
10 Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council 1 
11 Cambridge City Council 1 
12 Cannock Chase Council 1 
13 Carlisle City Council 1 
14 City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council 1 
15 City of Edinburgh Council 1 
16 City of Lincoln Council 1 
17 City of York Council 2 
18 Comhairle Nan Eilean Siar 3 
19 Conwy County Borough Council 1 
20 Coventry City Council 1 
21 Coventry & Warwickshire NHS Trust 1 
22 Denbighshire County Council 1 
23 Derby City Council 1 
24 Dumfries & Galloway Council 1 
25 Dundee City Council 1 
26 East Ayrshire Council 1 
27 East Dunbartonshire Council 1 
28 East Lothian Council 1 
29 East Renfrewshire Council 1 
30 Exeter City Council 1 
31 Falkirk Council 1 
32 Fife Council 2 
33 Flintshire County Council 1 
34 Glasgow City Council 1 
35 Gloucester City Council 1 
36 Gredigion County Council 1 
37 Greenwich Borough Council 1 
38 Gwynedd Council 1 
39 H Blaenau Gwent County Borough Council 1 
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40 Hampshire County Council 1 
41 Hull City Council 1 
42 Inverclyde Council 1 
43 Isle of Anglesey County Council 1 
44 Kirklees Council 1 
45 Lancaster City Council 1 
46 Leeds City Council 1 
47 Leicester City Council 1 
48 Liverpool City Council 1 
49 Manchester City Council 2 
50 Midlothian Council 1 
51 NHS National Services Scotland 1 
52 North Ayrshire Council 1 
53 North Lincolnshire Council 1 
54 North Yorkshire County Council 2 
55 Nottingham City Council 1 
56 Orkney Islands Council 1 
57 Perth & Kinross Council 7 
58 Peterborough City Council 1 
59 Preston City Council 1 
60 Portsmouth City Council 2 
61 Renfrewshire Council 1 
62 Salford City Council 1 
63 Sandwell Council 1 
64 Scottish Borders Council 1 
65 Sheffield City Council 1 
66 Shetland Islands Council 5 
67 Solihull Council 1 
68 Staffordshire County Council 1 
69 Staffordshire Moorlands District Council 1 
70 Stirling Council 1 
71 Sunderland City Council 1 
72 Tamworth Borough Council 1 
73 The Highland Council 1 
74 The Moray Council 1 
75 Wakefield City Council 1 
76 Warwickshire County Council 1 
77 West Dunbartonshire Council 1 
78 West Lothian Council 5 
79 Wyre Forest District Council 1 
 Total 100 
 
List of FTSE100: 
 Company Numbers of samples 
1 Aberdeen Asset Management  1 
2 Admiral Group  1 
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3 Aggreko  2 
4 AMEC 1 
5 Anglo American 1 
6 Antofagasta 1 
7 ARM Holdings 1 
8 Associated British Foods  2 
9 Astrazeneca 1 
10 Aviva 1 
11 BAE Systems 1 
12 BG Group 1 
13 BHP  1 
14 BP 2 
15 British American Tobacco 2 
16 British Land Company  1 
17 BskyB 1 
18 BT Group 1 
19 Bunzl 2 
20 Burberry Group 1 
21 Capita  1 
22 Centrica 3 
23 Compass Group 1 
24 Croda International 1 
25 Diageo 1 
26 Easy Jet 1 
27 G4S 1 
28 GKN 1 
29 GlaxoSmithKline 1 
30 Hargreaves Lansdown 1 
31 HSBC   1 
32 IMI 1 
33 Imperial Tobacco Group 1 
34 Intercontinental Hotels Group  1 
35 International Consolidated Airlines Group 2 
36 Intertek Group  1 
37 Johnson Matthey 1 
38 Kingfisher 1 
39 Land Securities Group 1 
40 Lloyds Banking Group 2 
41 London Stock Exchange 1 
42 Marks & Spencer Group 1 
43 Morrison (WM.) Supermarkets 1 
44 Meggitt  2 
45 Next 1 
46 Pearson 1 
47 Persimmon 1 
48 Petrofac 1 
49 Prudential 1 
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50 RSA Insurance Group 1 
51 Reckit Benckiser 1 
52 Reed Elsevier 1 
53 Rexam 1 
54 Rolls Royce Group 1 
55 Royal Bank of Scotland Group 1 
56 Royal Dutch Shell 1 
57 Sabmiller 1 
58 SAGE Group 1 
59 Sainsbury (J)  1 
60 Schroders 1 
61 Severn Trent 1 
62 Smith & Nephew 1 
63 Smiths Group 1 
64 SSE 1 
65 Standard Chartered  1 
66 Standard Life 2 
67 Tate & Lyle 2 
68 Tesco 1 
69 Travis Perkins 1 
70 TUI Travel 1 
71 Tullow Oil 1 
72 Unilever 1 
73 United Utilities 1 
74 Vedanta Resources 1 
75 Vodafone Group 1 
76 Weir Group 2 
77 William Hills 2 
 Total 91 
 
List of FTSE250: 
 Company Numbers of samples 
1 3I Group 1 
2 Afren 1 
3 African Barrick Gold 1 
4 Alent 1 
5 Alliance Trust 1 
6 Amlin 1 
7 Atkins (WS) 1 
8 Balfour Beatty 1 
9 Barrat Development 1 
10 Berendsen 1 
11 Berkeley Group Holding 1 
12 Betfair Group 1 
13 Booker Group 1 
14 Bovis Homes Group 1 
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15 Brewin Dolphin Holding 1 
16 Britvic 1 
17 Brown (N) Group 1 
18 BTG 1 
19 Cable & Wireless Communications 1 
20 Carpetright 1 
21 Chemring Group 1 
22 City of London Investment Trust 1 
23 Close Bros Group 1 
24 Cobham 1 
25 Colt Group 1 
26 Computacenter 1 
27 Cranswick 1 
28 CSR 1 
29 Dairy Crest Group 1 
30 Debenhams 1 
31 Devro 1 
32 Dialight 1 
33 Dignity 1 
34 Diploma 1 
35 Dixon Retail 1 
36 Direct Line Insurance Group 1 
37 Domino Printing Sciences 1 
38 Edinburgh Investment Trust 1 
39 Electrocomponents 1 
40 Enterprise Inns 1 
41 Essentra 1 
42 Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation 1 
43 Evraz 1 
44 F&C Asset Management 1 
45 Fenner PLC 1 
46 Firstgroup 1 
47 Fisher (James) & Sons  1 
48 Foreign & Colonial Investment Trust 1 
49 Galliford Try 1 
50 Grainger 1 
51 Greggs 1 
52 Hays 1 
53 Henderson Group 1 
54 Home Retail Group 1 
55 Home Serve  1 
56 Hunting 1 
57 IG 1 
58 Inchcape 1 
59 Inmarsat 1 
60 International Personal Finance 1 
61 Intu Properties  1 
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62 Investec 1 
63 Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group 1 
64 Kazakhmys 1 
65 Kcom 1 
66 Lonmin 1 
67 Michael Page International 1 
68 MITIE Group 1 
69 Millenium & Copthorne Hotels 1 
70 Moneysupermarket.Com Group 1 
71 National Express Group 1 
72 Oxford Instruments 1 
73 Pace 1 
74 Perpetual Income & Growth Investment Trust 1 
75 Premier Farnell 1 
76 Premier Oil 1 
77 Provident Financial 1 
78 PZ Cussons 1 
79 Qinetiq Group 1 
80 Rank Group 1 
81 Rathbone Bros Group 1 
82 Rentokil Initial 1 
83 RPC  1 
84 Senior  1 
85 Serco Group 1 
86 Spectris 1 
87 St. James’s Place 1 
88 St. Modwen’s Properties 1 
89 Supergroup 1 
90 TalkTalk Telecom Group 1 
91 Taylor Wimpley 1 
92 Ted Baker 1 
93 UBM 1 
94 Victrex 1 
95 Wetherspoon (JD) 1 
96 WH Smith 1 
97 Wood Group (John) 1 
 Total 97 
 
Service provider companies: 
 Company Numbers of samples 
 Audit and Assurance 7 
 Audit North West 1 
 Audit North NHS 1 
 Audit South West 7 
 CEAC 1 
 Chantrey Vellacot 3 
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 Grant Thornton 4 
 Mersey Internal Audit Agency 2 
 Moore Stephens 37 
 Reeves 4 
 Scott-Moncrieff 10 
 South Coast Audit 3 
 West Yorkshire Audit Consortium 1 
 Total 81 
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Appendix K: Hierarchical regression results 
Table A: Means, standard deviations and correlations among control, independent and dependent variables (Scenario 1) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Controls                
1 Age 3.00 .85 1.00             
2 Gender 1.81 .55 .07 1.00            
3 Exp. 2.04 .77 .57*** -.10 1.00           
4 Client  1.80 .92 -.23*** .05 -.24*** 1.00          
5 Position 1.52 .98 -.09 .01 .15** .01 1.00         
Dependent 
               
6 Intention 4.26 .57 .03 -.06 -.03 -.07 -.20* 1.00        
Independents 
               
7 Attitude 3.18 .57 .05 .00 .03 .08 -.15** .37*** 1.00       
8 IN 4.04 .69 .21*** .10 .07 -.20* -.00 .44*** .38*** 1.00      
9 DN 3.41 .78 -.04 .03 -.03 -.19* .06 .40*** .33*** .62*** 1.00     
10 PBC 3.95 .71 .05 .01 .03 -.13* -.08 .28*** .20*** .21*** .17** 1.00    
11 SE 3.99 .78 .08 -.01 .01 -.01 -.16** .51*** .44*** .40*** .39*** .27*** 1.00   
12 OPC 4.31 .59 .21*** .10 -.06 .02 -.19** .04 .03 .14* .11 .12* .27*** 1.00  
13 AW 1.99 .45 -.07 .14* -.28*** .12* -.05 .07 .12* .01 .14* .12 .10 .09 1.00 
Exp. = experience, IN = injunctive norm, DN = descriptive norm, PBC = perceived behavioural control, SE = self-efficacy, OPC = organizational-professional conflict, AW 
= awareness  
*p<.1, **p<.05,***p<.01 
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Table B: Means, standard deviations and correlations among control, independent and dependent variables (Scenario 2) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Controls                
1 Age 3.00 .85 1.00             
2 Gender 1.81 .55 .07 1.00            
3 Exp. 2.04 .77 .57*** -.10 1.00           
4 Client  1.80 .92 -.23*** .05 -.24*** 1.00          
5 Position 1.52 .98 -.09 .01 .15** .01 1.00         
Dependent 
               
6 Intention 4.53 .60 .10 .07 .01 -.13* -.20** 1.00        
Independents 
               
7 Attitude 3.36 .65 .15** .18* .12* -.01 -.13* .45*** 1.00       
8 IN 3.99 .66 .11 .09 .04 -.06 -.02 .44*** .48*** 1.00      
9 DN 3.61 .72 .02 .15** -.03 -.14* .06 .37*** .45*** .67*** 1.00     
10 PBC 4.43 .58 .03 -.04 -.04 -.26*** -.03* .57*** .19*** .14*** .25*** 1.00    
11 SE 4.29 .71 .17** -.03 .18* -.12* -.16** .43*** .42*** .31*** .29*** .34*** 1.00   
12 OPC 4.31 .59 .21*** .10 -.06 .02 -.19** .08 -.01 .09 .10 .07 .24*** 1.00  
13 AW 1.99 .45 -.07 .14* -.28*** .12* -.05 .05 .02 -.08 .10 -.10 .06 .09 1.00 
Exp. = experience, IN = injunctive norm, DN = descriptive norm, PBC = perceived behavioural control, SE = self-efficacy, OPC = organizational-professional conflict, AW 
= awareness  
*p<.1, **p<.05,***p<.01 
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Table C: Means, standard deviations and correlations among control, independent and dependent variables (Scenario 3) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Controls                
1 Age 3.03 .85 1.00             
2 Gender 1.73 .45 .11** 1.00            
3 Exp. 2.05 .77 .57*** -.09 1.00           
4 Client  1.66 .64 -.33*** .14* -.38** 1.00          
5 Position 1.47 .88 -.05 .02 .16** -.12 1.00         
Dependent 
               
6 Intention 4.58 .60 .20 .06 .07 -.11 -.06 1.00        
Independents 
               
7 Attitude 3.54 .59 .23*** .28*** .16** .04 .06 .43*** 1.00       
8 IN 4.29 .68 .31*** .14* .13* -.07 .04 .47*** .60*** 1.00      
9 DN 4.02 .73 .16** .08 .05 -.20** .13* .48*** .53*** .76*** 1.00     
10 PBC 4.50 .65 .12 -.00 -.04 -.11 -.14* .50*** .29*** .34*** .41*** 1.00    
11 SE 4.41 .68 .19** -.01 .13* -.12* -.06 .51*** .42*** .38*** .43*** .52*** 1.00   
12 OPC 4.34 .58 .16** .19** -.13* .05 -.22** .05 .01 .18** .19** .11 .13* 1.00  
13 AW 1.99 .45 -.09 .14* -.30*** .16** .04 .05 -.04 -.11 .00 -.02 .04 .08 1.00 
Exp. = experience, IN = injunctive norm, DN = descriptive norm, PBC = perceived behavioural control, SE = self-efficacy, OPC = organizational-professional conflict, AW 
= awareness  
*p<.1, **p<.05,***p<.01 
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Table D: Statistical results using Standard Multiple Regression versus Hierarchical Regression Analysis
Part A: Results for exploring relationship between independent variables and dependent variable 
Dependent variable: Intention to whistle-blow 
Model and 
Scenario 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Standard Multiple 
Regression 
Hierarchical 
Regression 
Standard Multiple 
Regression 
Hierarchical 
Regression 
Standard Multiple 
Regression 
Hierarchical 
Regression 
Model 1 Injunctive norm* 
Perceived 
   behavioural 
   control* 
Self-efficacy*** 
Employment 
  position** 
Attitude** 
Injunctive norm*** 
Perceived behavioural 
  conflict*** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Awareness* 
Employment 
  position** 
Injunctive norm*** 
Perceived 
  behavioural 
  conflict*** 
Self-efficacy** 
Age* 
Model 2 Injunctive norm* 
Perceived 
  behavioural 
  control* 
Self-efficacy*** 
Organizational- 
  professional 
  conflict * 
Injunctive norm** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Employment 
  position* 
Injunctive norm*** 
Perceived behavioural 
  conflict*** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Organizational- 
  professional conflict* 
Employment 
  position** 
Injunctive norm*** 
Perceived 
  behavioural 
  conflict*** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Employment 
  position* 
Injunctive norm*** 
Perceived 
  behavioural 
  conflict*** 
Self-efficacy** 
 
Perceived 
  behavioural 
   conflict** 
Self-efficacy** 
 
Standard Multiple Regression: 
- Model 1: all independent variables were analysed. 
- Model 2: all independent variables and demographic variables (control variables) were analysed. 
Hierarchical multiple Regression: 
- Model 1: Demographic variables (control variables) were analysed as the first block of variables. 
- Model 2: Demographic variables (control variables) and independent variables (the second block of variables) were analysed. 
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Part B: Results for exploring moderating effect of moral intensity on the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable 
Dependent variable: Intention to whistle-blow 
Model and 
Scenario 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Standard Multiple 
Regression 
Hierarchical 
Regression 
Standard Multiple 
Regression 
Hierarchical 
Regression 
Standard Multiple 
Regression 
Hierarchical 
Regression 
Model 1 Injunctive norm** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Employment  
  position* 
- Injunctive norm*** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control*** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Employment  
  position* 
Employment   
  position** 
Attitude* 
Injunctive norm*** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control** 
Self-efficacy** 
 
Age* 
Model 2 Injunctive norm** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Employment  
  position* 
Injunctive norm* 
Self-efficacy*** 
Injunctive norm** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control*** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Employment  
  position* 
Employment   
  position** 
Injunctive norm** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control*** 
Self-efficacy*** 
Injunctive norm*** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control** 
Self-efficacy** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control** 
Self-efficacy** 
 
Model 3 Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control** 
Self-efficacy*** 
 
Self-efficacy*** Injunctive norm** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control*** 
Self-efficacy*** 
 
Injunctive norm** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control*** 
Self-efficacy*** 
 
Attitude* 
Injunctive norm** 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control*** 
Self-efficacy** 
Injunctive norm X 
  Moral intensity*** 
Descriptive norm X 
  Moral intensity * 
Perceived   
  behavioural   
  control*** 
Self-efficacy** 
Injunctive norm X 
  Moral intensity* 
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Only variables that have significant influence are listed in the table. 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
 
Standard Multiple Regression: 
Model 1: Independent variables and demographic variables were analysed. 
Model 2: Independent variables, demographic variables and moderating variable were analysed. 
Model 3: independent variables, demographic variables, moderating variable and interaction between independent variables and moderating variable were analysed: 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression: 
Model 1:  Demographic variables (first block of variables) were analysed. 
Model 2:  Demographic variables (first block), independent variables and moderating variable (second block) were analysed. 
Model 3:  Demographic variables (first block), independent variables and moderating variable (second block) and interaction between  independent   
                 variables and moderating variable (third block) were analysed. 
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Table E: Hierarchical regression results for whistle-blowing intentions 
Model & 
Variables 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
B SE β B SE β B SE β 
M
od
el
 
O
ne
 
Cons. 18.51 1.18 
 
18.45 1.25  17.33 1.52  
Age .06 .30 .02 .20 .32 .07 .58 .34 .21 
* 
Gender -.24 .38 -.06 .29 .40 .07 .26 .52 .05 
Work 
experience 
-.12 .33 -.04 -.09 .35 -.03 -.22 .38 -.07 
Client 
categories 
-.18 .23 -.07 -.32 .24 -.12 -.33 .39 -.09 
Employment 
position 
-.44 .21 -.19 
** 
-.46 .22 -.19 
** 
-.14 .27 -.05 
R2  .05 .07 .05 
F-value 1.22 1.69 1.22 
M
od
el
 
Tw
o
 
Cons. 10.24 2.02  4.19 2.30  6.05 2.44  
Age -.10 .26 -.00 .01 .25 .01 .15 .29 .05 
Gender -.30 .31 -.07 .25 .31 .06 .06 .45 .01 
Work 
experience 
-.12 .29 -.04 -.07 .29 -.02 -.06 .33 -.02 
Client 
categories 
.01 .20 .00 -.06 .19 -.02 -.15 .34 -.04 
Employment 
position 
-.35 .18 -.15 
* 
-.30 .18 -.12 
* 
-.17 .23 -.06 
ATT .05 .09 .05 .11 .08 .11 .11 .11 .11 
IN .12 .06 .22 
** 
.16 .06 .27 
*** 
.10 .08 .17 
DN .09 .07 .12 -.03 .08 -.03 .09 .11 .11 
PBC .19 .12 
.12 .54 .16 .26 
*** 
.45 .17 .25 
** 
SE .24 .07 .33 
*** 
.30 .07 .35 
*** 
.20 .09 .23 
** 
OPC -.13 .08 -.13 -.08 .08 -.08 -.09 .09 -.09 
AW .10 .08 .01 .07 .08 .06 .08 .09 .08 
R2  .40 .50 .43 
∆ R2 .35 .43 .38 
F-value 6.35 9.44 6.46 
∆ F 9.59 14.07 9.70 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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Table F: Moderated hierarchical regression analysis results of the main effects and 
moderating effects of internal auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions (Scenario 1) 
Scenario 1 
Dependent variable:  Intention to blow the whistle 
Control variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B p B p B p 
Age .21 .52 -.01 .99 .07 .84 
Gender -.41 .41 -.27 .52 -.03 .95 
Working experience -.01 .97 -.09 .79 -.14 .69 
Client categories .29 .44 .18 .59 .25 .46 
Employment position -.41 .11 -.34 .12 -.29 .20 
Independent variables:       
Attitude    .01 .96 .00 .98 
Injunctive norm   .10 .10* .09 .16 
Descriptive norm   .13 .13 .14 .12 
Perceived behavioural control    .06 .68 .12 .41 
Self-efficacy   .27 .00*** .22 .00*** 
Organisational-professional conflict   -.12 .33 -.14 .29 
Awareness   -.05 .59 -.07 .46 
Moderator:       
Moral intensity (MI)   -.01 .90 .02 .81 
Cross-product term:       
Attitudes x MI      .00 .98 
Injunctive norm x MI     -.04 .16 
Descriptive norm x MI     -.00 .93 
Perceived behavioural control x MI     .04 .39 
Self-efficacy x MI     -.02 .61 
Organisational-professional  
conflict x MI 
    .04 .34 
Awareness x MI     .02 .54 
Constant 17.33 17.96 17.36 
R2  .04 .39 .42 
∆ R2 .04 .35 .03 
F-value .95 5.01 3.41 
∆ F .95 7.27 .67 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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Table G: Moderated hierarchical regression analysis results of the main effects and 
moderating effects of internal auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions (Scenario 2) 
Scenario 2 
Dependent variable:  Intention to blow the whistle 
Control variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B p B p B p 
Age .39 .26 -.04 .89 .04 .89 
Gender .12 .82 -.09 .83 -.07 .87 
Working experience -.10 .80 -.04 .90 -.10 .78 
Client categories -.06 .89 -.05 .87 -.03 .94 
Employment position -.60 .03** -.42 .05** -.40 .07 
Independent variables:       
Attitude    .12 .23 .14 .16 
Injunctive norm   .17 .01** .14 .03** 
Descriptive norm   -.00 .98 .01 .93 
Perceived behavioural control    .54 .00*** .56 .00*** 
Self-efficacy   .29 .00*** .27 .00*** 
Organisational-professional conflict   -.05 .69 -.04 .74 
Awareness   .09 .32 .10 .26 
Moderator:       
Moral intensity (MI)   .06 .32 .05 .48 
Cross-product term:       
Attitudes x MI      .02 .47 
Injunctive norm x MI     -.02 .33 
Descriptive norm x MI     .04 .17 
Perceived behavioural control x MI     -.06 .31 
Self-efficacy x MI     -.02 .44 
Organisational-professional  
conflict x MI 
    .02 .57 
Awareness x MI     -.03 .23 
Constant 17.82 19.10 18.90 
R2  .07 .53 .55 
∆ R2 .07 .46 .03 
F-value 1.55 8.66 5.78 
∆ F 1.55 12.30 .74 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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Table H: Moderated hierarchical regression analysis results of the main effects and 
moderating effects of internal auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions (Scenario 3) 
Scenario 3 
Dependent variable:  Intention to blow the whistle 
Control variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B p B p B p 
Age .58 .09* .12 .68 .15 .63 
Gender .26 .62 .06 .89 .21 .65 
Working experience -.22 .56 -.08 .83 -.09 .80 
Client categories -.33 .41 -.20 .56 -.17 .64 
Employment position -.14 .59 -.14 .52 -.11 .64 
Independent variables:       
Attitude    .10 .35 .10 .40 
Injunctive norm   .08 .29 .08 .32 
Descriptive norm   .09 .40 .08 .49 
Perceived behavioural control    .42 .02** .50 .00*** 
Self-efficacy   .19 .03** .18 .04** 
Organisational-professional conflict   -.09 .47 -.13 .30 
Awareness   .06 .51 .05 .60 
Moderator:       
Moral intensity (MI)   .08 .20 .04 .57 
Cross-product term:       
Attitudes x MI      .04 .44 
Injunctive norm x MI     -.05 .08* 
Descriptive norm x MI     .02 .60 
Perceived behavioural control x MI     .01 .85 
Self-efficacy x MI     -.02 .59 
Organisational-professional  
conflict x MI 
    .03 .48 
Awareness x MI     .01 .65 
Constant 17.33 18.53 18.18 
R2  .05 .44 .47 
∆ R2 .05 .39 .03 
F-value 1.22 6.08 4.09 
∆ F 1.22 8.68 .67 
*p<.1, **p<.05,***p<.01 
 
